Tuesday, April 08, 2008
Al-Sadr's ceasefire and the Iranian game
Any discussion of our policy in Iraq requires a "theory of Iran," meaning a characterization of Iran's interventions in Iraq to date, its objectives over the next few years, and its national interest as it relates to Iraq. Is the Islamic Republic a disruptive power that has projected force through proxies and even directly with the objective of forcing out the United States and "Finlandizing" the Shi'ite government in Baghdad, or is it an essentially conservative regime that does what it does primarily to forestall or deter American military action against it? In the former view, the ongoing confrontation with Iran is a reason -- either incremental or fundamental -- for persisting in Iraq. In the latter view, Iran can help us extract ourselves from a quagmire.
McClatchy Newspapers Baghdad bureau chief, Leila Fadel, has written an apparent news story that pretty much assumes into evidence the most benign possible theory of Iran. Read these paragraphs, and then hoist your jaw off the table (bold emphasis added):
Army Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker were critical of Iran when they testified Tuesday before the Senate, barely giving credit for an Iranian-brokered cease-fire that curbed the killing after a week of Shiite-on-Shiite bloodshed in southern Iraq and Baghdad.
As they spoke, firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr threatened to unleash his Mahdi Army militia against U.S. and Iraqi forces. Once again, it was Iran that stepped into the political vacuum and urged a halt to militia attacks into the heavily fortified Green Zone, where U.S. and Iraqi officials, including Petraeus and Crocker, have their offices.
It seems to me that Fadel has an exceedingly shallow grasp of the Iranian game. Giving Iran "credit" for the ceasefire is like giving the Soviets credit for "ending" the Yom Kippur war before its Egyptian and Syrian proxies were destroyed.
Having armed and trained the Mahdi "army," Iran does not want to see its most important asset inside Iraq either win a decisive victory over the government (however unlikely that might be) or get ripped to shreds. If the Mahdi army weakened the Maliki government too much, the United States might throw in the towel and back a Sunni restoration. That is the last thing Tehran wants because it resurrects Iran's worst nightmare, the possibility in the future of another ruinous conventional war with Iraq. If, however, the Maliki government and the United States wiped the deck with the Mahdi thugs -- much more likely -- Iran would lose its principal means for exerting influence inside Iraq. Tehran's hope for a weak, Finlandized Shi'ite government would be less likely than a relatively strong coalition Arab/Kurd government backed by the United States for decades to come. The best result for Iran, therefore, is to preserve the Mahdi army as a constant threat that can be rolled out as necessary to destabilize, threaten, or deter the government of Iraq. It is therefore not wonder that Iran pressured al-Sadr to declare a ceasefire, and hardly something for which an American general should give "credit."
3 Comments:
By 
, at
Wed Apr 09, 09:57:00 AM:
Yesterday, 143 years ago Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox.
And not one single story in the papers praising the South for ending those hostilities.
I guess Ms. Faidel was busy covering other stories.
By 
joated, at
Wed Apr 09, 02:12:00 PM:
This was one of those times when the US and Iraqi forces should have accepted no cease fire but an unconditional surrender.
By Ray, at
Thu Apr 10, 11:52:00 PM:
I'm more cynical. I don't think Iran wants a Finlandized Iraq. I think Iran wants an Iraqi proxy state, similar to what Hezbollah/Syria were trying to achieve in Lebanon. From that POV, the reason Iran arranged a ceasefire now is purely tactical -- can anybody think of a more convenient time for the Mahdi Army to throw down with the Iraqi Army?
Why might October 2008 work better for Iran than April? Discuss :)
