Sunday, December 03, 2006
Sunni blundering in Iraq
Richard Fernandez of the Belmont Club, elaborating on Westhawk, argues that the Sunni insurgency has been a catastrophic military and political failure, and led the Sunnis of Iraq into a strategic cul de sac:
In an irony that must rank as one of the most curious in history, the insurgency in al-Anbar finds it must continue precisely because of the threat of a US drawdown. At the end of a sequence of blunders, Sunni strategists have managed to add yet one more. It is a continuation of a failed policy which begun with the Sunnis defying the US Armed Forces; that led to US Armed Forces building up a Shi'ite Army; that resulted in the crushing of Sunni strongholds. It continued in their absurd response to defeat: provoking civil unrest in an internal conflict they could not hope to win. That civil unrest has come within a handsbreadth of politically driving America from Iraq. And now they realize too late that an American withdrawal means their inevitable massacre in a war they are now too weak to win. The Sunnis find themselves, as Westhawk puts it, looking at a political "chasm" they cannot cross.
The massacre of the Sunnis is not quite "inevitable." There remains the possibility of significant intervention from Sunni Arabs in the region, which is precisely what Saudi Arabia has threatened to do.
Over the past year, a chorus of voices has called for Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni community in Iraq and thwart Iranian influence there. Senior Iraqi tribal and religious figures, along with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and other Arab and Muslim countries, have petitioned the Saudi leadership to provide Iraqi Sunnis with weapons and financial support. Moreover, domestic pressure to intervene is intense. Major Saudi tribal confederations, which have extremely close historical and communal ties with their counterparts in Iraq, are demanding action. They are supported by a new generation of Saudi royals in strategic government positions who are eager to see the kingdom play a more muscular role in the region.
Because King Abdullah has been working to minimize sectarian tensions in Iraq and reconcile Sunni and Shiite communities, because he gave President Bush his word that he wouldn't meddle in Iraq (and because it would be impossible to ensure that Saudi-funded militias wouldn't attack U.S. troops), these requests have all been refused. They will, however, be heeded if American troops begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq. As the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene.
Read the whole thing. Note that the disclaimer at the end -- that it does not represent "official Saudi policy" -- is a crock. As I wrote yesterday, the projection of Sunni power into Iraq would have terrible long-term consequences, and is reason enough to sustain the American military presence.
9 Comments:
By 
allen, at
Sun Dec 03, 10:11:00 AM:
While one hears daily of Iranian and Syrian meddling in Iraq, one must ask if the past and present behavior of Iraq's Sunni is not the result of Saudi influence, actual and implicit. Are we to believe the Saudis have, for 3 plus years, been uninvolved in influencing events in Iraq? Given Saudi vulnerability, that is highly unlikely. May we again find that our best efforts to overcome Muslim radicalism have been undermined by our friends the Saudis?
By Matt Rowe, at
Sun Dec 03, 10:32:00 AM:
From www.WinTheGWOT.org
Sunnis Cannot Be Excluded in the New Iraq: How to Really Win the War in Iraq and Positively Impact the Global War on Terror
Anne Gearan’s Associated Press article on December 2, 2006 “US rethinking Iraqi unification goal” indicates that President Bush is stepping up his personal role in the Iraqi political situation in an attempt to bring stability there. The article also hints at something quite ominous that other media sources have begun discussing of late. That is, the potential for the US choosing factional sides and the possible exclusion of Sunnis from further political attempts at bringing them into a more cooperative and diverse government. This would be a strategic mistake with tragic consequences. Fortunately, President Bush intends to meet with the Sunni Vice President next month to ensure that no such signal is officially sent—at least not yet.
Excluding the minority Sunnis would be a mistake for many reasons. First, regardless of past events and their minority status, it would further legitimize them as enemies to the majority groups and leave them even more vulnerable to oppression and neglect from the new government and their fellow Iraqis. Not all Sunnis are enemies of the new Iraqi government today, but if excluded they would likely become so when lacking any alternative.
Conversely, not all Shiite (and other) groups are friendly to the Iraqi government, so granting them some sort of blanket political status in comparison to a Sunni rejection would create a dangerous environment for some of our key allies in the region. Sunnis in Jordan and the majority Sunni population in Saudi Arabia, which does not necessarily support its own Wahhabist rulers, could interpret this action as an attack on Sunnis as a whole. This would compel them actively support their brethren in Iraq and expand the conflict and possibly destabilize other countries. External aid to Sunnis would increase Iran’s motivation to support the Shiites and a regional conflict could spin out of control, necessitating further US military involvement.
Rather, the US and Iraqi governments must identify the areas of support they already have, regardless of ethic or religious faction, and work to provide safety and security in those locations. This may only be a small portion of the country at first, but it is easiest to start there and build a legitimate working system that demonstrates how the government can effectively work for all groups in Iraq. The emphasis should be to build local police who are not corrupt and who respect diversity and Human Rights—that is, police who have a stake in the success of the local community. They are the primary counterinsurgents. Iraqi military forces should be used to help protect them and the people in these select areas and to fight the insurgents elsewhere whenever practical. It is critical that investments be made in these areas to increase employment and public services, and that are available to all members of the community.
The US and Iraqi governments should work with Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran and Syria, to obtain overall support and a commitment to reduce the amount of external arms and influence entering Iraq and bolstering the anti-government forces. It will not be easy, but it must occur.
As the protected and properly governed areas begin to prosper and the new Iraqi government builds relationships of trust within the general population, it can then begin expanding its influence outward and reduce the effectiveness and popularity of the anti-government forces and insurgents. To attempt to do this to the entire country at once is folly—the current Iraqi forces bolstered by 140,000 US troops have demonstrated that much already.
Once these “protected” areas are identified and troops are put into position, the US can reduce its forces by about 80%, leaving approximately 28,000 troops or 9 carefully chosen brigades to support the Iraqi led effort. US Special Forces advisor/trainers could work to help professionalize the police and military while US brigades capable of rapid deployment and reaction to specific crises could be stationed outside of the main population centers. This would reduce the US presence without completely eliminating our ability to protect our own troops and support the Iraqi government.
This is the true definition of the “long war” we have been hearing about for so long, and one can only hope that the Iraq Study Group presents some similar plan that the Bush Administration buys into. It will take decades to complete, but would cost the US a lot less in terms of non-recoverable military expenses and turn our effort into a genuine investment in the future of world stability. It would also reduce the incentive and popular support for local terrorists and lead to a genuine victory in Iraq as well as a victory in the global war on terror.
The sooner we get started the sooner we can stabilize Iraq and create a long term ally with a relatively prosperous people who have no reason to hate the US and support the anti-American jihadist terrorists, which was our goal in the first place.
By Lanky_Bastard, at
Sun Dec 03, 04:41:00 PM:
Iraq: Pandora's box of the Middle East. It can always get worse I guess.
By 
, at
Sun Dec 03, 07:57:00 PM:
We believe it is both desirable and inevitable that the U.S. government tilts in favor of Shi'ite/Kurdish governance in Iraq. At this point, it is the only way to end the civil war.
The U.S. State Department has proposed ending the U.S. government's attempt at reconciliation with Iraq's Sunni Arabs. We discussed this important development in this post. On Monday, President Bush will have a hastily-arranged meeting with Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, Iraq's most powerful Shi'ite politician. This meeting will occur just days after Mr. al-Hakim met with the U.S. presidential delegation last week in Amman, Jordan. We invite you to speculate on their discussions.
So if the U.S. abandons Iraq's Sunni Arabs, will this spark a regional war? We think this is highly unlikely.
Saudi intervention to "save" Iraq's Sunnis would "bet the kingdom" and have no chance of success. Further, the region's players have much to lose, and little to gain, from going to war over Iraq.
Don't worry, it's not August 1914 in the Middle East.
Westhawk
By Assistant Village Idiot, at
Sun Dec 03, 08:56:00 PM:
I went over to Westhawk's links and found the arguments persuasive. I 4echo the rec
By Unknown, at
Sun Dec 03, 09:00:00 PM:
Tigerhawk, you know that the Sunni Arabs (most of the Kurds are Sunnis, too) can't win in Iraq, Wretchard knows it, and I know it. The question is do the Sunni Arabs in Iraq know it?
By K. Pablo, at
Sun Dec 03, 11:48:00 PM:
Hey, Westhawk, you always refer to yourself in the second-person plural. What are ya, the friggin' POPE?
By , at
Mon Dec 04, 10:55:00 AM:
Dear k. pablo:
Westhawk relies on the ideas and contributions of several people. We use the plural to give credit to all of these contributions.
Westhawk
By K. Pablo, at
Mon Dec 04, 08:57:00 PM:
