Wednesday, March 15, 2006
Iraq and Clinton - 1998
It highlights the latent bipartisan reality supporting action to change the regime in Iraq. Everything else is merely political horse puckey and pandering to isolationists and pacifists.
8 Comments:
By 
Charlottesvillain, at
Wed Mar 15, 02:30:00 PM:
It is convenient to ignore all this for political expediency. One of the possible benefits of a Hillary candidate is it will make it a bit harder to ignore some of these aspects of the last Clinton presidency (not to mention his ongoing counsel to his middle eastern friends regarding current issues of national security, port ownership, etc).
By Cassandra, at
Wed Mar 15, 05:30:00 PM:
Oh, you are *bad*.
I have beaten this horse so many times, but I am perfectly willing to see someone else flail away at it :)
By TigerHawk, at
Thu Mar 16, 06:07:00 AM:
I often takes a long time to figure out the difference between strategic and tactical victories. In another twenty years, when new histories of the Vietnam era are written by people who were not alive then and who have no point to make about Iraq in the process, we may regard Vietnam as a strategic victory. Would Thailand, the Phillipines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have been able to fend off communism without the United States fighting in Indochina for 15 years? We cannot, after all, know how aggressively Moscow would have responded to American pacifism. It just might have been interpreted as a weakness that could have been exploited.
Similarly, much of the disappointment that comes with Iraq has to do with failures of expectations, rather than actual strategic failures. The anti-war crowd assumes it is a strategic defeat because (i) we have not achieved -- and probably will not achieve -- the most optimistic objectives of some of the architects of the war, and (ii) al Qaeda has almost certainly been able to use to the war to recruit men and money. What we do not know is whether the war, by polarizing the region, has not created even more new enemies of al Qaeda among Arab Muslims. If it has, we may well look back at Iraq in 20 years as an essential turning point in the war on Islamic terrorism.
By 
, at
Thu Mar 16, 10:19:00 AM:
Clinton didn't invade.
Important distinction.
Acknowledging a problem is not the same as trying to solve that problem in a grotesquely incompetent way.
All Bush has done is removed Saddam as the primary cause of Iraq’s misery and replaced him with a simmering civil war.
Iraq has as much chance of being a stable representative democracy today as it did back in 1998.
By Georg Felis, at
Thu Mar 16, 11:14:00 AM:
Sorry Shochu, this is exactly the same criticism that the Left made for many years, that the US coddles murderous dictators and ignores suppressed cries for democracy in order to promote stability. Now when the US takes action against a murderous dictator to allow a democracy to take root, the Left is crying that the region is becoming unstable.
Criticism is pointing out shortcomings and how they may be fixed. Whining is just complaining about events.
If you have a thoughtful insightful concept on how the US might have deposed Saddam, set up a democracy to replace his dictatorial rule, and maintained some semblance of peace in the Muddle East, please post it. Otherwise you’re just whining, like so many other Democrats now who have no plans on what to do in Iraq, other than running like Rats.
By Cardinalpark, at
Thu Mar 16, 12:49:00 PM:
The great wonder of the continuum of history is that it explains itself when you benefit from distance, but at each moment of time many find it simply incomprehensible.
You cannot decipher Iraq by looking at the current presidency and saying we simply made an arbitrary decision and wound up here. American policy over long periods of time shows remarkable cogency. You cannot say Clinton made a good choice and Bush made a bad one. All you can say is that each subsequent decision was shaped by the prior one, and the reactions to it.
Clinton did not invade. The reasons can't be known, other than Annan intervened. Clinton also did not invade Afghanistan. But he clearly appreciated the danger of Saddam and his flouting of the UN cease fire rules, and he certainly appreciated the danger of Osama. He did try to kill him, but failed. And the policy of the US government evolved to sanction Saddam's removal. A law no less.
Subsequent events were a response to those decisions. Our adversaries drew certain, often mistaken conclusions about our intentions and commitments. But we as a nation had a continuum of evolving policy shaped by history.
With the benefit of hindsight, and the quiet of the issue no longer being political fodder, it will be obvious why we invaded Iraq. It will be non-controversial. It will have been the result of years of conflict, disagreements, brutality, and an inability for peaceful diplomacy to manage a brutal, irrational tyrant.
If I had to guess, the greater controversy will relate to the foolish decision in 1991 to leave Saddam in power, not the decision in 2003 to remove him. this will be compared to Chamberlain's appeasement, though an unfulfilling precise comparison. It will be the flawed judgment, not Saddam's removal. Just as wi th the the passage of time, the decision to remove Milosevic by the Clinton Administration has largely been vindicated and will be moreso over time.
By Dawnfire82, at
Thu Mar 16, 02:57:00 PM:
"Thirdly, you missed several reasons it is a strategic defeat:
iii. It ties up US military and financial resources, overextending us and limiting our ability to threaten force."
This is rhetorical crap. This claim could be made about ANY conflict, including the hypothetical one that Iraq prevents us from reacting to.
"iv. Increased Iranian influence in Iraq."
You say this like it's set in stone. It's not. They are trying to establish permanent influence in Iraq, and we are trying to prevent it. It is a clandestine battle at this point, but shots have been fired and elements have leaked into the press. This is a result of Iran *desperately* trying to derail the entire venture. Why? Because it fucks THEM strategically. The very fact that they are trying so hard strengthens the idea that this venture was worthwhile vis a vis Iran.
"v. Rule by Shi’ite theocrats"
1, this isn't even true. 2, How is this premise related to the idea of a strategic defeat? Somehow, I think that rule by a Shi'i theocrat like, oh, Ali al-Sistani would probably be in the interest of the US. (at least as far as raw power politics go)
"vi. Negative impact on US prestige abroad by invading a country in a war widely consider illegitimate in the first place, making a royal mess out of it, and then failing to admit or even see what the results truly are."
This statement is tainted by political ideology. Now that we have that out of the way, here is another of Dawnfire's Lessons on How the World Works. (tm)
First up, legitimacy is an illusion. Literally. It is a matter of perspective. Much more important is the actual reality. I can call the US an illegitimate government all I please, but if I do not obey its laws I will be put in jail. By force. That reality MAKES it legitimate.
There is a school of thought in International Relations that focuses on what is called Hegemonic Theory. There are two general kinds of Hegemonic Theory that I know of; that of the Benign Hegemon and Coercive Hegemon.
In Benign Hegemony, the Hegemon (the US, in this age) provides public goods and maintains the international system out of self interest. Other states that benefit from the maintenance of the international system and associated public goods (like keeping the seas free of pirates, or enforcing an international code of behavior, or free trade pacts, or whatever) don't really have to do anything to get them; they are provided by the hegemon. The relations between individual states and the hegemon are unimportant here. The hegemon provides the goods because it is in its interest to do so; the fact that other states benefit also is secondary.
The theory of a Coercive Hegemon is that of an international bully that uses a combination of incentives and threats to increase its land, wealth, and power. Ancient Rome and from time to time Imperial Britain fit this mode, but only Marxists and leftist revisionists try to fit this theory onto the US. Our utter failure to conquer or otherwise absorb other states (*cough*Canada*cough*) since ascension to hegemonic status kind of kills it, but it is useful for explaining how hegemons (including the US) get what they want.
Modern practice by the Bush Administration puts elements of both of these theories into practice. The modern US sees itself as a benign hegemon, taking on the jobs that no one else wants. i.e. the lion's share of funding for the UN, bombardment in Kosovo, diplomacy/conflict with rogue states like Libya, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, and so forth. The US does this out of ideological belief and a certain element of exceptionalism, but primarily because it is in its interest to do so. The current global order has the US at the top; therefore, preserving this global order is of paramount importance. So the status quo (i.e. 'stability'), perhaps with limited regional initiatives to reinforce it, is ideal.
However, US policies also include elements of the coercive hegemon line of thinking, where credibility is important. We threaten hostile or disruptive states (like Iraq, Iran) and reward friendly or well-behaved states (like the UAE) to try to help keep the friendly states friendly, and neutralize the hostile ones as cheaply as possible. However, this policy relies on credibility. If no one believes the US will carry out its threats, or that promises of reward are empty, then no one has an incentive to 'behave' at all. We can thank the legacy of Vietnam, the chronic spinelessness of the UN, and the "law enforcement first" policies of the 80s and 90s in response to terrorism for the current belligerence of many states; our international credibility is in tatters.
9/11 delivered the incentive to reverse this. The US realized that their enemies could not be deterred because they didn't fear them. Law enforcement didn't do the trick (surprise). Why not strike at an enemy if they are weak? And so they did. To reverse this, promises needed to be followed upon to restore US credibility; tough talk and bold policy. Kicking over the Taliban was a decent start, but too easy. The next obvious festering problem was Iraq; irrational, dangerous, and in permanent violation of the agreement that kept him from being blown up in 1991. Seemed like a logical target.
So witness invasion, guerilla campaign, Saddam's capture, Al Qaeda's takeover as primary combatant, et cetera. What is important is that the US doesn't run away like it is perceived to have done in Vietnam. Even if it loses, it would be better than if it ran away. If, in the attempt to restore US credibility the US flees (again!), credibility will probably be beyond repair and will arguably signal the beginning of the downfall of the US as global hegemon. What friend could trust the US to support them? What enemy would fear them? No one.
Point: Running away would be infinitely worse for US prestige than invading in the first place.
"vii. Widespread violence, including sectarian tensions that threaten to plunge Iraq into civil war. That is for those who do not think that widespread sectarian street killings, including enough to fill a 27 corpse mass grave, do not indicate a civil war already."
1) What you just described also happened immediately following the conclusion of the US Civil War. I've already preached on this blog about 'pacification' and what it means.
2) I don't consider 27 deaths as indicative of a civil war. Gang Wars in the US have higher death tolls.
Insert my previous comments on 'widespread sectarian violence' in Northern Ireland.
"viii. De-stabilization of the region due to the violence in Iraq."
Buzzwords, devoid of logic. There's violence all over the world, all the time. Was China 'destabilized' by Tiananmen Square? The USSR by invading Czechoslovakia? Germany by annexing Austria? France by riots in Paris? The US by riots in Los Angeles? Japan by nerve gas attacks in its subways? I could go on.
However, you are correct in a way I'm sure you didn't foresee. The region IS destabilized by violence in Iraq. The whole point of the invasion was to overthrow the government and install something more palatable. This completely altered the regional balance of power domestically, internationally, and economically.
The *OVERALL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE* of the invasion could be simplified into "destabilize the region." So, how is that a strategic failure?
CP - "If I had to guess, the greater controversy will relate to the foolish decision in 1991 to leave Saddam in power, not the decision in 2003 to remove him."
It was a sound decision at the time, virtually forced on the US by regional allies (like Saudi Arabia) who feared that a follow-up government without the US as a stabilizer (we were going to bring our troops home, period. There was less than 0 support for sticking around to rebuild Iraq) would leave a power vacuum that Iran would step into. It was a valid fear. Hell, Iran is trying now WITH the US forces present.
"The goal here was patently unrealistic in addition to being executed poorly."
Wow. Although I know it, I sometimes forget what a nation of pussies we have become.
The US can defeat Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan *at the same time* on *THREE* fronts and set them up as successful democracies, 60 years ago, but it's unrealistic to introduce a democratic system to one single medium sized middle eastern country with the most highly proficient and advances military in the world? And why? Because it isn't going perfectly.
Pearl Harbor. Guam. The Phillipines. The Bulge. Al-Alamein.
500,000 American warriors are turning over in their graves.
By Cardinalpark, at
Thu Mar 16, 03:18:00 PM:
DF - I agree with everything you said except the chomp at me on 91. The other guy is full of platitudes and devoid of facts.
It was dead stupid to leave Saddam in power. It was lazy. The path of least resistance, yes. But wrong. If you are going to fight a war, finish the job. Unconditional surrender. The cost of leaving him in was brutally high. It was a mistake.
I understand why it was made. I don't think it was an irrational decision. but I think it was the wrong decision. When we ar eputting our money and people in line to defend the saudis, it is not their call or the UN's call how we finish the job. when you make that commitment, you go get the enemy's leader and put him away. If you aren't intent on that, don't bother.
Another point on which we agree, i have made the pussy point before. Are you telling me (us) that this country, which for 50 years prepared for massive world war with the soviets on evry front, cannot muster the energy to defeat these piddling middle eastern despots?
Please. It is about will. You would have though 9/11 would have provided it to more people. That is why I have great respect for the current administration. They have many flaws, but they do not lack for will.
