Saturday, May 13, 2006
Iran's three objectives
Amir Tahani discusses Iran's three geopolitical objectives under Ahmadinejad:
Right from the start of the current crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration has pursued three main objectives.
The first of these is to prevent the formation of a unified international front opposed to Tehran. The idea here is that if Iran manages to split the United Nations’ Security Council, and prevent the United States from enlisting the full support of the European Union, any plan to stop Iran’s plans would be doomed to failure.
The second objective of the Ahmadinejad administration has been to present the nuclear issue as the most pressing topic in Iran’s domestic politics. The idea here is that since most people do not quite know what is at stake the government has a fair chance of casting itself in the role of “ the defender of national interests” against foreign, imperialistic powers that do not wish Iran, and other developing nations for that matter, to secure a share of modern science and technology. The nuclear issue has the added advantage of edging out other issues of domestic politics, notably the systematic violation of human rights, the looming economic crisis, and the bitter power struggle that is tearing the ruling establishment apart.
Finally, the Ahmadinejad administration has tried to transform the nuclear issue into a duel between itself and the Bush administration in Washington. This strategy is based on the calculation that almost all countries, including Iran’s neighbors and the veto-holding members of he Security Council, would be glad to transfer that hot potato to Washington.
The third objective -- to turn the nuclear issue into a duel between Iran and the United States -- is really in service of the first, which is to prevent the unification of Iran's opposition. It is also the most important reason -- although not the only reason -- why the Bush administration has been so reluctant to agree to direct talks with Iran on the nuclear question. It may well be that in the end we will have to talk directly to Iran, but critics of the Bush administration who deride it for speaking with Iran only through European intermediaries are also, usually, the people who care the most about getting European support for American policy. If we take over the discussions with Iran, then it will be very easy for the Europeans to blame America for the results or -- at best -- decide that Iran is no longer their problem. At the least, critics who argue that the Bush administration should cut out the intermediaries have to explain why this is not playing into Ahmadinejad's hands and what we should do when European support for the containment of Iran evaporates.
4 Comments:
By 
, at
Sat May 13, 01:51:00 PM:
I would add a fourth objective; To distract domestic opposition from the social and economic failures of the current regime and keep them focused on percieved external threats to the Islamic Republic.
By , at
Sat May 13, 06:10:00 PM:
I would suggest the way ahead is to demonstrate why love of oil or trade with Iran does not detract from the role Iran plays in destabilizing Russia and China.
By , at
Sat May 13, 06:11:00 PM:
Ps:
This is one thing the State Department and our intelligence services should be good at (I said should be good at).
By , at
Sun May 14, 05:58:00 PM:
Of all of the actors in this drama (Russia, China, Europe, Israel, the Arab world, and the U.S.), the U.S. will be the last in time that Iran can threaten with a nuclear attack. The U.S. will be the last to come into Iranian missile range and will be the hardest for an Iranian team to infiltrate with a nuclear weapon.
The U.S. should cooperate with the Europeans, the IAEA, and the UN on the Iran issue, but it should not over-extend or over-commit itself on the Iran issue, not to any greater degree than any of the other actors who will be under Iranian threat long before the U.S. will be.
The prime U.S. interest for the next ten years is to protect and provide reassurance to its Arab allies from the growing Iranian threat. However, this will not be as easy as it should be.
Those observers that reject using military force to stop Iran's nuclear program thus choose instead an inevitable, very dangerous, and potentially even more catastrophic three-sided (Israel, Saudi Arabia-Egypt, Iran) nuclear arms race.
For those who wonder what could be worse than bombing Iran, please read out post:
The worst place on Earth for an arms race.
Westhawk
