Sunday, October 16, 2005
Metrics
John Robb, who writes a blog that many more people would read if he put up a Sitemeter and a blogroll, opined yesterday in the New York Times that "[b]y most measurements, the [Iraq] war is going badly." His evidence:
Via his blog, Robb has a link to his own analysis (pdf) of the size of the insurgency, which he believes is many times CENTOM's estimate of "no more than 20,000," (pdf) and generally holds to the view that numerical measures indicate that the Coalition is losing (Thomas P.B. Barnett critiques Robb here, and Robb responds here).
For my own part, I do not agree with Robb's characterization of America's victory condition (achievement of "a monopoly on violence in Iraq"). That is certainly the long term objective of the government of Iraq, but it is largely unnecessary to the accomplishment of the Coalition's strategic objectives.
However, if one were to look for ways to measure the political influence of the insurgency rather than simply toting up the number of car bombs detonated, one could do worse than look at its failure to have any impact on yesterday's referendum. There were 347 attacks on voters and polling places during January's elections, virtually all of which were foiled. Yesterday there were 13 attacks, notwithstanding the insurgency's stated objective to disrupt the balloting.
There will be more violence in the weeks to come, but that does not mean that the insurgency is winning strategically. It is often thus: 1943 was a much more violent year than 1942, even though the tide turned against the Axis at every front in 1942, and 1863 was a much bloodier year than 1862, even though history reveals that the Lost Cause was truly lost by September 1863. Al Qaeda knows that its prestige is at stake in Iraq, and that if the government of Iraq and the Coalition crushes its organization there it will suffer a huge strategic reversal. One might well argue whether the United States invited this fight on purpose or stumbled in to it, but even if the latter we must recognize that it is an opportunity. The failure of the chattering classes to understand this point baffles me every day.
The Sunni rejectionists will also continue to blow stuff up, because for them the violence is a negotiation tactic. Whether the constitution is ratified or not, the "last minute compromise" puts a lot of pressure on the new parliament to be elected in December, which will have another crack at key parts of the constitution. The Sunni insurgency will continue to try to influence the participants to achieve the best possible result for the dispossessed Sunni tribes in the center of the country. But that has not stopped Sunnis from legitimizing democratic politics in the current referendum, and it does not by any means prove strategic defeat for the government of Iraq. Indeed, do not forget that the United States postponed -- and I use the term advisedly -- its own civil insurgency by more than 70 years through deft compromise. Our own constitution was but a "first draft" that did not resolve many of the central controversies of the founding era. Iraq will resolve its central controversies much more quickly.
Insurgent attacks have been increasing steadily since the invasion, and the insurgents' methods are growing more sophisticated. American casualty rates remain high despite an increasingly experienced force and improvements in armor. The insurgents have also radically expanded their campaign of violence to include Iraqi troops, police officers, government officials and Shiite civilians. Since the American military's objective is to gain a monopoly on violence in Iraq, these developments indicate that it has sustained the commercial equivalent of a rapid loss in market share.
Via his blog, Robb has a link to his own analysis (pdf) of the size of the insurgency, which he believes is many times CENTOM's estimate of "no more than 20,000," (pdf) and generally holds to the view that numerical measures indicate that the Coalition is losing (Thomas P.B. Barnett critiques Robb here, and Robb responds here).
For my own part, I do not agree with Robb's characterization of America's victory condition (achievement of "a monopoly on violence in Iraq"). That is certainly the long term objective of the government of Iraq, but it is largely unnecessary to the accomplishment of the Coalition's strategic objectives.
However, if one were to look for ways to measure the political influence of the insurgency rather than simply toting up the number of car bombs detonated, one could do worse than look at its failure to have any impact on yesterday's referendum. There were 347 attacks on voters and polling places during January's elections, virtually all of which were foiled. Yesterday there were 13 attacks, notwithstanding the insurgency's stated objective to disrupt the balloting.
There will be more violence in the weeks to come, but that does not mean that the insurgency is winning strategically. It is often thus: 1943 was a much more violent year than 1942, even though the tide turned against the Axis at every front in 1942, and 1863 was a much bloodier year than 1862, even though history reveals that the Lost Cause was truly lost by September 1863. Al Qaeda knows that its prestige is at stake in Iraq, and that if the government of Iraq and the Coalition crushes its organization there it will suffer a huge strategic reversal. One might well argue whether the United States invited this fight on purpose or stumbled in to it, but even if the latter we must recognize that it is an opportunity. The failure of the chattering classes to understand this point baffles me every day.
The Sunni rejectionists will also continue to blow stuff up, because for them the violence is a negotiation tactic. Whether the constitution is ratified or not, the "last minute compromise" puts a lot of pressure on the new parliament to be elected in December, which will have another crack at key parts of the constitution. The Sunni insurgency will continue to try to influence the participants to achieve the best possible result for the dispossessed Sunni tribes in the center of the country. But that has not stopped Sunnis from legitimizing democratic politics in the current referendum, and it does not by any means prove strategic defeat for the government of Iraq. Indeed, do not forget that the United States postponed -- and I use the term advisedly -- its own civil insurgency by more than 70 years through deft compromise. Our own constitution was but a "first draft" that did not resolve many of the central controversies of the founding era. Iraq will resolve its central controversies much more quickly.
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Mon Oct 17, 07:26:00 AM:
