Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Though the Iraq war is certainly not over, it has reached a crossroads. During the course of the war, about 40 countries sent troops to fight in what was called “Multi-National Force-Iraq.” As of this summer, only one foreign country’s fighting forces remain in Iraq — those of the United States. A name change in January 2010 will reflect the new reality, when the term “Multi-National Force-Iraq” will be changed to “United States Forces-Iraq.” If there is an endgame in Iraq, we are now in it.
The plan that U.S. President Barack Obama inherited from former President George W. Bush called for coalition forces to help create a viable Iraqi national military and security force that would maintain the Baghdad government’s authority and Iraq’s territorial cohesion and integrity. In the meantime, the major factions in Iraq would devise a regime in which all factions would participate and be satisfied that their factional interests were protected. While this was going on, the United States would systematically reduce its presence in Iraq until around the summer of 2010, when the last U.S. forces would leave.
Two provisos qualified this plan. The first was that the plan depended on the reality on the ground for its timeline. The second was the possibility that some residual force would remain in Iraq to guarantee the agreements made between factions, until they matured and solidified into a self-sustaining regime. Aside from minor tinkering with the timeline, the Obama administration — guided by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whom Bush appointed and Obama retained — has followed the Bush plan faithfully.
The moment of truth for the U.S. plan is now approaching. The United States still has substantial forces in Iraq. There is a coalition government in Baghdad dominated by Shia (a reasonable situation, since the Shia comprise the largest segment of the population of Iraq). Iraqi security forces are far from world-class, and will continue to struggle in asserting themselves in Iraq. As we move into the endgame, internal and external forces are re-examining power-sharing deals, with some trying to disrupt the entire process.
There are two foci for this disruption. The first concerns the Arab-Kurdish struggle over Kirkuk. The second concerns threats to Iran’s national security.
The Kurdish Question
Fighting continues in the Kirkuk region, where the Arabs and Kurds have a major issue to battle over: oil. The Kirkuk region is one of two major oil-producing regions in Iraq (the other is in the Shiite-dominated south). Whoever controls Kirkuk is in a position to extract a substantial amount of wealth from the surrounding region’s oil development. There are historical ethnic issues in play here, but the real issue is money. Iraqi central government laws on energy development remain unclear, precisely because there is no practical agreement on the degree to which the central government will control — and benefit — from oil development as opposed to the Kurdish Regional Government. Both Kurdish and Arab factions thus continue to jockey for control of the key city of Kirkuk.
Arab, particularly Sunni Arab, retention of control over Kirkuk opens the door for an expansion of Sunni Arab power into Iraqi Kurdistan. By contrast, Kurdish control of Kirkuk shuts down the Sunni threat to Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and cuts Sunni access to oil revenues from any route other than the Shiite-controlled central government. If the Sunnis get shut out of Kirkuk, they are on the road to marginalization by their bitter enemies — the Kurds and the Shia. Thus, from the Sunni point of view, the battle for Kirkuk is the battle for the Sunni place at the Iraqi table.
Turkey further complicates the situation in Iraq. Currently embedded in constitutional and political thinking in Iraq is the idea that the Kurds would not be independent, but could enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Couple autonomy with the financial benefits of heavy oil development and the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq becomes a powerful entity. Add to that the peshmerga, the Kurdish independent military forces that have had U.S. patronage since the 1990s, and an autonomous Kurdistan becomes a substantial regional force. And this is not something Turkey wants to see.
The broader Kurdish region is divided among four countries, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The Kurds have a substantial presence in southeastern Turkey, where Ankara is engaged in a low-intensity war with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), members of which have taken refuge in northern Iraq. Turkey’s current government has adopted a much more nuanced approach in dealing with the Kurdish question. This has involved coupling the traditional military threats with guarantees of political and economic security to the Iraqi Kurds as long as the Iraqi Kurdish leadership abides by Turkish demands not to press the Kirkuk issue.
Still, whatever the constitutional and political arrangements between Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s central government, or between Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish government, the Iraqi Kurds have a nationalist imperative. The Turkish expectation is that over the long haul, a wealthy and powerful Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region could slip out of Baghdad’s control and become a center of Kurdish nationalism. Put another way, no matter what the Iraqi Kurds say now about cooperating with Turkey regarding the PKK, over the long run, they still have an interest in underwriting a broader Kurdish nationalism that will strike directly at Turkish national interests.
The degree to which Sunni activity in northern Iraq is coordinated with Turkish intelligence is unknown to us. The Sunnis are quite capable of waging this battle on their own. But the Turks are not disinterested bystanders, and already support local Turkmen in the Kirkuk region to counter the Iraqi Kurds. The Turks want to see Kurdish economic power and military power limited, and as such they are inherently in favor of the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government. The stronger Baghdad is, the weaker the Kurds will be.
Baghdad understands something critical: While the Kurds may be a significant fighting force in Iraq, they can’t possibly stand up to the Turkish army. More broadly, Iraq as a whole can’t stand up to the Turkish army. We are entering a period in which a significant strategic threat to Turkey from Iraq could potentially mean Turkish countermeasures. Iraqi memories of Turkish domination during the Ottoman Empire are not pleasant. Therefore, Iraq will be very careful not to cross any redline with the Turks.
This places the United States in a difficult position. Washington has supported the Kurds in Iraq ever since Operation Desert Storm. Through the last decade of the Saddam regime, U.S. special operations forces helped create a de facto autonomous region in Kurdistan. Washington and the Kurds have a long and bumpy history, now complicated by substantial private U.S. investment in Iraqi Kurdistan for the development of oil resources. Iraqi Kurdish and U.S. interests are strongly intertwined, and Washington would rather not see Iraqi Kurdistan swallowed up by arrangements in Baghdad that undermine current U.S. interests and past U.S. promises.
On the other hand, the U.S. relationship with Turkey is one of Washington’s most important. Whether the question at hand is Iran, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Afghanistan, Russia or Iraq, the Turks have a role. Given the status of U.S. power in the region, alienating Turkey is not an option. And the United States must remember that for Turkey, Kurdish power in Iraq and Turkey’s desired role in developing Iraqi oil are issues of fundamental national importance.
Now left alone to play out this endgame, the United States must figure out a way to finesse the Kurdish issue. In one sense, it doesn’t matter. Turkey has the power ultimately to redefine whatever institutional relationships the United States leaves behind in Iraq. But for Turkey, the sooner Washington hands over this responsibility, the better. The longer the Turks wait, the stronger the Kurds might become and the more destabilizing their actions could be to Turkey. Best of all, if Turkey can assert its influence now, which it has already begun to do, it doesn’t have to be branded as the villain.
All Turkey needs to do is make sure that the United States doesn’t intervene decisively against the Iraqi Sunnis in the battle over Kirkuk in honor of Washington’s commitment to the Kurds.
In any case, the United States doesn’t want to intervene against Iraq’s Sunnis again. In protecting Sunni Arab interests, the Americans have already been sidestepping any measures to organize a census and follow through with a constitutional mandate to hold a referendum in Kirkuk. For the United States, a strong Sunni community is the necessary counterweight to the Iraqi Shia since, over the long haul, it is not clear how a Shiite-dominated government will relate to Iran.
The Shiite Question
The Shiite-dominated government led by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is no puppet of Iran, but at the same time, it is not Iran’s enemy. As matters develop in Iraq, Iran remains the ultimate guarantor of Shiite interests. And Iranian support might not flow directly to the current Iraqi government, but to al-Maliki’s opponents within the Shiite community who have closer ties to Tehran. It is not clear whether Iranian militant networks in Iraq have been broken, or are simply lying low. But it is clear that Iran still has levers in place with which it could destabilize the Shiite community or rivals of the Iraqi Shia if it so desired.
Therefore, the United States has a vested interest in building up the Iraqi Sunni community before it leaves. And from an economic point of view, that means giving the Sunnis access to oil revenue as well as a guarantee of control over that revenue after the United States leaves.
With the tempo of attacks picking up as U.S. forces draw down, Iraq’s Sunni community is evidently not satisfied with the current security and political arrangements in Iraq. Attacks are on the upswing in the northern areas — where remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq continue to operate in Mosul — as well as in central Iraq in and around Baghdad. The foreign jihadists in Iraq hope such attacks will trigger a massive response from the Shiite community, thus plunging Iraq back into civil war. But the foreign jihadists would not be able to operate without some level of support from the local Sunni community. This broader community wants to make sure that the Shia and Americans don’t forget what the Sunnis are capable of should their political, economic and security interests fall by the wayside as the Americans withdraw.
Neither the Iraqi Sunnis nor the Kurds really want the Americans to leave. Neither trust that the intentions or guarantees of the Shiite-dominated government. Iraq lacks a tradition of respect for government institutions and agreements; a piece of paper is just that. Instead, the Sunnis and Kurds see the United States as the only force that can guarantee their interests. Ironically, the United States is now seen as the only real honest broker in Iraq.
But the United States is an honest broker with severe conflicts of interest. Satisfying both Sunni and Kurdish interests is possible only under three conditions. The first is that Washington exercise a substantial degree of control over the Shiite administration of the country — and particularly over energy laws — for a long period of time. The second is that the United States give significant guarantees to Turkey that the Kurds will not extend their nationalist campaign to Turkey, even if they are permitted to extend it to Iran in a bid to destabilize the Iranian regime. The third is that success in the first two conditions not force Iran into a position where it sees its own national security at risk, and so responds by destabilizing Baghdad — and with it, the entire foundation of the national settlement in Iraq negotiated by the United States.
The American strategy in this matter has been primarily tactical. Wanting to leave, it has promised everyone everything. That is not a bad strategy in the short run, but at a certain point, everyone adds up the promises and realizes that they can’t all be kept, either because they are contradictory or because there is no force to guarantee them. Boiled down, this leaves the United States with two strategic options.
First, the United States can leave a residual force of about 20,000 troops in Iraq to guarantee Sunni and Kurdish interests, to protect Turkish interests, etc. The price of pursuing this option is that it leaves Iran facing a nightmare scenario: e.g., the potential re-emergence of a powerful Iraq and the recurrence down the road of the age-old conflict between Persia and Mesopotamia — with the added possibility of a division of American troops supporting their foes. This would pose an existential threat to Iran, forcing Tehran to use covert means to destabilize Iraq that would take advantage of a minimal, widely dispersed U.S. force vulnerable to local violence.
Second, the United States could withdraw and allow Iraq to become a cockpit for competition among neighboring countries: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria — and ultimately major regional powers like Russia. While chaos in Iraq is not inherently inconsistent with U.S. interests, it is highly unpredictable, meaning the United States could be pulled back into Iraq at the least opportune time and place.
The first option is attractive, but its major weakness is the uncertainty created by Iran. With Iran in the picture, a residual force is as much a hostage as a guarantor of Sunni and Kurdish interests. With Iran out of the picture, the residual U.S. force could be smaller and would be more secure. Eliminate the Iran problem completely, and the picture for all players becomes safer and more secure. But eliminating Iran from the equation is not an option — Iran most assuredly gets a vote in this endgame.
Well, the Kurds need to deal and deal fast lest they be abandoned to the tender mercies of the Turks and/or Iranians by Baghdad.
It may sound like mafia "protection", but if they don't pay up, their shop will get burned down and they don't have any of the things necessary for a protracted struggle (most notably ports).
My memory is a little hazy about this, but wasn't Kirkuk historically a Kurd-majority city? As Saddam Hussein's war against the Kurds, wasn't Kirkuk ethnically-cleansed of Kurds and weren't Sunni Arabs moved into the city in their place? I seem to recall the intent of Saddam Hussein was to put Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk to prevent Kurds from controlling the oil. (A war for oil? - Gasp).
The kurds have been moving back into Kirkuk and expelling Arabs since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
It is hard not to feel sympathy for the Kurds who have historically been marginalized and oppressed in their historic homelands. Will the Kurds be sold out yet again?
Can you say "Quagmire"?
Brilliant article laying out all the intertangled webs of connection and political consequences, alliances and future liabilities. It is truly a Gordon knot. Byzantine, really.
This is why removing Saddam was NOT a good idea. The situation guarantees a bad conclusion. There is no way to circumvent the reality of conflicting interests and historical grievances. Meanwhile, what is left out of that picture is of course the Christians.
The one really sad thing about this is that the war against Saddam Hussein has destroyed the Christian community of Assyrian Christians. Does this article say anything about them? No.
Here we are in America with a majority of Christians, and American heavyhandedness in an unjustified war, destroyed by unintended consequences the Christian communites of Iraq. They are being persecuted and killed.
Stepping into this Byzantine labrynthe has got to be the most stupidiest thing in the world. How stupid of Americans---this should have been figured out BEFORE THE WAR EVEN STARTED!
Prediction: Blowup. It's going to blowup in their face and to find out 4000 Americans died in vain. This is what the real moral of that story will be.
This really is putting the cart before the horse.
This article should have come first, and then a decision of do we invade or not to invade.
It seems now, that the Americans invaded, destroyed and torn up the place, and now the question becomes
"Duh, what do we do now, George, what do we do now?" (said in that cartoon voice)
We invaded a country without understanding the consequences. sarcasm: Just brilliant! /sarcasm.
Yugoslavia was able to host the Olympics -- usually the ultimate national coming out party, but imploded over ethnic/geographic divisions soon after. What's the over/under on Iraq lasting 20 years in its current form?
Invading Iraq squandered Bush's post 9/11 political capital. He could have led an ambitious plan to build 500 nuclear plants -- we'd be more energy independent and even cut CO2 emissions. Instead, he tried to outdo Poppy. Bush 43 became a weak domestic president because of it, and set the stage for Obama to outflank Hillary.
Interesting though that Obama isn't changing the Petraeus plan a wit -- so Obama won't get us out of Iraq any faster.
I'm with Stratfor until it comes down to two policy options. I doubt there are only two.
Iraq and Afghanistan seem to have become a linked operation. Our commitment to Iraq is impacted by policy decisions to reduce the American military footprint overseas and to do so before the next Presidential election.
We may be in a situation where we may do one of two things well or two badly. It might be a hard choice to make, but if I had to do so, I would have to conclude, despite the problem of Pakistan, that Iraq is where there is more need, and chance, for our success.
To me, a third policy option would be to regroup for success in Iraq and let Afghanistan find its own destiny with a warning that should they become a sanctuary again we will hurt them again. We should build on our image of strength and fairness Stratfor notes we are credited with by the Iraqis.
I fear the vacuum of a weak commitment and departure in Iraq will nip the development of democratic laws and institutions and the suppression of strong man rule in the bud. I fear the limited goals in Afghanistan will give little result at great cost. I fear policy is being set mostly by people with unreliable instincts who hope for too little.
If we could post 50,000 troops to Korea and Germany for decades, we should do the same for Iraq. We broke it, we own it ... it's too strategic.
I don't know what we're trying to achieve in Afghanistan anymore. Don't say "victory." A small force and a lot of drone aircraft should suffice.
A chronic and bizarre over/underestimation of Iranian power pervades Stratfor's Middle Eastern analyses.
On the one hand, Iran is this fierce and potentially powerful beast of war that could do all sorts of terrible things if roused, and they are always soon to be roused because they are terribly insecure ("nervous") about everything that occurs anywhere within about 500 miles of their borders.
On the other, their nuclear brinksmanship and threats/use of terrorist proxy groups as arms of policy are just bluster and window garnish and aren't really a source of concern.
Oh, and they're led by perfectly rational, cost/benefit oriented statesmen inspired by Vito Corleone (despite their open and irrational hatred of and violent opposition to Israel that didn't become policy until about 1980, for example) who only do things like talk about receiving a divine halo during a UN speech, or redesigning the city of Tehran to prepare for the coming of the Mahdi to fool the rubes.
The same kind of weird, awe struck apologia existed regarding the old USSR during the Cold War. It was false then, too.
"Remind me again of why Bush-Cheney had a brilliant long range vision when they had us invade Iraq on false pretenses?"
Establishing even a pseudo-functional democratic Arab state in the Middle East could be a transformational catalyst for the region no less than the establishment of the United States eventually was for Europe; the same United States that was born a provincial, backward, agrarian, and dysfunctional (Articles of Confederation, anyone?) slave-state but which became the richest, most powerful, most influential, and arguably freest nation in the history of mankind.
It's easy to shoot down a dream. Most dreams fail. But some don't.
Reg: 'False pretenses.' I have been urged to publish a paper that I have written that scatters that premise to the four winds. If anyone has a back door into a reputable publication that will accept an unsolicited contribution, please give me a ring. My initial suggested set of likelies turned up cold...
"It's easy to shoot down a dream. Most dreams fail."
Dawnfire82 ... you're often rational, so here's a rational reply
1) We -- the US -- happened on our own. We weren't someone else's dream.
2) We can't cut and run on Iraq -- quite the contrary. We broke it, we own it.
3) Even if we're lucky enough to get the best case 20-year and longer outcome "locally", Iraq was a mistake of Biblical proportions. Bush - Cheney - Rumsfeld - The Neocons ... each came in with a separate agenda that totally backfired ... none of them cared about "promoting democracy in the Middle East " ... they didn't even try that line of bullshit until everything else they lied to us about was proven unconvertibly false. They should all burn in some circle of hell.
4) The worst thing about Iraq is the domestic fallout. We're living with it today. It made Bush weak domestically. It was a necessary condition to Obama getting elected.
5) Our "Big Federal Government" is our biggest danger. It's out of control on many fronts. Bush & Co started this fire, Obama & Co are gasoline on this fire. The most likely outcome is that it goes broke in a three to ten year time frame. Then ... who the hell knows.
6) Until folks like you recognize this, we're weak fighting Obamism and saving our Republic. I keep harping on Bush-Cheney and Iraq, because if the "resistance" doesn't get this right we'll likely fail over the next ten years.
"1) We -- the US -- happened on our own. We weren't someone else's dream."
Not quite true (several European powers were essential to the success of the Revolutionary War) and even if it were true, irrelevant. Whether the idea of a democratic catalyst was born in Washington, Amman, or Tokyo doesn't matter; only the result.
And can you look at pictures of legions of Iraqis proudly, absurdly showing off their dyed purple fingers to cameras and each other and honestly tell me that it's not their dream as well?
"2) We can't cut and run on Iraq -- quite the contrary. We broke it, we own it."
A 'pottery barn' theory of international relations that has no place in recorded history. We didn't 'own' Panama in 1989, nor Mexico in 1848. This kind of behavior is a chosen policy, (to ensure the establishment of a democratic state) not some sort of immutable law that must be followed.
"3) Even if we're lucky enough to get the best case 20-year and longer outcome "locally", Iraq was a mistake of Biblical proportions. Bush - Cheney - Rumsfeld - The Neocons ... each came in with a separate agenda that totally backfired ... none of them cared about "promoting democracy in the Middle East " ... they didn't even try that line of bullshit until everything else they lied to us about was proven unconvertibly false. They should all burn in some circle of hell."
Utterly wrong. President Bush's first public linkage of the spread of democracy in the Middle East to American strategic interests was made shortly after 9/11. A speech specifically addressing the establishment of democracy in a Middle Eastern Muslim country, specifically Iraq, as a strategic interest was made before the Enterprise Institute in February, 2003. The month before hostilities began, in case your chronology is fuzzy.
It wasn't pushed very hard to the public because they didn't think it would be very persuasive, but it was (in my opinion) the root strategic objective, closely followed by eliminating Iraqi WMDs.
And I thought that the 'Bush lied!' thing was limited to the lunatic fringe. Can you really believe that the entire upper levels of the Executive hatched a multi-year, utterly secret conspiracy to fake evidence in order to persuade not only their own constituents, but numerous foreign powers (some of whom were obviously in on this conspiracy, because they too supplied arguments and evidence) to launch an invasion to, to paraphrase you, 'outdo the president's daddy?' The President, Vice President, intelligence chiefs and their peons, military officers and their peons, foreign heads of state and *their* intelligence agencies and militaries, and Congressional leadership were either criminal masterminds or criminally stupid to be fooled by this mind-blowingly large and complex Illuminati conspiracy, and between them all hatched a conflict to fulfill some imagined Freudian psychological need?
Either the Bavarian Illuminati are real and Alex Jones is a prophet of truth, or that's completely retarded.
I've got to get that paper published... of course, as former intelligence agent during the war I'd probably just be written off as a neo-con agent of influence, obfuscating the 'Truth.'
"4) The worst thing about Iraq is the domestic fallout. We're living with it today. It made Bush weak domestically. It was a necessary condition to Obama getting elected."
While true, that has nothing to do with the original strategic aim of the invasion. Besides, would you really want a president to think, 'I can't do what appears to be in the best interest of the country because it might affect the next-next presidential election?'
"5) Our "Big Federal Government" is our biggest danger. It's out of control on many fronts. Bush & Co started this fire, Obama & Co are gasoline on this fire. The most likely outcome is that it goes broke in a three to ten year time frame. Then ... who the hell knows."
That's your opinion, not a rational fact. And what does this have to do with Iraq?
"6) Until folks like you recognize this, we're weak fighting Obamism and saving our Republic. I keep harping on Bush-Cheney and Iraq, because if the "resistance" doesn't get this right we'll likely fail over the next ten years."
So the key to defeating the radical elements of Obama's agenda is to pillory the former President? And here I thought that was Obama's plan to *enact* his radical agenda.
The Stratfor analysis is good. Even if one disagrees with this or that point, it demonstrates clearly how there is no simple us-vs-them strategic policy that will be successful. But I disagree with the commenters who suggest that since we are "damned if we do, damned if we don't" we should not have attempted a strategic policy in the first place, particularly in Iraq.
It was necessary for America to invade Iraq for a number of reasons besides the ones usually given. Not only to change Iraqis or the Middle East, but to change us. We had to face down the enemy with American soldiers, not through proxies such as Israel or economic sanctions. Otherwise, we would not have been motivated to understand the enemy, or the conflict. We would not have been forced to confront our hypocrisy in foreign policy, such as decrying Saddam's torturous regime while we ourselves employed torture in some of the very same prisons. We would not have worked our way through the flawed leadership of Cheney, Rumsfeld, Garner, etc. until finding our footing with a workable anti-insurgency strategy instituted by leaders such as Petraeus, Gates, and McChrystal.
Americans can be ignorant of foreign ways, or, we can be imperialist meddlers. But we can't be both at the same time and achieve success in foreign policy.
It would be nice to think America could somehow withdraw its troops from the Middle East, but that will not be able to happen (without disastrous consequence) for another 50 years. This is a conflict only marginally smaller in scale than WWII, and our enemies have expressed no moderation in their intent to destroy America and kill Americans since 9/11. The war in Afghanistan and Iraq was only the beginning, and the countries of Iran and Pakistan represent far more formidable challenges.