Wednesday, January 09, 2008
Looking ahead to 2008
I am in the San Francisco airport, shortly to board my flight home. For your reading pleasure and animated discussion in the next six hours or so, I offer the following paragraphs from the Stratfor annual forecast:
There are three major global processes under way that will continue to work themselves out in 2008. First, the U.S.-jihadist war is entering its final phase; the destruction of al Qaeda’s strategic capabilities now allows the United States to shift its posture — which includes leveraging the Sunni world to finish the job begun in Iraq — and enables Washington to begin drawing down its Middle Eastern forces. Second, an assertive Russia is re-emerging and taking advantage of the imbalance in U.S. power resulting from the war. Third, oil at historical highs and continued Asian — particularly Chinese — exports have created a massive redistribution of financial might that is reshaping the international financial architecture. These processes intersect with each other, as well as with a fourth phenomenon: It is a presidential election year in the United States, which remains the center of gravity of the international system. These are the trends that shape our global forecast.
Normally in an election year, U.S. attention on global affairs dwindles precipitously, allowing other powers to set the agenda. That will not be the case, however, in 2008. U.S. President George W. Bush is not up for re-election, and there is no would-be successor from the administration in the race; this frees up all of the administration’s bandwidth for whatever activities it wishes. Additionally, Bush’s unpopularity means that each of the White House’s domestic initiatives essentially will be dead on arrival in Congress. All of the Bush administration’s energy will instead be focused on foreign affairs, since such activities do not require public or congressional approval. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 2008 will see the United States acting with the most energy and purpose it has had since the months directly after the 9/11 attack.
Such energy is not simply a result of this odd hiccup in the American political system but of a major shift in circumstance on the issue that has monopolized American foreign policy efforts since 2003: Iraq. The Iraq war was an outgrowth of the jihadist war. After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the United States realized it lacked the military wherewithal to simultaneously deal with the four powers that made al Qaeda possible: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and Pakistan. The first phase of the Bush solution was to procure an anchor against Afghanistan by forcing Pakistan into an alliance. The second was to invade the state that bordered the other three — Iraq — in order to intimidate the remaining trio into cooperating against al Qaeda. The final stage was to press both wars until al Qaeda — the core organization that launched the 9/11 attack and sought the creation of a pan-Islamic caliphate, not the myriad local extremists who later adopted its name — broke.
As 2008 dawns, it has become apparent that though this strategy engendered many unforeseen costs, it has proven successful at grinding al Qaeda into nonfunctionality. Put simply, the jihadist war is all but over; the United States not only is winning but also has an alliance with the entire constellation of Sunni powers that made al Qaeda possible in the first place. The United States will attempt to use this alliance to pressure the remnants of al Qaeda and its allies, as well as those in the region who are not in the alliance.
This leaves Iran, the region’s only non-Sunni power, in the uncomfortable position of needing to seek an arrangement with the United States. The year 2008 will still be about Iraq — but in a different way. Iran cares deeply about the final status of Iraq, since every united Mesopotamian government has at some point in its history attempted a Persian invasion. Yet for the United States, the details of intra-Iraqi negotiations and security in Iraqi cities now are irrelevant to its geopolitical concerns. Washington does not care what Iraq looks like, so long as the Sunni jihadists or Tehran do not attain ultimate control — and evolutions in 2007 have made both scenarios impossible in 2008.
Iran recognizes this, and as a result Washington and Tehran are ever less tentatively edging toward a deal. It is in this context — as an element of talks with Iran — that Iraq still matters to Washington, and this is now the primary rationale for continued involvement in Iraq. The United States will not completely withdraw from Iraq in 2008 — indeed, it likely will have 100,000 troops on the ground when Bush leaves office — but this will be the year in which the mission evolves from tactical overwatch to strategic overwatch.
Talk amongst yourselves.
8 Comments:
By 
, at
Wed Jan 09, 05:42:00 PM:
Wow. If Fouad Ajami and Startfor were to start writing the history of the Bush 2 foreign policy, ol' GW will look like a towering figure.
Beyond half-serious flippancy, I'd love to hear what Bernard Lewis thinks of the Stratfor thesis.
By , at
Wed Jan 09, 06:01:00 PM:
Pretty optimistic spin on the whole thing.
An open civil war in Pakistan, now more likely than in Iraq (IMHO), would throw a gigantic monkey wrench in this analysis.
Let's see if Ahmedinejad lasts the year; that would be a strong indicator that Iran is willing to back down, a little.
-David
By 
antithaca, at
Wed Jan 09, 06:13:00 PM:
Not specific to the Stratfor "thesis" but...Lewis recently wrote in the Atlantic...
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200711/lewis-islam
"I still remember my first two impressions of Americans, derived from my wartime comrades. One was that they were unteachable. When America entered the war, we in Britain had been at war for more than two years. We had made many mistakes, and had learned something from them. We tried to pass these lessons on to our new allies and save them from paying again the price that we had paid in blood and toil. But they wouldn’t listen—their ways were not our ways, and they would do things their way, not ours. And so they went ahead and made mistakes—some repeating ours, some new and original. What was really new and original—and this is my second lasting impression—was the speed with which they recognized these mistakes, and devised and applied the means to correct them. This was beyond anything in our experience.
In looking at the world today, and at our present predicament, I vividly recall that first impression, and anxiously await the second."
I'm not sure the second act will take place under Bush. It may well have its seeds in the last year of the Bush administration...but (to stick with the theme)...it will of necessity flower, or wilt, under the next.
By SR, at
Wed Jan 09, 10:00:00 PM:
20 years on the BDS wackos will be denying that they were hoping for a US defeat because they just wanted to get back into power. However, we'll know the real story.
By Escort81, at
Thu Jan 10, 12:07:00 AM:
Normally in an election year, U.S. attention on global affairs dwindles precipitously, allowing other powers to set the agenda. That will not be the case, however, in 2008. U.S. President George W. Bush is not up for re-election, and there is no would-be successor from the administration in the race; this frees up all of the administration’s bandwidth for whatever activities it wishes. Additionally, Bush’s unpopularity means that each of the White House’s domestic initiatives essentially will be dead on arrival in Congress. All of the Bush administration’s energy will instead be focused on foreign affairs, since such activities do not require public or congressional approval. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 2008 will see the United States acting with the most energy and purpose it has had since the months directly after the 9/11 attack.
This is a variation of the "Bush Unbound" Thesis, which assumes: 1) that neither Bush nor Cheyney have any loyalty to the Republican Party in the sense that domestic political considerations with respect to an election year will be completely discounted when evaluating foreign policy options; or 2) that the sitting President and Vice President would not prefer to have McCain, Romney or Giuliani succeed them to continue roughly along the path that they have established over the past seven years, and therefore would do nothing to aid a potential Republican successor; 3) that Bush and Cheyney believe that even a President Obama would not act too much differently than they would in 2009 and 2010 with respect to troop drawdowns in Iraq, once he is seated in the big chair and understands the consequences of going to zero too quickly (simply to placate the wing of his party).
Frankly, it is hard to evaluate either side of these assumptions, but my guess is that both Bush and Cheyney would rather not leave the Republican Party in tatters, whatever the reality of the situation may turn out to be.
As to Stratfor's view that the Bush strategy has "broken" al Qaeda or that "it has proven successful at grinding al Qaeda into nonfunctionality," I would love to share that optimism, or better understand what is meant by "nonfunctionality." Yes, there have been major successes against al Qaeda and no major attacks in the U.S. since 9/11. However, al Qaeda only needs a few functioning cells and a few hundreds of thousands of dollars to carry out very effective terror attacks. I am not sure we have seen the last of al Qaeda attacks in the U.S. Perhaps, as Hillary obliquely mentioned as a jab at Obama right before the NH primary, al Qaeda will launch an attack early in the next U.S. administration, much as it did in the U.K. after Blair left office.
Iran still has lots of cards to play, many of them Jokers. Watching the video (the one Tehran says is a fake) of the IRGC fast boats darting around three U.S. Navy warships transiting the Strait of Hormuz last weekend, I was amused to see that the two men crewing the blue hulled boat playing Marco Polo with a Destroyer were both wearing bright orange life vests (as a poster at Blackfive also observed) on what may well have turned out to be a suicide mission, if the U.S. Captain had made the decision to light them up a few seconds earlier, before they started to turn away. "We don't want to drown if we capsize ourselves by turning too sharply at too high a speed, but we are fine with getting ripped up by the Phalanx CIWS -- 3,000 rounds per minute -- Ouch! -- used by the infidels." Tehran wants to be a regional hegemon -- why else would it arm Hezbollah, and attempt to control client states in Syria and Lebanon? Iran apologists can't use the same historical invasion reasoning that Soviet apologists used regarding the maintenance of Iron Curtain states during the Cold War (full disclosure again: I am half Hungarian) -- Tehran cannot reasonably fear Iraqi invasion from a majority Shia-led Iraq.
By , at
Thu Jan 10, 12:54:00 AM:
And i,ll bet you probibly wished you were somewhere else that HANOI ON THE BAY
By , at
Thu Jan 10, 09:29:00 AM:
"And i,ll bet you probibly wished you were somewhere else that HANOI ON THE BAY" - PWtK
You obviously didn't read my comment to Tige's "News from Fallujah" thread. Go read it.
As far as "Hanoi" goes, that was a Communistic regime. San Fran is the very opposite of that. If you're looking for a metaphor, try "LiberalLand" or "Wingnut Haven" or some such. Why besmirch the good people of Hanoi? :)
By All-Mi-T [Thought Crime] Rawdawgbuffalo, at
Sat Jan 12, 03:03:00 PM:
...the new efforts and focus on surge and money will not work . sunni or latter
