Friday, June 16, 2006
Locking down Baghdad and the role of the press
Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies put out a short note on Wednesday discussing the recently-launched operation to secure Baghdad. Highlights and commentary follow:
The problem of force ratios
Iraqi officials discuss Baghdad as having 20-33% of Iraq's population. Estimates of six million people are common, although it is unclear any real estimate exists beyond the data gathered for voting registrations and the UN food for peace program. Much depends as well on whether the core city, the entire province, or associated areas in greater Baghdad are counted. Regardless of the numbers, even 80,000 men would be a small force in terms of the total population and area to be covered. Moreover, only part of any such force can be deployed. No matter how many people are publicly announced as being involved in the operation, such totals inevitably include large numbers of support forces, headquarters units, etc. Accordingly, for an operation to have real meaning, and produce sustainable results, it has to go far beyond manning check points, establishing a visible presence, and creating the image of security. These are politically important, but they also will be hollow if they are the core of the operations. Insurgents and militias can simply wait out the operations, bury their arms, shift to targets in other areas, and operate around and outside the checkpoints and areas where forces are present.
The small force ratio does not, however, condemn the operation to failure. The real purpose is less to secure Baghdad for all time than to build the credibility of the government of Iraq. Since credibility is the desired end of the operation more than ultimate security, the press plays a big role here.
This does not mean this operation cannot have great impact, but the real impact will consist of active operations in the "red" or high threat areas that directly attack insurgent targets on which there is good intelligence, and efforts to disarm, disperse, or directly control the militias.
Given the political nature of this struggle, Iraqi and Coalition sources should stress Iraqi successes, Iraqi tips and HUMINT, and Iraqi control and planning. Such claims will often be correct, but Iraq does not yet have anything like the intelligence and command and control capabilities to conduct such an operation on its own. It still needs a US partner, although this partner should be as silent about its intelligence and special operations role as possible (and media should be extremely discrete) and minimize its importance in operations.
The public side of the operation needs to do as much as possible to restore Iraqi faith in US operations, the MOI forces, and the police. The scandals -- real and imagined -- of the past months, make it critical that Iraqi civilians are not injured or killed, collateral damage is minimal, and armed action be clearly directed at real insurgent targets. This makes the way the operation handles militias and local security forces equally important. One bad incident by US or Iraqi forces, particularly one with an apparent sectarian or ethnic character, could have very serious effect. This, however, gives the insurgents and more radical militias every incentive to lie about what happens and stage aftermaths and "witnesses." It also gives them an incentive to try to attack sectarian and ethnic fault lines in ways that grab public and media attention and discredit the success or character of the operation.
Victory in the securing of Baghdad will not be obvious. There are no front lines, and the enemy has no order of battle. The mainstream media will have an enormous opportunity to characterize this operation as a success or a failure. To a great degree, that characterization will determine whether it is a success or a failure. The Western press surely understands this point. We shall see which side it chooses to take.
There's much more in the Cordesman's three-page note, including some sharp analysis of the fundamental weakness of the "ink spot" strategy. Read the whole thing (pdf here).
4 Comments:
By 
, at
Fri Jun 16, 02:13:00 PM:
Cordesman is an Arabist. I question not only what he writes but the timing.
Why did he write this?
By 
Lanky_Bastard, at
Fri Jun 16, 06:33:00 PM:
Memo to the Press: make us look good, or else you're treasonously supporting the insurgency. Carry on then.
By Dawnfire82, at
Fri Jun 16, 06:52:00 PM:
Maybe he wrote it because it's relevant to the current situation?
And it wouldn't be so bad if the press didn't seem to support the insurgency. (I say 'seem' because some don't... but many do, or at least oppose the coalition to the extent that they de facto cater to the insurgency)
I think doing this kind of operation now, after AQ in Iraq has been decapitated, is good. The kind of strategic retaliation that this article fears ("incentive to try to attack sectarian and ethnic fault lines") will be slower in coming (if it comes at all) and limited thanks to the demise of the leadership.
By TigerHawk, at
Fri Jun 16, 11:19:00 PM:
I've read many of Cordesman's reports -- certainly more than a dozen -- and if by "Arabist" you mean "apologist for Arab dictators" (which is, after all, the usual meaning of those who use the term disparagingly), I would say that he is not. I do not always agree with him, but he is smart and dispassionate enough that he is worth reading.
