Saturday, April 15, 2006
Iran and "excess demand" for military action
A couple of days ago I heaped scorn on James Fallows, who has criticized the Bush administration for allegedly creating "excess demand" for military action against Iran. The idea is that the United States should bluff Iran secretly, rather than publicly, because in doing the latter we may be creating too much pressure to follow through, and thereby limit our own ability to back down. There are a number of reasons why Fallows grossly overstates the risk that "excess demand" will constrain the United States, including that the American public is nothing if not tired of war.
The concept of "excess demand" for military action is a valid one, however. Plenty of countries have gone to war because war was too popular in certain circles, or because they feared for their status as a "great power" if they backed down, or because the bluff increased the perception of insecurity in the enemy camp. As Ezra Klein points out, the cascade of escalation leading to World War I is the most famous modern example of this problem.
It seems to me that if there is an "excess demand" problem in the Iran crisis, it is not coming from the United States. We have simply declared our objective -- that Iran shall not build a nuclear weapon -- and in response to questions reminded reporters of our historical policy that we do not preclude the possibility of military action in advance. The "excess demand" is coming from Iran, whose head of state has repeatedly promised -- or at least predicted -- the destruction of Israel. President Ahmadinejad is creating internal demand for war, compounding Israel's usual sense of insecurity, and putting Iran's national prestige on the line.
Of these three risks embedded in Ahmadinejad's reckless posturing, the first two are probably low, or at least manageable. It is not clear whether the Iranian people have any abstract desire for war, even with Israel. I speculate that on average they do not, if for no other reason than the remaining national memory of the horrible war with Iraq. Similarly, Israel has repeatedly shown remarkable restraint in the teeth of merely verbal bellicosity. With the possible exception of the United States, no other militarily capable state would tolerate the threats that Arab and Muslim countries routinely make to Israel.
The big risk, it seems to me, is that Ahmadinejad is putting Iran's national prestige on the line. Iranians are famously proud, and famously ambitious to "lead" the Muslim world. Ahmadinejad may have invested so much of his nation's credibility in demonizing Israel that Iran's real leadership may reluctantly conclude one day that their national status as a regional "great power" requires Iran to attack Israel overtly. The chances that this will happen will increase if Muslim extremists exploit Iranian pride to encourage that result. If the jihadis or other radicals start publicly mocking Iran for not attacking Israel notwithstanding Ahmadinejad's "promise" to do so, the risk of war will go up dramatically whether or not Iran has a nuclear weapon.
The concept of "excess demand" for military action is a valid one, however. Plenty of countries have gone to war because war was too popular in certain circles, or because they feared for their status as a "great power" if they backed down, or because the bluff increased the perception of insecurity in the enemy camp. As Ezra Klein points out, the cascade of escalation leading to World War I is the most famous modern example of this problem.
It seems to me that if there is an "excess demand" problem in the Iran crisis, it is not coming from the United States. We have simply declared our objective -- that Iran shall not build a nuclear weapon -- and in response to questions reminded reporters of our historical policy that we do not preclude the possibility of military action in advance. The "excess demand" is coming from Iran, whose head of state has repeatedly promised -- or at least predicted -- the destruction of Israel. President Ahmadinejad is creating internal demand for war, compounding Israel's usual sense of insecurity, and putting Iran's national prestige on the line.
Of these three risks embedded in Ahmadinejad's reckless posturing, the first two are probably low, or at least manageable. It is not clear whether the Iranian people have any abstract desire for war, even with Israel. I speculate that on average they do not, if for no other reason than the remaining national memory of the horrible war with Iraq. Similarly, Israel has repeatedly shown remarkable restraint in the teeth of merely verbal bellicosity. With the possible exception of the United States, no other militarily capable state would tolerate the threats that Arab and Muslim countries routinely make to Israel.
The big risk, it seems to me, is that Ahmadinejad is putting Iran's national prestige on the line. Iranians are famously proud, and famously ambitious to "lead" the Muslim world. Ahmadinejad may have invested so much of his nation's credibility in demonizing Israel that Iran's real leadership may reluctantly conclude one day that their national status as a regional "great power" requires Iran to attack Israel overtly. The chances that this will happen will increase if Muslim extremists exploit Iranian pride to encourage that result. If the jihadis or other radicals start publicly mocking Iran for not attacking Israel notwithstanding Ahmadinejad's "promise" to do so, the risk of war will go up dramatically whether or not Iran has a nuclear weapon.
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