Wednesday, June 02, 2004
Did Chalabi turn over American intelligence?
The New York Times published an astonishing story this morning that contained allegations that
No official has gone on record to make this accusation, so we really have no idea how credible it is. Not surprisingly, I have a few disconnected comments.
First, if the allegation is true, then somebody committed a horrific breach of security in telling Chalabi that we broke Iran's code. Who? Getting to the answer to this question is of much greater moment than learning who outed Joe Wilson's wife.
Second, if the allegation is not true, then the article is an astonishing piece of character assassination. One hopes that the NYT, having been duped by Chalabi, is not now too willing to jump to the conclusion that he is a spy. The Times, after all, looks less irresponsible if we conclude that Chalabi is a spy instead of a swindler and crank. Hey, anybody can be bamboozled by a spy.
Third, the evidence against Chalabi is peculiar. According to the Times:
So an official of Iran, having come into possession of information that a particular code is broken, uses that same code to report that information back to the home office?! Many people argue that Iran has the most sophisticated intelligence in the Middle East. The Times, or the Times' leaker, is asking us to believe that an Iranian "official" is almost criminally stupid. Could it be that Iran is not stupid, but instead learned that its code was broken and decided to frame Chalabi for the leak? It is not implausible to think so. Not only would Iran eliminate a rival for influence among Iraq's Shia, but it would throw American counterintelligence off the trail of Iran's true source.
Fourth, we have all known about Chalabi's connections to Iran for a long time, and that the United States has probably been using him as a back channel into Tehran. The assertion in the story that "American officials had encouraged [Chalabi] in his dealings with Iran" rings true. Stratfor has been writing about it for months, arguing two weeks ago($) that Chalabi has been useful both to the United States and to Iran. Indeed, Stratfor called Chalabi to task not for what he said, but what he didn't say:
This, then, may explain the steep decline in Chalabi's stock, even if the specific charge that he leaked the breaking of Iran's code proves to be false. If Chalabi understood before the fact that the Baathists were planning to wage an insurgency after the fall of Saddam's government, he has damaged American interests and -- more fundamentally -- betrayed the people of Iraq. If true, it is right and proper that America discredit him, and Iraq prosecute him.
The pundits are acting like this story isn't going to go anywhere. Perhaps it is, like Whitewater, too complicated to capture the imagination of the public in an election year. That does not change the fact that there is something very strange going on here that reflects very badly on certain members of the Administration, including, perhaps, the Vice President.
Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi leader and former ally of the Bush administration, disclosed to an Iranian official that the United States had broken the secret communications code of Iran's intelligence service, betraying one of Washington's most valuable sources of information about Iran, according to United States intelligence officials.
No official has gone on record to make this accusation, so we really have no idea how credible it is. Not surprisingly, I have a few disconnected comments.
First, if the allegation is true, then somebody committed a horrific breach of security in telling Chalabi that we broke Iran's code. Who? Getting to the answer to this question is of much greater moment than learning who outed Joe Wilson's wife.
Second, if the allegation is not true, then the article is an astonishing piece of character assassination. One hopes that the NYT, having been duped by Chalabi, is not now too willing to jump to the conclusion that he is a spy. The Times, after all, looks less irresponsible if we conclude that Chalabi is a spy instead of a swindler and crank. Hey, anybody can be bamboozled by a spy.
Third, the evidence against Chalabi is peculiar. According to the Times:
According to American officials, the Iranian official in Baghdad, possibly not believing Mr. Chalabi's account, sent a cable to Tehran detailing his conversation with Mr. Chalabi, using the broken code. That encrypted cable, intercepted and read by the United States, tipped off American officials to the fact that Mr. Chalabi had betrayed the code-breaking operation, the American officials said.
So an official of Iran, having come into possession of information that a particular code is broken, uses that same code to report that information back to the home office?! Many people argue that Iran has the most sophisticated intelligence in the Middle East. The Times, or the Times' leaker, is asking us to believe that an Iranian "official" is almost criminally stupid. Could it be that Iran is not stupid, but instead learned that its code was broken and decided to frame Chalabi for the leak? It is not implausible to think so. Not only would Iran eliminate a rival for influence among Iraq's Shia, but it would throw American counterintelligence off the trail of Iran's true source.
Fourth, we have all known about Chalabi's connections to Iran for a long time, and that the United States has probably been using him as a back channel into Tehran. The assertion in the story that "American officials had encouraged [Chalabi] in his dealings with Iran" rings true. Stratfor has been writing about it for months, arguing two weeks ago($) that Chalabi has been useful both to the United States and to Iran. Indeed, Stratfor called Chalabi to task not for what he said, but what he didn't say:
What is important to see here is how the Iranians were using the Americans, and how the Americans were using the Iranians. Chalabi was an important channel, but hardly the only one. It is almost certain that his role was well known. Chalabi was probably left in place to convince the Iranians that the United States was naïve enough to believe them, or he was there simply as a token of good faith. But nothing he said triggered the invasion.
It was what he did not say that is significant. Chalabi had to know that the Iranians controlled the Iraqi Shia. It is possible that he even told the Pentagon that, since it wouldn't change fundamental strategy much. But there is one thing that Chalabi should have known that he certainly didn't tell the Americans: that Hussein was going to wage a guerrilla war. On that point, there is no question but that the Pentagon was surprised, and it mattered a lot.
Chalabi did not share intelligence that the Iranians almost certainly had because the Iranians wanted the Americans to get bogged down in a guerrilla war. That would increase U.S. dependence on the Shia and Iran, and would hasten the American departure.
Iranian intelligence had penetrated deep into Iraq. The preparations for the guerrilla war were extensive. Iran knew -- and so did Chalabi. The United States would still have invaded, but would have been much better prepared, militarily and politically. Chalabi did not tell the Pentagon what he knew, and that has made a huge difference in the war.
We suspect that the Pentagon intelligence offices and the CIA both knew all about Chalabi's relation to Iranian intelligence. The argument was not over that, but over whether this disqualified his intelligence. The Pentagon had made up its mind for strategic reasons to invade Iraq. Chalabi's intelligence was of use in internal disputes in the administration, but decided nothing in terms of policy. The CIA, understanding that Chalabi was not really a source in the conventional sense but was a geopolitical pawn, did not like the game, but didn't call the Department of Defense on it until after DOD got into trouble in Iraq -- and the CIA wanted to make certain that everyone knew it wasn't their mistake.
This, then, may explain the steep decline in Chalabi's stock, even if the specific charge that he leaked the breaking of Iran's code proves to be false. If Chalabi understood before the fact that the Baathists were planning to wage an insurgency after the fall of Saddam's government, he has damaged American interests and -- more fundamentally -- betrayed the people of Iraq. If true, it is right and proper that America discredit him, and Iraq prosecute him.
The pundits are acting like this story isn't going to go anywhere. Perhaps it is, like Whitewater, too complicated to capture the imagination of the public in an election year. That does not change the fact that there is something very strange going on here that reflects very badly on certain members of the Administration, including, perhaps, the Vice President.
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