Wednesday, October 11, 2006
2007 in Iraq
During 2007, I believe the US should dramatically reduce its forces in Iraq, reduce its footprint in the country, and maintain only a garrison not unlike what it has maintained in South Korea for over 50 years. It should contribute a significant force of military advisors and experts to Iraq, and it should carefully evaluate Iraq's readiness to receive significant military "aid" from the US and the West. By aid, I mean arms, of course. To some, this would seem to be a threat to America's relationship with Israel, but I would see it very differently. We provide arms and aid to Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (among others). Basically, our regional clients don't make war (they became clients well after 1973). Those who we do not favor with aid and client status behave as rogues.
I believe this for a couple of reasons. First, American military forces have completed the first mission, which was to change the ruling Iraqi regime. They have largely completed the second mission, which was to stabilize the country. In my view, a remaining US force of 150,000 may be inhibiting final stabilization. The Iraqi military and police forces must pacify the country without the overt US military presence. This view contradicts, I think, what seems to be a consensus view that America needs to increase its presence in Baghdad. I don't agree. This will lead to additional American casualties and expenditure of treasure without the same resolve that Iraqi military forces will bring to bear to eliminate rival militias. Today, the Iraqi military possesses overwhelming force superiority to quell Islamic militias of all stripes. It should be freed to exercise that force. Restraining it, in my view, is counterproductive to stabilizing the country.
The second reason involves Iran. We value Iraq as a strategic asset for a number of sound reasons, but most importantly its location at the center of the Levant, the heart of Arabia, and its oil reserves, which rival Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is the obvious and natural rival to Iran. And now it is a democratic client state of the US. It is fragile today, but within a few short years, it will be the strongest Arab country as a consequence of its oil resources and American aid. It will be the stabilizer America has sought at the other end of the Middle East, and when it is fully developed, will counterbalance Iran as was intended for Saddam. But it cannot do this as long as an oversized American footprint resides in Iraq. We need a tripwire force as we have maintained in South Korea to remind those who would threaten instability of our ability and willingness to act for our friends.
Why 2007 and not today? Sad to say I think it is driven by electoral political considerations. In 2007, our force reduction in Iraq will be a political non-event. It will simplify electoral considerations for 2008 as well. So I think it makes sense in real and superficial ways.
What about the implications of Iran as a nuclear state? This is clearly a complicating factor; they are accelerating their nuclear development because they understand that Iraq's development as a client state of the US bodes very poorly for an expansionist, theocratic and messianic Iran (take note of the qualifiers). An effective Iraqi military, trained and armed and supported by the US, makes a very demanding adversary for Iran. Even Khomeini understood that. But I would observe that even in the worst case -- a nuclear North Korea and Iran -- the dangers to the US are physically (though not economically) quite remote. While certain of the possibilities are quite unattractive, there is one possibility that is actually intriguing -- namely stability arising from a balance of power. But I digress.
The point I am trying to make is that all of this is increasingly impeded by our Iraqi footprint. We need to downsize and replace it with military aid and advice. And it can't come soon enough. Making Iraq a self sufficient, democratic client of the US is the end game, and we should get there ASAP.
6 Comments:
By 
skipsailing, at
Wed Oct 11, 10:23:00 AM:
CP: excellent analysis!
I agree that 2007 is a pivotal year and I further agree that US electoral politics is part of the picture.
for example, the second assault on Fallujah commenced within days of Bush's successful re election bid, not a minute before.
Iraqi domestic politics are part of the issue now. It seems clear to me that the underlying cynicism that seems so pervasive in the arab/muslim culture has proved tough to overcome. Thus the central government in B dad struggles to confront it's own demons because of the tangled web of alliances and affinities.
Further, we are witnessing an astounding level of outright xenophobia on the part of the arabs themselves. The low level assaults on co altion soldiers and assets isn't an attempt to drive us out, it's an expression of pure hatred for anyone who isn't "them".
The dynamics that drive this seem clear to me: years of enforced isolation required by despotic political leaders anxious to sit easy on their thrones and more than willing to deny the outside world to their subjects. For example see, inter alia, Kim Jong Il.
next, the Islamic clergy's role in this xenophobia is a direct result of the challenge to their position the currently percieve. A culture that abides in subjugation to the recieved wisdom of a single book and a handful of "interpreters" is clearly stymied. to accept help from non muslims is to admit that Islam doesn't in fact provide all that man requires.
good, thought provoking post.
Thank you
By 
, at
Wed Oct 11, 12:19:00 PM:
CP: I agree with the substance of your post and I think this is a good argument for accelerating our withdrawal timetable from Iraq. I'm curious though, as to how exactly the presence of our troops is exacerbating the insurgency. Is it simply a "hearts and minds" issue, that is, does our mere presence provide a recruiting pitch for militant Islamic factions? Surely, the presence of American troops can't directly be hindering the Iraqi army and police's efforts, can it?
By Cardinalpark, at
Wed Oct 11, 12:48:00 PM:
I think our presence hinders the Iraqi forces from exercising overwhelming force in a fashion consistent with local standards and encourages misbehavior on the part of militias which view us, ironically, as protectors (everything is relative). Our armed forces conduct themselves with extraordinary restraint, developed over more than 200 years of standards development. To apply those standards in the context of local sectarian skirmishes and gang warfare, in my mind, exacerbates rather than extinguishes the activity.
So, no, it has nothing to do with this notion of "recruitment" of more terrorists. I rather like that, because I think our armed forces do a superb job killing them. This is the flytrap theiry, and I support that wholeheartedly because it demoralizes them and encourages and recruits local muslim allies, who then disown the islamists (tigerhawk central thesis -- see Amman Hotel bombings).
By Dawnfire82, at
Wed Oct 11, 07:51:00 PM:
Slightly off-topic, but a question was asked. I take issue with the 'hearts and minds' phrase, and always have, but it was only recently that my brain clicked to exactly why.
'Winning the hearts and minds' implies that we are trying to win loyalty. The willingness to cooperate with us, the willingness to sell out their neighbors if they are planning attacks against us, the willingness to suffer hardships we want them to suffer in order to achieve goal X; really it boils down to loyalty.
That just isn't going to happen. They're not Americans. They're Iraqis. We will always be a foreign army in their country, no matter how many schools we equip or how much candy we give away or how many civilian-slaughtering terrorists we kill.
At best, we can cultivate the good will of certain factions, which will automatically result in illwill on the part of their rivals. And everyone has rivals. This whole idea about 'losing the battle for hearts and minds' (or winning) that the media and various other personalities throw around is, I think, silly. I could easily pick a major faction that we've successfully courted (the Kurds for instance, among whom President Bush has a 90%+ approval rating) or unsuccessfully (Sunni tribals) as evidence against either point.
British colonialism could be an ugly thing, but they did get the local political manipulation right. Unlike the French, Portugese, and others, the British 'colonies' (especially in the Mid East) were usually ruled by locals allied with Britain through a kind of feudal relationship. Find the faction most suitable to your interests, back them, crush his rivals, and leave them in charge. Then you can go home. We should learn from that.
By , at
Thu Oct 12, 01:15:00 AM:
Good lord, what world do you people live in?
By Dawnfire82, at
Thu Oct 12, 07:39:00 PM:
Way to contribute to the discussion trooper. Good job.
*rolls eyes*
