Sunday, April 15, 2007
Actions speak louder than words: Nuclear proliferation reveals the real threat in the Middle East
The New York Times has a big story on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, "Eye on Iran, Rivals Pursuing Nuclear Power." There is not much new in the story for people who follow these things closely, but the very fact of the revived quest for nuclear technology in the Middle East does reveal something about Arab and Muslim geopolitical fears, propaganda notwithstanding. Israel, obviously, has had nuclear weapons for more than 35 years, but the Jewish Bomb did not inspire a rush to develop dual-use technology. Oh, sure, Libya and Iraq had programs of varying credibility -- Iraq came closest, only to have it shut down after a couple of defectors tipped off the UN inspectors in 1994 -- but Israel's nuclear weapons have been fundamentally stabilizing insofar as they have greatly reduced the risk of total war among Israel and its neighbors. This is for the obvious reason that with the arguable exception of the Palestinian territories, Israel is not expansionist. The Arabs in the region apparently do not regard a Persian Bomb with quite the same equanimity.
3 Comments:
By 
Escort81, at
Sun Apr 15, 04:10:00 PM:
Israel started developing its nuclear capability during a period of time when, at least on paper and looking at the order of battle quantitatively, it had serious match up problems with the Arab armies it faced. A nuclear deterrent was the logical method of countering a conventional forces imbalance, much as NATO did against the more numerous Soviet forces in Europe for four decades of the Cold War (and in the West, we always felt that deterrence had a good chance of working).
Maybe an expert in sophistry would now say that since Israel no longer is on the short end of a mismatch in conventional forces (when factoring in both quantity and quality), the Israeli nuclear capability should stand down.
Even though Israel has never declared its nukes, everyone understands that they exist, probably in greater numbers than in France and the U.K., so the deterrent effect should be the same as if the weapons were declared.
The question is, will Iran be deterred? Is the leadership "rational" enough to understand that as much as it might want to have the "Jewish Entity" cease to exist on soil that is holy to Islam, a nuclear first strike against Israel also wipes out nearly all of Iran, because of a certain Israeli second strike? Does the theory of MAD still hold true?
As an aside, has anyone read a good recent article on Iran's delivery capabilities, assuming it develops a weapon that is deliverable?
By Dawnfire82, at
Mon Apr 16, 11:13:00 PM:
"Is the leadership "rational" enough to understand that as much as it might want to have the "Jewish Entity" cease to exist on soil that is holy to Islam, a nuclear first strike against Israel also wipes out nearly all of Iran, because of a certain Israeli second strike? Does the theory of MAD still hold true?"
Two points. 1) MAD only (theoretically) works when both powers have *secure* second strike capability. If Iran think that they can destroy Israel's ability to retaliate, or even retaliate proportionally, then it is conceivable that they will do so. Especially if there is a detrimental time factor at work. (i.e. the nuclear balance [or some other critical element] will or is already changing to Iran's disadvantage in the future)
2.) Our concepts of rationality don't really apply to fanatically religious theocrats. Triggering 'the end of the world' might be a perfectly rational objective to them. Recall, this is the same nation which charged battalions of unarmed children into minefields and fortified machine guns to clear them for real formations.
By Escort81, at
Tue Apr 17, 01:51:00 PM:
A -
Thanks for the response.
Israel will most likely always have more warheads than Iran, and I believe it has the capacity to launch a second strike from a submarine (which was always the strongest leg of the U.S. triad of air, sea and land deterrence during the Cold War). If there is an asymmetry, it is that Iran probably could not deliver a second strike in its early years of membership in the nuclear weapons club, but I somehow doubt that Israel would launch a nuclear first strike.
Your second point speaks to the really unknowable factor and the area of major concern. During the Cold War, many viewed the Soviet Union as an implacable foe, but the expectation was that the Soviet leadership would act rationally, in the Western sense of the word. As late as the mid-1960s, the Soviets had a major conventional advantage in the European theatre but a huge disadvantage worldwide in terms of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and would not risk making a conventional incursion into Western Europe.
The Soviets suffered nearly a million casualties, military and civilian, in the Battle of Stalingrad, during the long siege by the Nazi army (that total is almost as much as the total of all U.S. military casualties for all U.S. wars combined). Iran's casualties during the Iraq war were perhaps even higher, but of course the human wave tactics you mention show some disregard for the value the leadership places on the life of its own combatants.
I suppose we could pose two questions:
1) Is there a small leadership group in Iran that will have the authority to launch a first strike and are they fanatical enough to do so?
2) Would the clear majority of Iranian people be willing to support the decision of the leadership to launch a first strike, knowing that it means the end of Iran because of a retaliatory second strike?
If the answers are yes to 1 and no to 2, then there is a disconnect between the people and the leadership, and there is some hope that a regime that is already regarded as not all that secure could be displaced.
If the answers are no and no, then it is Cold War II.
If the answers are yes and yes, well, we have a real problem on our hands.
