Thursday, October 13, 2005
Connections
From this evening Stratfor letter:
"At this moment, it is possible to make the constitutional process into a
container for diverse Iraqi interests. It is also possible to see a point
where the Sunni Baathists would turn on the jihadists in order to protect
their political position. But all of this hinges on the guarantees that are
provided by each side, and the ability and willingness of the United States
to compel compliance with those guarantees. The paradox is that the most
likely path to a successful withdrawal from Iraq is the perception that the
United States is going to stay there forever -- and can do it. But as Bush
weakens in Washington, the ability of various Iraqi factions to rely on U.S.
guarantees declines.
"Geopolitics teaches the interconnectedness of events. The current American
strategy requires sufficient stability to be generated in Iraq to permit a
U.S. military withdrawal. That requires that the United States must be taken
seriously as a military force. But the weaker Bush is -- for whatever
reason, fair or not -- the less credible becomes his pledge to stay the
course. There are few parallels between Iraq and Vietnam save this: the
political climate in Washington determines the seriousness with which
American power is taken on the battlefield."
Comments?
(Via BlackBerry)
2 Comments:
By 
, at
Thu Oct 13, 08:00:00 PM:
We disagree with the main point of this.
Within Iraq, the main groups will have to achieve a balance-of-power among themselves in the long-run. The longer the U.S. is a guarantor, the longer the U.S. will be a guarantor. Better to let the Iraqis find their balance among themselves. If the Sunnis look to the U.S. to be their guarantor, it is also possible that they could play the other side and simultaneously continue the insurgency, blaming it on a fringe element over which they will say they have no control.
Where U.S. staying-power is very important is to persuade the Shi'ites to be a U.S. rather than an Iranian ally. Thus we see the U.S. guarantor role more important for the Shi'ites than the Sunnis.
Please read our blog posting "13th hour changes. Why?" for our analysis of the latest developments on the Iraqi constitution. Conclusion: these changes are mostly about lining up Sunnis as government coalition partners after the December elections. But if the Sunni insurgency is settled next year, the next "civil war" in Iraq might then be against the religious Shi'ite militias.
Westhawk
By 
Cardinalpark, at
Thu Oct 13, 08:33:00 PM:
Friedman's analogy to Vietnam is both wrong and historically asinine. We stayed in Vietnam for over 10 years. LBJ withdrew from the 1968 election. And we stayed for 7 more years. We lost 50,000 men and some estimate we killed well over 1 million Vietnamese. So electoral politics in Washington patently DID NOT chase us out of Vietnam. The antiwar candidates LOST in 1968 and 1972 -- particularly decimated in 1972. This illusion of how and why Vietnam came to an end is simply wrong.
In Iraq, where we have been for less than 3 years, have defeated the enemy and captured Saddam, and lost less than 3,000 men - this after upending the Taliban in Afghanistan, and withstanding an attack from Arabia in New York and Washington -- we have definitely won.
I would remind the clueless antiIraq-ers that they similarly bellyached about the Afghan constitutional process. Now these jokers are whining about the breakout of democratic politic in Iraq. THESE PEOPLE ARE IGNORANT. There is no other plausible explanation. Friedman is similarly off the rails. He too has BDS.
