Monday, April 10, 2006
The value of rising Iraqi nationalism
This morning's Washington Post reports that the previously agreed direct talks between the United States and Iran, which talks would have been the first official direct contact between the two countries since the embassy crisis of 1979-1980, have been delayed. The stated reason is that the United States does "not want to give the impression that [it] is sitting with Iran to decide about the Iraqi government. The Iraqis will decide that."
Fair enough. But the article does not say to whom the United States does not want to give that impression.
At a superficial level, of course, we do not want anybody to think that the United States is finally burying the hatchet with Iran after all these years and all the intervening crises just to reach a deal that carves up Iraq into spheres of influence. Indeed, if we did that, the anti-imperialist left would finally be right about the United States. However, the Bush administration is not known for worrying what the anti-imperialist left thinks about anything, and anti-Americans and other cynics are going to assume that some backroom puppeteering has been going on whether or not Iraqis form a national unity government.
The far more likely explanation is that this decision amounts to a tilt toward the Sunnis and the Kurds, who are holding out for the Shiites to fire Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Or, for those of us who believe that even in Iraq all politics are not necessarily ethnic or sectarian, the United States appears to be tilting toward those Iraqi nationalists, Shiites among them, who resent Iran's interference. The question is, will this subtle American shift divide the Shiites enough that they will put al-Jafari out on the iceberg and nominate somebody more acceptible to the Sunnis and the Kurds?
This is not the only respect in which the United States is trying to build Iraqi nationalism, which is sorely in need of repair after a generation of Saddam's divide-and-oppress dictatorship and three years of relying on the United States for the most basic governmental functions. In another story running today, the WaPo describes a military PSYOPS program to emphasize the importance of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, to the insurgency. The Post got its hands on a couple of Gen. George Casey's slides, which reveal a plan to "villainize Zarqawi/leverage xenophobia response." Although you would not know it from reading the Post's article, Gen. Casey's PSYOPS plan seems to have been successful, or at least affiliated with success (which is often the most we can claim in Iraq). Last week, al Qaeda in Iraq quite publicly kicked Zarqawi upstairs, formally diminishing his role. Over the weekend, the news was filled with reports of Iraqis demonstrating for unity, and against al Qaeda. Neither of these stories made it into the Post's article -- Thomas E. Ricks reporting -- which bizarrely led with the anti-Bush bureaucratic war:
Once you get past the appalling lede, for which no evidence other than anonymous bureaucratic sniping is adduced in the article, and the failure to point out the extremely relevant fact that al Qaeda in Iraq at least superficially "fired" Zarqawi last week, Ricks' story is pretty interesting. Read the whole thing, including all the stuff between the lines.
Nationalism is a potent weapon against al Qaeda, whose ideology explicitly rejects nationalism in favor of the global unity of Muslims. Iraqi nationalism, which has been a huge thorn in our side, is a potentially powerful counterweight against both al Qaeda and Iran's ambition to "Finlandize" that country. The blossoming of Iraqi nationalism is arguably -- and perversely -- in American interests, even if it also blows back against our own presence in that country.
Fair enough. But the article does not say to whom the United States does not want to give that impression.
At a superficial level, of course, we do not want anybody to think that the United States is finally burying the hatchet with Iran after all these years and all the intervening crises just to reach a deal that carves up Iraq into spheres of influence. Indeed, if we did that, the anti-imperialist left would finally be right about the United States. However, the Bush administration is not known for worrying what the anti-imperialist left thinks about anything, and anti-Americans and other cynics are going to assume that some backroom puppeteering has been going on whether or not Iraqis form a national unity government.
The far more likely explanation is that this decision amounts to a tilt toward the Sunnis and the Kurds, who are holding out for the Shiites to fire Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Or, for those of us who believe that even in Iraq all politics are not necessarily ethnic or sectarian, the United States appears to be tilting toward those Iraqi nationalists, Shiites among them, who resent Iran's interference. The question is, will this subtle American shift divide the Shiites enough that they will put al-Jafari out on the iceberg and nominate somebody more acceptible to the Sunnis and the Kurds?
This is not the only respect in which the United States is trying to build Iraqi nationalism, which is sorely in need of repair after a generation of Saddam's divide-and-oppress dictatorship and three years of relying on the United States for the most basic governmental functions. In another story running today, the WaPo describes a military PSYOPS program to emphasize the importance of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, to the insurgency. The Post got its hands on a couple of Gen. George Casey's slides, which reveal a plan to "villainize Zarqawi/leverage xenophobia response." Although you would not know it from reading the Post's article, Gen. Casey's PSYOPS plan seems to have been successful, or at least affiliated with success (which is often the most we can claim in Iraq). Last week, al Qaeda in Iraq quite publicly kicked Zarqawi upstairs, formally diminishing his role. Over the weekend, the news was filled with reports of Iraqis demonstrating for unity, and against al Qaeda. Neither of these stories made it into the Post's article -- Thomas E. Ricks reporting -- which bizarrely led with the anti-Bush bureaucratic war:
The U.S. military is conducting a propaganda campaign to magnify the role of the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, according to internal military documents and officers familiar with the program. The effort has raised his profile in a way that some military intelligence officials believe may have overstated his importance and helped the Bush administration tie the war to the organization responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Once you get past the appalling lede, for which no evidence other than anonymous bureaucratic sniping is adduced in the article, and the failure to point out the extremely relevant fact that al Qaeda in Iraq at least superficially "fired" Zarqawi last week, Ricks' story is pretty interesting. Read the whole thing, including all the stuff between the lines.
Nationalism is a potent weapon against al Qaeda, whose ideology explicitly rejects nationalism in favor of the global unity of Muslims. Iraqi nationalism, which has been a huge thorn in our side, is a potentially powerful counterweight against both al Qaeda and Iran's ambition to "Finlandize" that country. The blossoming of Iraqi nationalism is arguably -- and perversely -- in American interests, even if it also blows back against our own presence in that country.
1 Comments:
By 
Prariepundit, at
Mon Apr 10, 03:38:00 PM:
The military is strongly denying Rick's charges about Zarqawi. See the story here http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2006/04/military-response-to-ricks-zarqawi.html
