Thursday, August 04, 2005
Use of Overwhelming Force
I walked past him and began to think a little bit on the topic. So here's the question for TH readers: what provocation should be required for the US to consider seriously the use of overwhelming, meaning nuclear, weaponry? Given that we are 60 years past the initial use of atomic weaponry in conflict, when it was used to bring an unprecedentedly bloody conflict to an end, and the Cold War is 15 years past, what should our policy be given the different nature of current threats?
7 Comments:
By 
, at
Thu Aug 04, 09:50:00 AM:
I concur with Jamulblog, except that in the first hypothetical I would remove any limit on the casualty ratio.
By , at
Thu Aug 04, 10:28:00 AM:
All very well. But let's say that a suitcase bomb goes off in a major American city. The damage, though relatively small, amounts to thousands killed, tens of thousands seriously injured and property loss in the billions. Whom to attack?
Six weeks later, so-so evidence emerges that the financial trial leads to certain Sudi princes, a training camp in Pakistan. Transit and consultations through Eastern Syria. Technology sold from North Korea (maybe) and the plutonium has the signature of material made in France.
And then?
By 
Jason Pappas, at
Thu Aug 04, 11:22:00 AM:
The nuclear arsenal should be used as a deterrent--used as a response to a nuclear attack. Today’s conventional weapons can do considerable damage and are appropriate for most purposes. But if we are to maintain a credible threat we must respond to a nuclear bomb by using ours.
We will have to pick a proxy target if the enemy doesn’t have a precise location. This includes locations that are valuable to the enemy or those that aid and comfort the enemy. For this reason, we should sever relations with several Islamic countries and declare them hostile powers. Iran is already in the category and should be considered a default target. Saudi Arabia should be put in this category and I suggest changing our policy now.
Currently, we are failing to establish a deterrent. Our policy is to win them over. We try to liberate their countries, apologize for perceived insults, etc. We are standing midway between a policy of appeasement & surrender and a hawk-like policy of deterrence & war. This may be the best we can hope for in the short term but we need intellectual leadership to lay the ground for the future.
By , at
Thu Aug 04, 11:47:00 AM:
A response to an actual attack on us or our Allies (defined as short list of say, the UK, Australia, and few others, and excluding France, Germany, Canada, etc.) or as a pre-emptive where there's overwhelming evidence that we're going to be attacked.
Absent that, I think dropping a bunker buster on selected Syrian, Iranian, Saudi, Yemeni or N Korean sites would serve as a strong reminder that although it's really difficult to identify the "state sponsors", we know damn well where the cash is coming from.
Time to flush out the fat, wealthy "holy" men living the secret and decadent Western lifestyles at our expense in the ME.
It's an awful scenario to contemplate, but less awful to me than the mushroom cloud near my 'hood.
By , at
Thu Aug 04, 01:38:00 PM:
Garrett laid out the difficulty or identifying the potential nuke target when the nuke attack is a terrorist action. Obviously if North Korea, Iran or other country launches nuke bearing ICBMs toward our country, the retalitory nation is obvious. However, I believe that these are the only deterrence cases. When nukes were used against Japan, the enemy nation was well known and the nukes were used primarily to speed up the end of a war where Japan was already a defeated nation. Today the war is not with specific nations but with an ideology that spans many nations including our own and most of the other western nations. There are some that believe that nukes are already in this country being prepared for specific targets. What are the possible targets for retalitory strikes if one of these nukes is triggered and would the retalitory strike (s) be certain to end the war on terrorism? There is always the possibility that nuclear strikes could unlease the dreaded nuclear holocaust if other countries with substantial armament (Russia, China, India, etc.) join in. I think these are difficult questions with not easy answers.
By Cardinalpark, at
Thu Aug 04, 03:08:00 PM:
Interesting responses to this point. An observation and assertion or two:
1) Truman's first use of the atomic bomb was NOT in response to the Japanese using a similarly devastating weapon. And in my judgment, its use was nonetheless brilliant and morally correct. Within days, the war was over. So the no-first-use policy doesn't foot with actual experience. I have my doubts about anybody who concludes differently about Truman's decision.
2) A first user of nuclear weaponry against the US is unlikely to leave a signature, unless it is a massive icbm assault. Much more likely, is a non state actor with a rogue weapon, financed and supplied by rogue state actors. So who ya gonna bomb? Morally appealing to say we'll wait for an attack on us, but wrong as defense policy. Also wrong, I think, to commit to using atomic weaponry in the event of an attack on an ally. If North Korea launches a nuclear missile at Japan, should we be committed to a nuclear assault on North Korea? How would China feel about that?
If Tehran launches a nuclear assault on Israel or Egypt, should the US be committed to reponding in kind on our ally's behalf? It is not clear to me that the threat is a deterrent, but it does limit flexibility.
3) Is there value in being unpredictable? And ruthless? Should we not have a policy per se but instead maintain maximum flexibility?
By Chris, at
Fri Aug 05, 01:42:00 PM:
Deterrence only works when the threat is spelled out beforehand. MAD was an effective system because both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had committed publicly to a full exchange of nuclear weapons in response to any nuclear provocation.
I sincerely hope that behind the scenes, our diplomats have been whispering in the ears of the leaders of those states who are known to offer aid and cover to terrorists. In case of a nuclear incident in this country, these states must know that we will hold them culpable and respond accordingly.
If we are not covertly engaging in this type of brinksmanship, then we are wasting our time. State actors will have no incentive to worry about what activities their proxies are engaged in. The threat of overwhelming nuclear response will encourage these states to come clean in the event of a nuclear attack on the U.S.
Gerard Vanderleun had an excellent post on this subject.
