Monday, August 13, 2007
Nomenclature, again: What is the relationship between Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al Qaeda Central?
A little more than a month ago I wrote about the complaints of lefty readers of the New York Times that it was conflating "al Qaeda in Mesopotamia" and bin Laden's organization, often referred to as "Al Qaeda Central." As these complaining readers well understood, the relationship of these two organizations is important politically and practically because it has an enormous bearing on whether we ought to persist in Iraq even if the government of that country does not mature in accordance with the American electoral calendar. Those who favor rapid withdrawal as a matter of principle do not want the American public to think that the enemy in Iraq is derivative of bin Laden's organization, because that will hurt the political appeal of their argument. Supporters of continuing the mission notwithstanding the political mess inside Iraq believe that defeating, or retreating in the face of, al Qaeda in Mesopotamia will have important consequences for the wider war.
Not surprisingly, Christopher Hitchens is in the second camp:
Over the past few months, I have been debating Roman Catholics who differ from their Eastern Orthodox brethren on the nature of the Trinity, Protestants who are willing to quarrel bitterly with one another about election and predestination, with Jews who cannot concur about a covenant with God, and with Muslims who harbor bitter disagreements over the discrepant interpretations of the Quran. Arcane as these disputes may seem, and much as I relish seeing the faithful fight among themselves, the believers are models of lucidity when compared to the hair-splitting secularists who cannot accept that al-Qaida in Mesopotamia is a branch of al-Qaida itself.
Objections to this self-evident fact take one of two forms. It is argued, first, that there was no such organization before the coalition intervention in Iraq. It is argued, second, that the character of the gang itself is somewhat autonomous from, and even independent of, the original group proclaimed by Osama Bin Laden. These objections sometimes, but not always, amount to the suggestion that the "real" fight against al-Qaida is, or should be, not in Iraq but in Afghanistan. (I say "not always," because many of those who argue the difference are openly hostile to the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan as well as to the presence of coalition soldiers in Iraq.)
The facts as we have them are not at all friendly to this view of the situation, whether it be the "hard" view that al-Qaida terrorism is a "resistance" to Western imperialism or the "soft" view that we have only created the monster in Iraq by intervening there.
No, the facts are not friendly at all. Read the whole thing.
6 Comments:
By 
antithaca, at
Mon Aug 13, 08:08:00 PM:
I've got to believe that Mr. Hitchens (I'm an admirer BTW) challenges a great many conventions over there at slate.com judging by the readers of the magazine that I know.
By Ray, at
Tue Aug 14, 12:00:00 AM:
What does it take to get recognized as a branch of Al Qaeda these days? Is it sufficient to
1) Swear an oath of allegiance to Al Qaeda and its leadership (check).
2) Put Al Qaeda prominently in your name (check)
3) Import Al Qaeda personnel to be your commanders, trainers, and foot soldiers (check)?
Evidently not. By this standard, the failures of the US Army in Iraq, which is a completely separate organization from the US Army in America, cannot be rightly placed at any American politician's door.
By 
, at
Tue Aug 14, 12:55:00 AM:
Radical AL QUEDA terrorists who kill the inocent are not terrorists according to the liberals but parents who want to remove their kids from school becuase they dont want their kid learning SEX EDUCATION,EVOLUTION and ENVIROMENTAL BRAINWASHING are terrorists
By , at
Tue Aug 14, 03:35:00 AM:
By tm, at
Tue Aug 14, 09:05:00 AM:
By this standard, the failures of the US Army in Iraq, which is a completely separate organization from the US Army in America, cannot be rightly placed at any American politician's door.
The question of identity here operational integration. If the US army in Iraq leaves, we can send the US army in the US. They can be sent on the same mission, and follow the same leader.
The similar question for AQI is whether they would continue to attack US targets if the US left Iraq. Everything else is irrelevant; whether Zarqawi communicated with OBL is only relevant inasmuch as it supports the argument that AQI is operationally integrated into AQ and would share their mission of attacking the U.S. homeland and targets abroad.
By Dawnfire82, at
Tue Aug 14, 06:27:00 PM:
"The similar question for AQI is whether they would continue to attack US targets if the US left Iraq."
And here I always thought that 'global jihad' was self-explanatory.
