Sunday, July 23, 2006
Splitting Syria from Iran and the strategy deficit
Last Tuesday, our co-blogger Cardinalpark asked whether it might not be possible to split Syria from Hezbollah and Iran:
So here's the diplomatic tour de force that changes the equation if it can be orchestrated. Can the US and its Arab allies convince Syria, Hezbollah's protector, to sell out Hezbollah's leadership -- now in hiding between Lebanon and Syria? Hafez would have done it. Will Bashar? If he has the foresight to do it, and abandons Hezbollah and Iran in favor of the US, he will preserve and enhance his leadership of Syria and allow both Lebanon and Syria to move into the future. This is his best card, the best he's got.
It seems impossible certainly. But imagine that in several days, Hezbollah's fighting capacity will be eroded, its weapons inventories declining and its ability to resupply under great pressure. It will call out for assistance from Syria and Iran. What will they do? My view? Not much. Talk cease fire. Hezbollah will be in a vice. And then what does Syria have? A resurgent Israel, and a very weak and disloyal Iranian ally -- an ally that was probably prepared to see Syria go down in flames.
And they may have succeeded in only one, historically unprecedented development -- getting Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to support Israel (albeit tacitly) against the Persian incursion into the Levant. A dream scenario, undoubtedly. Wishful thinking perhaps. But Israel has seen its share of miracles you know.
On Thursday, Thomas Friedman made much the same point, only less eloquently.
Today, the New York Times reports on its front page that this is precisely the American diplomatic strategy.
As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice heads to Israel on Sunday, Bush administration officials say they recognize Syria is central to any plans to resolve the crisis in the Middle East, and they are seeking ways to peel Syria away from its alliance of convenience with Iran.
In interviews, senior administration officials said they had no plans right now to resume direct talks with the Syrian government. President Bush recalled his ambassador to Syria, Margaret Scobey, after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, in February 2005. Since then, America’s contacts with Damascus have been few, and the administration has imposed an array of sanctions on Syria’s government and banks, and frozen the assets of Syrian officials implicated in Mr. Hariri’s killing.
The question is, how to make this happen?
Ultimately, there is really only thing the Assad regime wants, and that is survival. That implies that the United States and Israel can get a lot from Syria if they "guarantee" that they will not attack Syria or subvert Assad's government. There are, though, at least three hurdles that will have to be overcome, and at least one significant long-term strategic problem.
First, we would have to have a credible mechanism for monitoring Syrian compliance with any deal to turn on Hezbollah and its mullah overlords in Tehran. How would we know that Syria will comply? Is there a monitoring mechanism that we can trust to work and that Syria can tolerate?
Second, Syria will need assurances that the United States will stick to its commitment not to undermine the Syrian regime in the future. How will it know that our policy won't change at the turn of the next administration? In order to turn on Hezbollah in its hour of need, Syria will need some continuing point of leverage against Israel and the United States. What would that need to be? How will we put Syria in a position to "trust" that we will not turn on them?
Third, in order for this to work, the Assad regime must fear Israel and the United States more than it fears Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed subversion. In the current climate, I'm not sure how we will be able to manufacture that fear. Suggestions, whether realistic or merely entertaining, are hereby solicited.
The long-term strategic problem would derive from success: we will have cut a deal to keep a terrible fascist regime in power. If we seal that pact with the devil and grab the immediate benefit of isolating Iran and killing off Hezbollah, what will we have done to the essential strategy for fundamental change in the Middle East? A deal to preserve Assad in power really would be the death-knell of the democratization strategy, which I believe is a critical part of the long-term war against the jihadis.
Looked at this way, one gets the sense that we do not have a strategic framework through which to examine both Israel's current war with Hezbollah and the wider struggle against the Sunni jihad. This failure of imagination is not limited to the Bush administration. The New York Times, which one can usually count on to reproduce the latest thinking from out-of-power diplomats and academics, published a fascinating graphic today which purports to diagram the conflicts in the Middle East but which ignores the struggle that has defined our interventions there in the past five years. Why no mention of al Qaeda?
If we don't integrate these conflicts with the war on the Islamist jihad, we will be lost.
14 Comments:
By 
, at
Sun Jul 23, 10:45:00 AM:
I agree with Sirius_sir' point and please note the following from Across the Bay
http://beirut2bayside.blogspot.com/ Magnus Ranstorp, the Swedish specialist* on Hezbollah, talked to Georges Malbrunot of Le Figaro about Hezbollah's kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers. Here's a translation of Ranstorp's answer:
"Such a decision is taken by its head, Hassan Nasrallah, within the Shura Qarar, the highest decision-making body of the movement. It consists of seven members, two of whom are Iranians attached to the Iranian embassy in Beirut, and who are tied to the intelligence services of Tehran. Through them, Iran knows exactly what Hezbollah is doing, especially when the decision goes beyond the normal red lines, such as attacking Israel outside the Shebaa Farms. In this case, Hezbollah also consults with the Syrians, because the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers carries implications for Syria's security. The consultations with Damascus are often done through the liaison Hassan Khalil, who is in contact with the military intelligence services in Damascus."
Syrian Information Minister Mohsen Bilal said in an interview published on Sunday.
"If Israel invades Lebanon over ground and comes near to us, Syria will not sit tight. She will join the conflict," He told newspaper ABC.
I think that any attempt to peel Syria away from Iran is misguided as the only solution is to send them both to hell in a basket. And my question is:
If nuking Nagasaki and Hiroshima was justified because it ended the war with a lower number of casualties tahn through conventional combat, why would not the same logic apply to Syria and Iran?!!
Luc
By 
C. Owen Johnson, at
Sun Jul 23, 10:50:00 AM:
I'm afraid to don't quite understand this line: "A deal to preserve Assad in power really would be the death-knell of the democratization strategy"?
Why exactly? The democratization strategy does not depend on making everyone democratic now or on refusing to deal with regimes that are not notably democratic: ie Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan. If making deal with Assad's regime that removes their malevolent influence strengthens democracy in Iraq and Lebanon, how can this be said to the "deathknell" of that strategy?
Further, the current key to the strategic question in the Mid-East is Iran, not Syria. Iran, unlike Syria, is pretty well placed to become a functioning democracy. If that were to happen, Syria would be irrelevant, no matter what sort of regime it had. Syria only matters to the democratization strategy to the extent they can hinder it's progress. Ergo, cutting a deal with them to stop that hindrance supports the democratization strategy. Thus, I really don't see that we have a problem here.
By , at
Sun Jul 23, 11:02:00 AM:
And why the destabilisation of Syria is worse than present sit.?
The insuing chaos will actually reduce the jihadis abilities to move supplies around: they will be forced to use asses instead of planes.
By Purple Avenger, at
Sun Jul 23, 11:31:00 AM:
Is there a monitoring mechanism that we can trust to work and that Syria can tolerate?
The same one that monotors them now? The Mossad ;->
By Dawnfire82, at
Sun Jul 23, 12:30:00 PM:
"If making deal with Assad's regime that removes their malevolent influence strengthens democracy in Iraq and Lebanon, how can this be said to the "deathknell" of that strategy?"
Because 1) it sets a precedent; if tyrants x, y, and z just sit and behave themselves with regard to an important issue for a while they can be granted a sort of 'regime change immunity' card. i.e. tread water until the next presidential elections and all will be well. No more tyranies will be jeopardized.
2) 'Guarantees' are tricky things. If the US is willing to grant Syria some sort of guarantee over ceasing to support Hezb Allah, why wouldn't Syria then take advantage of that to do something else irritating, like reasserting power in Lebanon and Iraq, (there go the new democracies...) or buying medium range missiles capable of weaponized chemical delivery, or whatever. After all, they have a security guarantee; if we act against them they can claim the deal was in bad faith a return to Hezb Allah's open arms. If we want to offer a security guarantee, we have to be ready to accept those alternative outcomes. If we aren't, there's no point in making the offer in the first place.
3), the existence of a guarantee limits one's foreign policy options. This could hamper your actions in the future because a useful option that might be carried out or threatened is now missing and you become more easily predictable and therefore prone to manipulation.
By Dan, at
Sun Jul 23, 01:21:00 PM:
Guarantying that we won’t attack Castro’s regime worked out so well so why not do it again with another unsavory goon, even when there is no compelling reason.
By , at
Sun Jul 23, 03:26:00 PM:
Give Syria nothing. The have screwed themselves into a corner. They are not a friend. They will not be a friend whatever the incentive.
I speak about the Baaths and Assad of course. Not about some mystic defect of the Syrians as a group.
The Baath, a secular party, will find alliance with the totally fundamentalist Iranian regime a very unhappy experience. They probably already do. It is my understanding that Syria is mostly Sunni and not a good fit with Iran's Shites. Syria is Arab and has no ethnic fondness for the Iranians.
So why do they play nice. Well, the Syrians must feel lonely. The have no friends - and rightly so given the history of Baath rule. But Iran wants to gather any help they can against the West. So Syria is a useful idiot to Iran. Hezbollah has more religious affinity to Iran and probably gets more real aid from them. I doubt Hez cares about Syria except about the logistics of supply in the area.
Don't split Syria from Iran to get them in our camp or even into neutrality. They will secretly do as they wish anyway while using our aid to stay in power.
By Purple Avenger, at
Sun Jul 23, 07:38:00 PM:
If nuking Nagasaki and Hiroshima was justified because it ended the war with a lower number of casualties tahn through conventional combat, why would not the same logic apply to Syria and Iran?!!
Were invasions planned, imminent, with invasion troops on the water in transit, and US casualties estimated to be 500,000 for the invasion, I would have no problem with this.
I think it can be accomplished with less than a half million dead GI's though.
By Mark in Texas, at
Sun Jul 23, 11:24:00 PM:
dawnfire82
We have already set a precedent. We are not going to change regimes in Lybia. We have also taken them off the terrorist watch list and American companies are in country upgrading their oil infrastructure.
This deal cost Khadaffi his nuclear weapons program and spilling the beans on A.Q.Kahn's door to door Nukes R Us sales organization.
I personally think that it was worth it.
What do we want from Syria? Cut off Hezbollah, round up the ones in Syria and either dump them over the border in Lebanon where they will just happen to be picked up by an Israeli patrol or interrogate them until they are dead. Stay out of Lebanon. Stop allowing jihadis, weapons or cash through the border to Iraq. Interrogate the jihadis to death and Syria can keep the weapons and cash. Round up any Iraqi Baathists in Syria. Either interrogate them to death or dump them over the border in Iraq. Keep us informed about people who are plotting to do us ill.
What can we do in return? We won't look for a provocation to expunge Syria's air force and destroy all its armored vehicles. We won't lean on financial institutions to stop making loans to Syria. We won't make financial transactions in and out of Syria way more painful than they are now.
Instead, we will lean on the World Bank to make development loans to Syria, particularly improvements to Syrian port facilities and improvements to the roads across Syria to Iraq. We will encourage the Saudis to invest in Syria in ways that will grow the Syrian economy with the understanding that Baath party officials will be skimming reasonable sums off the top and depositing their pelf in Switzerland, the Cayman Islands or wherever those guys hide money these days. There might even be an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Mediteranean.
The goal is to build up a Syrian middle class and to make provisions for an eventual comfortable retirement for the Baathists.
By C. Owen Johnson, at
Mon Jul 24, 08:20:00 AM:
dawnfire82:
Mark above already dealt with the precendent issue, so I won't address that. As for 'Guarantees', what I think some are missing here are the possible repercussions of any deal with Syria that we would sign up for.
How would Iran react to Syria caving in the Great Satan and selling out a major Iranian organization? Would they be undestanding? I rather doubt it.
I think it likely that any such deal would isolate Syria completely, and severly cut down on their hijinks. After such a betrayal, who would trust them? And how long would Assad last in such a climate?
Actually, it may be that such total isolation might be the best thing that could happen to Syria. Recall what happened to Chile.
By , at
Mon Jul 24, 03:21:00 PM:
It is quite possible that the Syrians in charge are in no position to do anything about Hezbolah or Iran
The infiltration of Iran into Syria may have gone to far to move back.
By , at
Mon Jul 24, 04:09:00 PM:
This situation requires that we stop all these diplomatic dances and finally take this fight to the enemy. This is one war with many fronts and issolation and UN condemnation will get us squat.
If Syria does not play ball, then we should jump in and support our ally Israel by destroying Assad's military. From sea and air.
If they don't capitulate then a Marine Division from the west and an Army Division from the East at least, would be a great wakeup call to this dictatorship. We owe them greatly for what they are doing against us in the War.
We are fooling ourselves if we think negotiation with Islamist and Arab Dictators will get us anywhere.
It's time to go WWII on their asses and use our full combat power. No occupation....and no reconstruction until victory.
By , at
Tue Jul 25, 10:24:00 PM:
i am not sold on any "democratization" strategy anymore. pro-American Middle Eastern governments rule in spite of overwhelming anti-American sentiment in the region. once radical Islamist ideologies are marginalized, then democracy may be a more reasonable option. but so far -- Hamas being elected, Hezbollah enjoying popular support in the south and getting one-fifth of the seats in Lebanese parliament, Ahmadinejad being adored by both Iranians and the "Arab street" -- all this just proves to me that we have to pursue a more realist strategy. the neoconservative end-all solution of democracy has proven misguided in the current climate.
and i know Assad doesn't represent the ideal government (though i don't think "fascist" is the right word.) but come on. we've negotiated with Egypt and Jordan in the past, when they were two of Israel's fiercest opponents. so what's the point of undermining Syria? unlike Tehran, Damascus has no ideological beef with Israel, and nothing ideologically in common with Hezbollah. it's gotten everything it wanted from supporting Hezbollah -- Israel's out of southern Lebanon. and there are major Syrian-friendly Lebanese politicians that are not affiliated with Hezbollah at all. the only dispute Syria currently has with Israel is over the Golan Heights. so i don't see what it has to gain from the current fight. if we have reason to believe we can split them off from Iran through negotiations, we should do it.
conservatives like Kissinger understood foreign relations a lot better than some of the reckless "democracy, democracy, democracy" worshippers in the current administration. i'm not saying that stability is always good, but for democracy to work, you have to see an opening and exploit it. the idea of revolutionary democratic change solving all the Middle East's problems, given the current climate, is bogus.
By , at
Wed Jul 26, 01:05:00 AM:
and i should mention that this is an entirely different conflict than the one with al-Qaeda. sure, both groups are dedicated Islamists, but the fact that they hate each other should be taken into account.
with the removal of the Taliban, there is no longer a state sponsor of al-Qaeda. Hezbollah and Tehran represent a problem that involves Israel much more than it does the U.S., while with al-Qaeda it's been the other way around.
anyway, until we're convinced that it will stop empowering fanatics we should work with the allies we have and stop promoting democracy in the Middle East. the secular dictatorships in the Arab world and the fundamentalist-but-not-fanatical (considering al-Qaeda hates it) monarchy in Saudi Arabia have not been as responsible for the rise of these Islamist groups as some have claimed. economic development is an important part of reducing radicalism's appeal, and can serve as an excellent _precursor_ to democracy, but right now the conditions aren't right.
and of course the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be central as well, though i honestly can't see how that'll be solved anytime soon.
