Wednesday, March 22, 2006
Iran, the United States, and Iraq
Not to put too fine a point on it, but the real players in Iraq are now going to sit down and see if they can reach some decisions about the country's future. They are going to do this over the heads of their various clients. Obviously, the needs of those clients will have to be satisfied, but in the end, the Iraq war is at least partly about U.S.-Iranian relations, and it is clear that both sides have now decided that it is time to explore a deal -- not in a quiet Georgetown restaurant, but in full view of the world. In other words, it is time to get serious.
The offer of public talks actually was not made by Iran. The first public proposal for talks came from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, who several months ago reported that he had been authorized by Bush to open two lines of discussion: One was with the non-jihadist Sunni leadership in Iraq; the other was with Iran. Interestingly, Khalilzad had emphasized that he was authorized to speak with the Iranians only about Iraq and not about other subjects. In other words, discussion of Iran's nuclear program was not going to take place. What happened last week was that the Iranians finally gave Khalilzad an answer: yes.
As we have discussed many times, Iraq has been Iran's obsession. It is an obsession rooted in ancient history; the Bible speaks of the struggle between Babylon and Persia for regional hegemony. It has some of its roots in more recent history as well: Iran lost about 300,000 people, with about 1 million more wounded and captured, in its 1980-88 war with Iraq.... The Iranians, then, came out of the war with two things: an utter hatred of Saddam Hussein and his regime, and determination that this sort of devastation should never happen again....
The Iranians were unable to wage war against Hussein but were content, after Desert Storm, that he could not attack Iran. So they focused on increasing their influence in the south and bided their time. They could not take out Hussein, but they still wanted someone to do so. That someone was the Americans....
Iran responded to the 9/11 attacks in a predictable manner. First, Iran was as concerned by al Qaeda as the United States was. The Iranians saw themselves as the vanguard of revolutionary Islam, and they did not want to see their place usurped by Wahhabis, whom they viewed as the tool of another regional rival, Saudi Arabia. Thus, Tehran immediately offered U.S. forces the right to land, at Iranian airbases, aircraft that were damaged during operations in Afghanistan. Far more important, the Iranians used their substantial influence in western and northern Afghanistan to secure allies for the United States. They wanted the Taliban gone. This is not to say that some al Qaeda operatives, having paid or otherwise induced regional Iranian commanders, didn't receive some sanctuary in Iran; the Iranians would have given sanctuary to Osama bin Laden if that would have neutralized him. But Tehran's policy was to oppose al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to quietly support the United States in its war against them. This was no stranger, really, than the Americans giving anti-tank missiles to Khomeini in the 1980s...
But the main chance that Iran saw was getting the Americans to invade Iraq and depose their true enemy, Saddam Hussein. The United States was not led to invade Iraq by the Iranians -- that would be too simple a model. However, the Iranians, with their excellent intelligence network in Iraq, helped to smooth the way for the American decision....
The Iranians wanted the United States to defeat Hussein. They wanted the United States to bear the burden of pacifying the Sunni regions of Iraq. They wanted U.S. forces to bog down in Iraq so that, in due course, the Americans would withdraw -- but only after the Sunnis were broken -- leaving behind a Shiite government that would be heavily influenced by Iran. The Iranians did everything they could to encourage the initial engagement and then stood by as the United States fought the Sunnis. They were getting what they wanted.
What they did not count on was American flexibility. From the first battle of Al Fallujah onward, the United States engaged in negotiations with the Sunni leadership. The United States had two goals: one, to use the Sunni presence in a new Iraqi government to block Iranian ambitions; and two, to split the Sunnis from the jihadists. It was the very success of this strategy, evident in the December 2005 elections, that caused Iraqi Shia to move away from the Iranians a bit, and, more important, caused the jihadists to launch an anti-Shiite rampage. The jihadists' goal was to force a civil war in Iraq and drive the Sunnis back into an unbreakable alliance with them.
In other words, the war was not going in favor of either the United States or Iran. The Americans were bogged down in a war that could not be won with available manpower, if by "victory" we mean breaking the Sunni-jihadist will to resist. The Iranians envisioned the re-emergence of their former Baathist enemies. Not altogether certain of the political commitments or even the political savvy of their Shiite allies in Iraq, they could now picture their worst nightmare: a coalition government in which the Sunnis, maneuvering with the Kurds and Americans, would dominate an Iraqi government. They saw Tehran's own years of maneuvering as being in jeopardy. Neither side could any longer be certain of the outcome.
In response, each side attempted, first, to rattle the other. Iran's nuclear maneuver was designed to render the Americans more forthcoming; the assumption was that a nuclear Iran would be more frightening, from the American point of view, than a Shiite Iraq. The Americans held off responding and then, a few weeks ago, began letting it be known that not only were airstrikes against Iran possible, but that in fact they were being seriously considered and that deadlines were being drawn up.
This wasn't about nuclear weapons but about Iraq, as both sides made clear when the talks were announced. Both players now have all their cards on the table. Iran bluffed nukes, the United States called the bluff and seemed about to raise. Khalilzad's request for talks was still on the table. The Iranians took it. This was not really done in order to forestall airstrikes -- the Iranians were worried about that only on the margins. What Iran had was a deep concern and an interesting opportunity.
The concern was that the situation in Iraq was spinning out of its control. The United States was no longer predictable, the Sunnis were no longer predictable, and even the Iranians' Shiite allies were not playing their proper role. The Iranians were playing for huge stakes in Iraq and there were suddenly too many moving pieces, too many things that could go wrong...
From the Iranian point of view, if ever a man has needed a deal, it is Bush. If there are going to be any negotiations, they are to happen now. From Bush's point of view, he does need a deal, but so do the Iranians -- things are ratcheting out of control from Tehran's point of view as well....
The Iranians want at least to Finlandize Iraq. During the Cold War, the Soviets did not turn Finland into a satellite, but they did have the right to veto members of its government, to influence the size and composition of its military and to require a neutral foreign policy. The Iranians wanted more, but they will settle for keeping the worst of the Baathists out of the government and for controls over Iraq's international behavior. The Americans want a coalition government within the limits of a Finlandic solution. They do not want a purely Shiite government; they want the Sunnis to deal with the jihadists, in return for guaranteed Sunni rights in Iraq. Finally, the United States wants the right to place a force in Iraq -- aircraft and perhaps 40,000 troops -- outside the urban areas, in the west. The Iranians do not really want U.S. troops so close, so they will probably argue about the number and the type. They do not want to see heavy armored units but can live with lighter units stationed to the west.
Now obviously, in this negotiation, each side will express distrust and indifference. The White House won the raise by expressing doubts as to Tehran's seriousness; the implication was that the Iranians were buying time to work on their nukes. Perhaps. But the fact is that Tehran will work on nukes as and when it wants, and Washington will destroy the nukes as and when it wants. The nukes are non-issues in the real negotiations.
There are three problems now with negotiations. One is Bush's ability to keep his coalition intact while he negotiates with a member of the "axis of evil." Another is Iran's ability to keep its coalition together while it negotiates with the "Great Satan." And third is the ability of either to impose their collective will on an increasingly self-reliant Iraqi polity. The two major powers are now ready to talk. What is not clear is whether, even together, they will be in a position to impose their will on the Iraqis....
The only incremental observation that I am going to make this morning -- I am in a bit of a rush -- is that the United States faces something of a paradox in these negotiations. It can cut a deal with Iran, and then, as Stratfor suggests, fail to get the Iraqis to "go along," whatever that may mean in the particulars of the matter. Ironically, the ability of Iraq to resist any deal cut by the United States and Iran will be a reflection of rising post-Ba'athist Iraqi nationalism, which is probably a positive development for the future of a united Iraqi state and geopolitical balance in the region.
Stratfor's strength, and its weakness, is that as an organization it follows the tendencies of its founder, George Friedman. Friedman tends to derive geopolitical strategy in all the actions of nation states, apparently not allowing as much room for rank emotionalism or bureaucratic stupidity as I would. However, he has long seen our game with Iran more deeply than conventional American politics will allow, and in that regard makes a huge contribution to the discussion.
3 Comments:
By 
, at
Wed Mar 22, 10:15:00 AM:
Dear Mr. TigerHawk:
Stratfor's wordy and meandering essay on the U.S.-Iran "negotiations" is wrong.
U.S-Iranian negotiations on the subject of Iran's activities or influence in Iraq would be a complete waste of time for the U.S. Iranian intelligence and paramilitary operations inside Iraq are clandestine; any "agreement" about reducing or eliminating them, reached between the U.S. and Iran in side-talks, would be both unenforceable by the U.S. and unnecessary for the Iranians to comply with. The U.S. knows all of this in advance.
So what is the purpose of Mr. Khalilzad's invitation to the Iranians to come to Baghdad?
We describe the answer in this post on our blog,
Iran and the U.S. talk about Iraq. Why?.
In summary, Iran's goal with this meeting is to achieve international recognition for an Iranian seat at any table discussing Iraq. The Iranians seek quasi-legal legitimacy for their interference inside Iraq. The U.S. goal is to motivate the Iraqis to refocus on the Iranian threat, and get on with organizing an Iraqi government and response to that threat. The U.S. purpose is to influence Iraqi, not Iranian, behavior.
We also note that a subversive Iranian takeover of much of Iraq (achieved through proxies) will be as unacceptable to Western interests as would be a nuclear weapons arsenal in the possession of Iran's mullahs. If Iraqi Shi'ite politicians (such as al-Sadr or al-Hakim) assist Iran toward this end, it will only accelerate an inevitable military clash between Iran and the West.
Westhawk
By 
TigerHawk, at
Wed Mar 22, 12:16:00 PM:
Westhawk,
Good comment. I'm on the road right now, but I'll take a look at your post later.
By Dawnfire82, at
Wed Mar 22, 01:44:00 PM:
That long post was full of speculation, simplifications, and wrong assumptions. A short list of the obvious ones.
1) chalking up Iranian interest in Iraq as an ancient obsession. That's just silly. It has more to do with regional politics and religious identity.
2) No one with any degree of knowledge and understanding of Islamist terrorism can seriously describe Al Qaeda as a tool of Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda is dedicated to the overthrow of the Saudi government. Did this guy sleep through the myriad shootouts that Saudi security forces have had with Al Waeda operatives over the last couple of years? How about the suicide bomb attempt against a Saudi refinery like, two months ago? Aside, Iran has worked with Al Qaeda in the past, most notably with the Khobar Towers bombing.
3) Iran was glad to see the Taliban go, yes, but not happy to see the US arrive. They have sheltered and armed anti-US forces in the area, including Hekmatyar, an old and respected jihadi who I think still eludes capture or neutralization. "Tehran immediately offered U.S. forces the right to land, at Iranian airbases, aircraft that were damaged during operations in Afghanistan." - this was a tongue-in-cheek geo-political move. Think of it as, 'yes, we're very sorry you got suicide bombed, even though we've done it to you ourselves, so feel free to land your aircraft in our country so we can pick them apart as we *repair* them, like the Chinese did to your spy plane in 2001.'
4) "the Iranians, with their excellent intelligence network in Iraq" - I don't think I buy this.
5) The essay implies that the Iranians have up to this point assumed a hand off approach in Iraq, that their ambitions there were somehow blocked politically. Iran has had a very active hand in Iraqi instability. Mugtada al-Sadr anyone? That guy is an Iranian pawn who has led uprisings twice, and is an active political/paramilitary player even now. Iranian agents have been reported in the media as being active in Iraq, and American officers have accused Iran of shipping advanced IEDs into the country to give to insurgents. One of these killed a friend of mine in January. This means that they are dealing with Salafi insurgents, specifically Zarqawi's minions. There is additional evidence of Iranian meddling that is currently classified and has not been leaked yet.
6) Iran did not initiate a 'nuclear maneuver' in response to the American invasion. The existence of their nuclear program was published in 2002 (before the Iraqi invasion) by a dissident group. Following a runaround with the IAEA that included discovery of plutonium, it has slowly developed into a diplomatic crisis.
7) "Finally, the United States wants the right to place a force in Iraq -- aircraft and perhaps 40,000 troops -- outside the urban areas, in the west."
What? Where did this come from? Last I heard, the US would not ask for permanent bases in Iraq, and the Iraqis were not considering it.
8) To imply that the American coalition will somehow disintegrate if the US talks to Iran is stupid. Of all members in the coalition, the one with the worst relations with Iran is the US. Iran does not have a coalition; it is a theocracy. What the leadership says, goes. And I would hardly call a self-reliant polity in Iraq a problem for the US; after all, that is the whole point of the war.
Who wrote this?
