Monday, June 16, 2008
The missing A-bomb plans
In case you missed it, the Washington Post reported some rather sobering news yesterday:
An international smuggling ring that sold bomb-related parts to Libya, Iran and North Korea also managed to acquire blueprints for an advanced nuclear weapon, according to a draft report by a former top U.N. arms inspector that suggests the plans could have been shared secretly with any number of countries or rogue groups.
The drawings, discovered in 2006 on computers owned by Swiss businessmen, included essential details for building a compact nuclear device that could be fitted on a type of ballistic missile used by Iran and more than a dozen developing countries, the report states.
Of course, of those "dozen developing countries," only Axis-of-Evil charter members North Korea and Iran have mastered the nuclear fuel cycle.
The revelation is troubling, because one of the reasons for the "what, me worry?" approach to Iran and North Korea is that it is very difficult to miniaturize an atomic bomb. The hope was that the miniaturization challenge would give us some extra time -- you know, at least into the Obama administration -- to deal with the threat. Maybe not so much. Stratfor, for example, is worried:
The Washington Post reported on Sunday that a Pakistani-based ring led by the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program had in its possession detailed blueprints for the construction of nuclear weapons small enough and rugged enough to be fitted to missiles. The ring, led by A.Q. Khan, has been known about for several years (it was busted in 2004). It has also been known that the ring provided nuclear technology, in the form of parts, to Libya, Iran and North Korea. What the Post has revealed is that Khan’s group also had blueprints for a usable nuclear weapon. The data were found in 2006 on a computer owned by a Swiss businessman. Therefore, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have known about the data since then. However, according to the Post article, it is not known whether the information was given to the Iranians — which is what makes this report disturbing, to say the least.
It has been Stratfor’s position that the Iranian nuclear program ought not to be taken particularly seriously, because merely possessing enriched uranium does not give you a weapon. It might give you a device that could be detonated under careful controlled circumstances, but not a weapon that could be reliably delivered on a missile. Before that could happen, the device would have to be turned into a weapon. It would have to be miniaturized and ruggedized, able to withstand the stresses of launch, possible time in vacuum or very low air pressure and the heat of re-entry.
If the Post report is true, that is what these blueprints would provide the Iranians: knowledge of how to turn a device into a weapon. It must be remembered that a blueprint does not by itself enable you to build the weapon. A blueprint for a house would allow me to build the house, but I would need expertise in implementing the blueprint. It is not clear that the Iranians have enough expertise to follow even the most precise instructions, nor the prerequisite equipment. Knowing the kinds of materials or electronics needed to build the weapon doesn’t mean you have the facilities or engineers, in sufficient quantity, to do the job. We continue to think that the Iranians could not actually build a weapon. They lack things like sufficient quality-control engineers and technicians to get the job done. However, they might have the blueprints, and that is a huge barrier to have crossed.
But it simply isn’t clear that the Iranians actually have the blueprints. According to the author of the report, David Albright, who worked for the IAEA, “These advanced nuclear weapons designs may have long ago been sold off to some of the most treacherous regimes in the world.” He also said that Iran and North Korea “both faced struggles in building a warhead small enough to fit atop their ballistic missiles, and these designs were for a warhead that would fit.”
The United States and Israel obviously have known since 2006 that these blueprints existed. Both countries’ intelligence services clearly had one mission above all others: find out if the Iranians had received the blueprints. The fact that there is no weapon yet does not mean that the Iranians don’t have the blue prints. Even with step-by-step instructions, it would take years to build a weapon and marry it to a missile. At the same time, while it might not be known whether they have the blueprints directly, equipment acquisitions, personnel movements and facilities construction could be tracked. If the Iranians were weaponizing, from whatever data source, that likely would be noticeable.
Neither the United States nor Israel has attacked Iran. That indicates that either they know that the Iranians do not have the plans or the process of implementing them has not progressed to a stage of imperative concern. When we recall the National Intelligence Estimate’s finding on Iran’s nuclear program, it would appear not to have triggered visible movement.
But here is the problem. Intelligence is not a science. Yesterday, our view was that the Iranians do not have the know-how or facilities to build a nuclear device. Today, our view is that they might have the know-how and almost certainly do not have a viable program. That’s quite a leap in a short time.
Stratfor's hypothesis that the Iranians do not have the blueprints essentially rests on the assumption that if they did and we had evidence of it the United States and Israel would have attacked by now. The problem is that both countries are led, presently, by executives who are very weak politically. Is it wise to assume that either country would, under the present circumstances, attack Iran based on intelligence findings (especially since those findings, in the case of the United States, would contradict the current National Intelligence Estimate)? I do not think so.
One is forced to wonder whether this information make it into the presidential campaign. One can easily predict John McCain's reaction to a question about these blueprints, but what about Barack Obama? Obama has argued for a more accomodating posture toward Iran. Will the new revelation that blueprints for a missile-capable bomb are available in digital form give him the space to hawk-up his rhetoric? If I were him I'd take that opportunity, but I'm not holding my breath.
Arms Control Wonk has more, and downplays the importance of miniaturization. Far be it from me to argue with any of the ACW bloggers, but I am not in the least persuaded that in the hands of the mullahs a Bomb deliverable by guided or ballistic missile would not be substantially more destabilizing than one that must be delivered by aircraft, ship, truck, or train.
8 Comments:
By 
, at
Mon Jun 16, 06:18:00 PM:
" It must be remembered that a blueprint does not by itself enable you to build the weapon."...Irrelevent, so long as there are people and/or governments willing to sell anything for the right price, be it blueprints or expertise, one would be foolish to not consider the possibility, at least, that blueprints and expertise will, not might, show up in the most inopportune locales at the least convenient time.
By , at
Mon Jun 16, 09:37:00 PM:
If it was a warhead design that was small enough to fit on a ballistic missilem, and still have a siginificant yield, then it was a fusion warhead, i.e., a hydrogen bomb.
We are no longer talking about a Hiroshima type bomb. We are talking about a warhead that could yield hundreds of kilotons or megatons of destruction.
Welcome to the brave new world.
-David
By 
Purple Avenger, at
Mon Jun 16, 09:41:00 PM:
Bomb plans don't concern me much. The US managed to produce plans for a bomb that worked on the first try using 60 year old technology, over the span of only a few years.
Working as an undergrad, using publicly available data, over a period of a few months, John Phillips produced a bomb design that Dyson said was very likely to go bang.
Since Phillip's project was instantly classified and work impounded by the FBI, one suspects Dyson's evaluation of the Phillips design to be pretty good.
By Purple Avenger, at
Mon Jun 16, 09:46:00 PM:
If it was a warhead design that was small enough to fit on a ballistic missile, and still have a significant yield, then it was a fusion warhead, i.e., a hydrogen bomb.
Ted Taylor's Super Oralloy bomb produced 500kt in the Ivy King test. It used only 60kg of uranium.
By Purple Avenger, at
Mon Jun 16, 09:55:00 PM:
I would also add that having plans for an H-bomb isn't terribly useful unless you already know how to make an A-bomb...because the initiator for an H-bomb is...[drumroll]...a small A-bomb.
By , at
Tue Jun 17, 03:36:00 AM:
I am always astonished at the idiocy of selling plans for your own destruction. That "Swiss businessman" exhibits a level of stupidity that I don't think can be adequately expressed in English.
By , at
Tue Jun 17, 04:53:00 PM:
On occasion I've visited the Air Force museum in Dayton. I took some comfort in looking at the casings of the first generation H bombs. Some of those seemed to be the size of a bus. Trying to deploy one without detection looks to be a huge chore. The first generation A bombs weren't all that tiny either.
By Georg Felis, at
Wed Jun 18, 04:05:00 PM:
Anything smaller than a shipping container is very dangerous. And since A-Bombs have been made robust and very small (i.e. artillery deliverable by 8-inch shell)...
