Thursday, June 03, 2004
More on Chalabi
The Los Angeles Times reports that the FBI has launched an investigation into the allegation that Ahmad Chalabi leaked to Iran the fact that the United States had broken an important Iranian code. As I wrote yesterday, there are many questions about this allegation -- among others, both the United States and Iran might have reasons to frame Chalabi.
Now the Justice department is investigating this episode. Assuming that our counterintelligence folks do uncover the truth and that the truth sees the light of day (both big questions), there are are only so many different possibilities here.
First, American claims might be genuine - what if the United States did break an important Iranian code, and Chalabi leaked that fact back to the Iranians, and we learned of the leak via internal Iranian communications using the supposedly broken code? Then somebody in the United States government with very high security clearence told Chalabi that we had broken the Iranian code. As the LA Times points out,
Chalabi will obviously know who told him about the broken code, and he has said that he is willing to come to Washington and cooperate with the FBI "without reservation. If so, somebody pretty senior is quaking in his boots.
Second, it may be the case that the United States broke an Iranian code, and that the Iranians learned of it, but that having suffered the broken code the Iranians are exploiting this loss to frame Chalabi. After all, they used an allegedly broken code to communicate the fact that they believed their code was broken! If you were smart, and the Iranians most certainly are in matters of intelligence, they would use their knowledge of the American codebreaking to spread false information. Perhaps the claim that Chalabi leaked the fact of the codebreaking is the false information.
Third, it is possible that the United States didn't break any Iranian code, and cooked up the story to discredit Chalabi -- there are plenty of Americans with reason to do that -- and screw up Iran as a dividend. If Iran believes that its code is broken, it has to scramble around and try to figure out which of its communications may have been compromised, which has to be a big hassle for the people charged with keeping the mullahs in the know. Indeed, for what little it is worth, Iran is denying, lamely, that its codes were broken:
"Basically"? Sounds like there was a broken code to me. The other reason to discount the story is that Iran would be able to confirm or deny (at least for internal purposes) whether the United States was lying -- did, or did not, an Iranian official tell Tehran that the United States had broken its codes? If the U.S. were making it all up to frame Chalabi, then Tehran would know. It is therefore probable that the United States had broken some Iranian code, and that Iran learned of the codebreaking by some means.
Fourth, it remains possible that the CIA and Tehran are working together to get rid of Chalabi. We know the reason why the CIA might do this -- Washington insider accounts claim that it hates Chalabi, almost as an institutional matter -- but why might the Iranians want to get rid of him? Perhaps the Iranians believe they have a better relationship with other Iraqi Shiites, and don't want Chalabi to get in the way of their political aspirations.
And then there are the possible explanations I can't imagine. Consider them unknown unknowns, which in my case are legion.
If the Justice Department gets to the bottom of this, it will be explosive.
Now the Justice department is investigating this episode. Assuming that our counterintelligence folks do uncover the truth and that the truth sees the light of day (both big questions), there are are only so many different possibilities here.
First, American claims might be genuine - what if the United States did break an important Iranian code, and Chalabi leaked that fact back to the Iranians, and we learned of the leak via internal Iranian communications using the supposedly broken code? Then somebody in the United States government with very high security clearence told Chalabi that we had broken the Iranian code. As the LA Times points out,
These are considered among the most valuable of intelligence products, and federal law even provides for the death penalty in some cases in which "communications intelligence or cryptographic information" has been disclosed.
"The number of people who could have leaked this is small, in the dozens or less," said Flynt Leverett, a former CIA (news - web sites) officer and former Middle East director for President Bush (news - web sites)'s National Security Council. "If this is true, someone in this administration did this. It really cries out for accountability."
Chalabi will obviously know who told him about the broken code, and he has said that he is willing to come to Washington and cooperate with the FBI "without reservation. If so, somebody pretty senior is quaking in his boots.
Second, it may be the case that the United States broke an Iranian code, and that the Iranians learned of it, but that having suffered the broken code the Iranians are exploiting this loss to frame Chalabi. After all, they used an allegedly broken code to communicate the fact that they believed their code was broken! If you were smart, and the Iranians most certainly are in matters of intelligence, they would use their knowledge of the American codebreaking to spread false information. Perhaps the claim that Chalabi leaked the fact of the codebreaking is the false information.
Third, it is possible that the United States didn't break any Iranian code, and cooked up the story to discredit Chalabi -- there are plenty of Americans with reason to do that -- and screw up Iran as a dividend. If Iran believes that its code is broken, it has to scramble around and try to figure out which of its communications may have been compromised, which has to be a big hassle for the people charged with keeping the mullahs in the know. Indeed, for what little it is worth, Iran is denying, lamely, that its codes were broken:
In Tehran, an Iranian official denied that Chalabi had disclosed that Washington had broken its secret codes, calling the story "basically a lie," according to Reuters.
"Basically"? Sounds like there was a broken code to me. The other reason to discount the story is that Iran would be able to confirm or deny (at least for internal purposes) whether the United States was lying -- did, or did not, an Iranian official tell Tehran that the United States had broken its codes? If the U.S. were making it all up to frame Chalabi, then Tehran would know. It is therefore probable that the United States had broken some Iranian code, and that Iran learned of the codebreaking by some means.
Fourth, it remains possible that the CIA and Tehran are working together to get rid of Chalabi. We know the reason why the CIA might do this -- Washington insider accounts claim that it hates Chalabi, almost as an institutional matter -- but why might the Iranians want to get rid of him? Perhaps the Iranians believe they have a better relationship with other Iraqi Shiites, and don't want Chalabi to get in the way of their political aspirations.
And then there are the possible explanations I can't imagine. Consider them unknown unknowns, which in my case are legion.
If the Justice Department gets to the bottom of this, it will be explosive.
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