Monday, January 16, 2006
The Zawahiri strike and its aftermath
If we were using headlines on diaries, Sunday's would be, "The Man Who Didn't Come to Dinner." U.S. intelligence apparently received information that Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda's No. 2, was going to be at a dinner Jan. 13 in the Pakistani village of Damadola, celebrating the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. U.S. Predators carried out airstrikes, but after the smoke cleared, it became apparent that al-Zawahiri was not present, nor were other members of al Qaeda. Spontaneous anti-American demonstrations were quickly and carefully organized throughout Pakistan.
Exactly.
Stratfor again:
The failure points are numerous. The source of the intelligence might not have known the facts. The source might have lied deliberately to set up an airstrike. The source, uncovered by al Qaeda, might have been fed false information to set up a failed attack. Al-Zawahiri's security might have detected a leak and decided to cancel the visit. The analyst reading the raw intelligence might have made a mistake and picked the wrong village. Al-Zawahiri might have had an upset stomach and stayed home. The possibilities are endless. On a strategic level, it could range from U.S. intelligence being sucked in by deliberate disinformation, a leak in U.S. intelligence, precursor events -- like reconnaissance flights -- spooking al-Zawahiri, or sheer dumb luck.
What this does point to is the essential problem of surgical covert operations. There is very little room for error.
The real question is why we did not inject a battalion of Rangers to seal off the area. True, the incursion into Pakistan would have been even more offensive to Pakistan's sovereignty, but the "spontaneous" demonstrations would hardly have been worse, and we might have nailed our target. I am not second-guessing CENTCOM and the CIA -- I am sure there are a hundred variables to which I am not privy -- but one cannot help but wonder whether bureaucratic politics isn't hampering the operations in and on the border of western Pakistan.
Confederate Yankee has much more.
5 Comments:
By 
TigerHawk, at
Mon Jan 16, 11:52:00 AM:
Pakistan is neither our ally nor our enemy in the usual sense. It is an actor that we an al Qaeda work hard to coerce and otherwise influence. Sometimes, we win, sometimes they win.
The tension, of course, is between domestic political pressure (in regard to which al Qaeda has the advantage) and foreign pressure (e.g., India). Musharraf is between a rock and a hard place.
By Admin, at
Mon Jan 16, 12:05:00 PM:
i would remind everyone, that we killed 18 people, 5 of whom were children, in our apparent intelligence error.
By TigerHawk, at
Mon Jan 16, 01:16:00 PM:
If the adults invited Zawahiri to dinner, they were giving aid and comfort to our enemy. If they had their children present, they were negligent.
It all depends on the particular reason why Zawahiri was not there.
By TigerHawk, at
Mon Jan 16, 01:19:00 PM:
sirius_sir:
Musharraf personally hates the jihadis -- they tried to assassinate him at least twice. No doubt he would love to be rid of them. The problem, though, is that they have a lot of sympathizers in his country, including particularly in his own intelligence service (allegedly). So he does what he can to defeat al Qaeda, but within his own constraints. We make it easier for him when we put pressure on him, because we give him a good reason -- in the eyes of the Pakistani military -- to crack down.
By Papa Ray, at
Mon Jan 16, 07:32:00 PM:
Everybody on the web is jumping to conclusions, reading in info not there, believing media reports and falling into the old traps that Mark Twain warned about.
We [the collective we] don't know and maybe never will know who was in those mud huts.
Papa Ray
West Texas
USA
