Wednesday, February 16, 2005
Pop-ups
In the battle against insurgents here, two kinds of Iraqi military forces are emerging: the planned units and the pop-ups.
The planned units of the Iraq Army, about 57,000 soldiers strong, are the result of careful preparation this summer between the U.S. and Iraqi commanders. The pop-ups started to emerge last fall out of nowhere, catching the American military by surprise. These dozen disconnected units totaling as many as 15,000 soldiers are fast becoming one of the most significant developments in the new Iraq security situation.
The unplanned units -- commanded by friends and relatives of cabinet officers and tribal sheiks -- go by names like the Defenders of Baghdad, the Special Police Commanders, the Defenders of Khadamiya and the Amarah Brigade. The new units generally have the backing of the Iraqi government and receive government funding.
The article describes several of the units quite favorably, and describes support given to several of them by the American military, including radios, clothing, supplies and ammunition. These organic units are better motivated than the formal recruited units, and they fight more cohesively and with more discipline because the soldiers trust each other. Desertion rates are very low, and morale is high.
This is an important development, because it suggests that the "best" argument for pessimism about Iraq -- that the insurgency has so extensively infiltrated the Iraqi army and police that those institutions will never establish domestic security -- may be irrelevant. Spontaneously generated organic fighting units bound together by the glue of tribal and ethnic affiliation will be very difficult for the insurgency -- whether Sunni "dead-enders" or al Qaeda jihadists or newly minted nationalists -- to infiltrate. Such a decentralized counterinsurgency would be virtually unique in modern times, and it would go a very long way to nullifying the traditional advantage that insurgencies have in the gathering of intelligence and the effectiveness of coercion.
3 Comments:
, at
This is a fascinating development, and one I hope Belmont Club explores in more detail. About a year ago I thought that one of the more interesting developments of the current war would be how our forces evolved with experience fighting in the Middle East. It is remarkable how successful we actually have been, given our ignorance in certain respects. Certainly I never read anyone who anticipated popups.
I wonder whether there are similar tribal connections in Iran and whether with proper support they could might precipitate some changes there.
By jj mollo, at Wed Feb 16, 09:36:00 PM:
The trouble with vigilante groups is that they retain power after the emergency has passed. Can we really expect a self-appointed militia to turn into the Boy Scouts of Iraq once the smoke clears?
By TigerHawk, at Wed Feb 16, 10:16:00 PM:
jj usa:
The underlying article was clear that the pop-up brigades are actually officially sanctioned and funded and within the law, quite different from unlawful militias. You're right, though, that if these organizations aren't eventually absorbed into the central government's army and police, they could become a separate source of political power and ultimately destabilizing.