Friday, September 12, 2008
Modeling Iran
I wrote a comment to this post and liked it enough to turn it into something more. The question is, how should we "model" the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran? This is different, I think, from predicting the behavior of Iran. The prediction is the output of the model, so you need a conception of that country and its government in order to predict its behavior.
The problem, however, is that there is no consensus on the model.
There are two basic opinions of Iran, the first dominant among academic foreign policy experts, journalists, and the rest of the lefty chattering classes and the second among cranky malcontents, wingnut hawks, Israelis, and other regional powers. Not surprisingly, I adhere to the second view.
The first view holds that Iran shapes its foreign policy with more or less the same objectives as the typical nation state, and that it responds to similar stimuli. According to this model of Iranian behavior, the Islamic Republic is aggressive primarily because it feels insecure. It feels insecure because of perceived or actual aggression against it, including by the United States. Therefore, it is unwise of the United States to increase Iran's sense of insecurity, whether by posting troops in adjacent countries or hinting that "all options are on the table." Concessions to Iran will beget concessions from Iran.
The alternative model describes Iran as a revolutionary state, bent on extending its revolution wherever it reasonably can. In this view, revolutionary Iran is not unlike the Communist powers in their early years, including particularly the Soviet Union. If this is your model of the Islamic Republic -- and it is mine -- then Iran will take every concession, bank it, and use it as a starting point for the next confrontation. Therefore, it is wise to minimize concessions to those necessary to achieve tactical objectives and otherwise confine Iran in as small a box as possible.
Further complicating the argument is this: At least one hawkish foreign policy expert I know argues that we do not have a clear enough understanding of the Islamic Republic's internal politics in order to decide on the correct model, and the reason that we do not is that we have no embassy in which to house a nest of spies. Therefore, some concessions to Iran and recognition of it may be necessary in order to build a model that can predict its behavior in the future.
Since I will be on a flight back from "the coast" most of the day, please hash this issue out and provide solutions that I can review when I land.
10 Comments:
By 
, at
Fri Sep 12, 11:28:00 AM:
TH, and THT:
I'm going with Lord Farquat hoping Obama gets in and we do the 70s, complete with the modern-day Jimmy Carter, and he can bitch slap us again.
My approach then, is a media confirmation that the US military has dropped in dark shades, some Orville Reddenbacher, and cold brewski to watch the fireworks. Like martians watching the mushroom clouds in a Far Side comic.
And I'm betting on our modern day version of Reagan, with the wisdom of the mistakes made (Keating 5), and broader world issues in McCain, to bring us through this peacefully, and with honor.
JT
By , at
Fri Sep 12, 11:30:00 AM:
In Mark Bowden's book, "Guests of the Ayatollah", his interviews and research indicate that there was a constant struggle among various factions to get the approval of the Supreme Leader for any action or initiative. There were some rational Iranians that wanted the hostage crisis to end, and try to get the relationship with the US back to some kind of normalcy. Obviously, they lost.
Ayatollah Khomeini is long dead, but the tension between various factions goes on.
1) the para-military factions, such as the Qods force, that are answerable only to Supreme Leader and the Governing Council. Sort of like the SS running parallel to the Wehrmacht in WWII Germany.
2) the 'elected' factions, such as the Dwarf and the parliament
3) The mullahs, who have theological influence in Iran
4) The Supreme Leader and the Governing Council he heads
The fact is, there is no coherent way to model the Iranian behavior because the do not have a coherent government. It is a constant political knife fight inside the government, with getting denounced, imprisoned and maybe dead as the door prize for losing an argument.
Good luck trying to figure out what those rug merchants will do next. I'm sure that Thomas Friedman has a book in the works that will explain it all.
-David
By 
GreenmanTim, at
Fri Sep 12, 11:31:00 AM:
I find it difficult to imagine that the only things preventing us from housing a nest of spies in Iran is the lack of diplomatic cover. That is the conventional way, surely, but is that all that explains our apparent lack of sufficient intelligence assets in the Islamic Republic of Iran? DF82, want to help us out, here?
By , at
Fri Sep 12, 12:37:00 PM:
For some interesting listening on the subject, try this podcast with Bruce Bueno De Mesquita.
By Dawnfire82, at
Fri Sep 12, 01:06:00 PM:
"Further complicating the argument is this: At least one hawkish foreign policy expert I know argues that we do not have a clear enough understanding of the Islamic Republic's internal politics in order to decide on the correct model, and the reason that we do not is that we have no embassy in which to house a nest of spies. Therefore, some concessions to Iran and recognition of it may be necessary in order to build a model that can predict its behavior in the future."
I can't stress how terrible of an idea that is.
Embassies are established on three principles: extra-territoriality, diplomatic immunity, and reciprocation.
Therefore, if we establish an embassy in Iran then they will expect to establish one in Washington. Doing so gives them the ability to insert Revolutionary Guardsmen and even Hezb Allah footsoldiers as 'diplomatic officers' into our country. Oh, and they get diplomatic immunity and diplomatic bags with which to transport wads of cash, plastic explosives, propaganda, encoded instructions to operatives, radio intercept equipment, and whetever else they can get away with.
That is incredibly stupid.
Greenman: Always nice to be asked by name to pitch in... it feeds the ego.
Everyone knows about our images capability. It was impressive back in the 60s, and it's only gotten better since then. That's why they hide all their nuclear stuff underground and shield it. Not only can we not see what's happening there but thermal patterns and other things, like detectable radioactivity, that might tip us off to the routine and type of activities are blocked from satellite view. Some things, like conventional forces maneuvers, cannot be so hidden. If they ever decide to mass up and invade someone, we'll see them coming. The trick then is to tell when they're serious and when they aren't. (the 1973 Egyptian invasion was initially successful because while Israeli intelligence saw what they were doing, it was like the 6th mobilization of the year and they didn't take it seriously until it was only a few hours from H-hour)
Without diplomatic cover, human intelligence operatives are considered 'illegals,' as in they are inside the country and operating illegally according to international norms and rules. Naturally, it happens all the time, but it's considered dangerous because if you are caught you are caught. There's no embassy working to save you, and you'll probably be disavowed anyway. In many places, this means execution preceded by brutal interrogation.
Historically, the US has shied away from using illegals because our enemies are almost always full-on or pseudo-police states who spy on foreigners as a matter of course. China, Syria, and Iran all do this, and even relatively more benign nations like Pakistan, Egypt, and Russia. It's not uncommon for individuals with connections to the US government (military or otherwise) who are innocently traveling through these countries to be shadowed, wiretapped, or have their rooms rifled through. I received an interesting briefing on this very phenomenon from a counterintelligence Major back in the day.
So basically, using illegals against Iran is high-risk and low-payoff. It probably makes more sense to acquire the services of natives, who can avoid a lot of the crap aimed at foreigners, who already have international connections and can be reached abroad. That's what I would guess is the source of most of our human intelligence in Iran.
Another primary intelligence source would be signals. Without divulging any national secrets, a *lot* of information ends up in the airwaves somehow, and a *lot* of it can be listened to by foreign powers. They know that we listen, and they take certain countermeasures. Some of them work well, and some of them don't.
So we can watch what they do on the surface if we know where to look, and we can hear much of what they say to one another over the airwaves, and we can poach humint sources abroad. There are probably some variant collection activities that differ not so much in style as in specificity that are conducted by the military.
Caveat: I never worked against Iran.
Hope that was as helpful as you expected.
By , at
Fri Sep 12, 02:03:00 PM:
But there is a model of Iran: Islam and the example of Muhammad. Too many discussions of Iran falter because they treat it as a European nation-state, as if Islam were an incidental factor in what it does. Such a politically correct approach is, in my opinion, a fatal error. Islam is central to everything it does. If you instead ask yourself "what would Muhammad do", Iran's actions make a great deal more sense.
By Whiskey, at
Fri Sep 12, 06:33:00 PM:
David/Bowden/Randian all have it correct.
Iran is a tribal state, with permanent factions. Any faction can "win" using the Khomeni model to start a conflict with the US to discredit and kill domestic opponents seeking to reach out to the US.
This is political reality inside Iran. It is unlikely to change, ever.
This pretty much guarantees Iran when it has nukes will give them to AQ to provoke a US response, and so let one faction attack the other as "pro-US."
Khomeni's take-over of the Embassy came when the Soviets and their client, Saddam, menaced Iran and indeed, Saddam invaded a year into it and nearly toppled Khomeni. Who was not stupid and understood the risk. He just wanted to eliminate domestic opponents more.
That's the reality.
By , at
Sat Sep 13, 12:03:00 AM:
It seems to me that the American Left has for years insisted upon seeing our enemies as "people just like us, who want the same things we do." Go back to the "buy the world a Coke" thing. I have travelled around, and hell no, not everyone is the same as us. Not everyone wants what we want, not everyone is risk averse to the same extent we are, not everyone thinks along the same timlelines we do. There are people in this world who are entirely alien to our way of thinking, and the left is so comfortable with that concept that they refuse to even acknowledge it.
Every election lefties predictably announce that they will leave th ecountry if (insert name) is elected. They never do, although for most of them the price of a ticket is negligable. In 1982 my ship picked up a boat of Vietnamese refugees who had, literally, risked everything just for the chance - no guarantee - of obtaining a better life.
By , at
Sat Sep 13, 07:25:00 PM:
Steve, I'm on the Left (albeit close to center) and your remark is right on the mark IMO. However, I don't think those on the Right have any better insight (in fact, much worse) about what those Others actually want in their lives. It's not stupid ignorance, for it is in fact quite difficult to understand another country's people in a predictive way, and nigh impossible for a large group of people (such as America's policy makers and doers) to attain such an understanding.
We should attempt no such model of Iran, nor pretend as a group we have some accurate understanding of them. We may create a model that works in many respects, but it will almost certainly be wrong in crucial aspects because that is the inherent nature of models. No, instead, our guidance should come from Iranians themselves -- those who have lived, worked, and were born there.
Like Demaratus in Herodotus' telling of Thermopylae, the King can receive honest counsel, but it will be up to him to comprehend and act on it (which Xerxes was not able to do).
By Dawnfire82, at
Sat Sep 13, 08:10:00 PM:
"No, instead, our guidance should come from Iranians themselves -- those who have lived, worked, and were born there. "
That gives no special insight in to the performance of government in international affairs than does being born in the US predict how the US will act in international affairs.
