Tuesday, October 04, 2005
The al Qaeda "diaspora": attack or retreat?
Iraq's Minister of the Interior, Bayan Jabor, gave a barely-noticed interview over the weekend in which he claimed that Abu Massab Zarqawi's "al Qaeda in Iraq" was sending some of its fighters back to their home countries:
Assuming for a moment that the counterinsurgency did find such documents and that they are authentic, there are at least two interesting questions that flow from this. First, is al Qaeda's objective in sending soldiers home to attack other "apostate" Arab regimes (as it has already done, particularly in Saudi Arabia), or is it to preserve the military assets that it has gathered in Iraq? Put differently, is al Qaeda escalating against other apostate regimes now that it smells victory in Iraq, or is it retreating from the squeeze play that is depriving it of its operational flexibility in the Sunni Triangle? Or perhaps the return of Sunni Arabs to the political system has persuaded al Qaeda that it will not soon destroy democracy in Mesopotamia? Since these alternative explanations are not mutually exclusive, it is possible that al Qaeda is both attacking and retreating. Is necessity the mother of al Qaeda's invention?
The extent to which the al Qaeda "diaspora" is an attack or retreat is virtually impossible to assess -- at least from a hotel in Gaithersburg, Maryland, where I find myself this morning -- to anybody's political satisfaction. As has been true for thirty months, there are as many reasons to be pessimistic about Iraq's future as there are to be optimistic. As I have written before, however, it is possible that even while the insurgency as a whole shows little sign of abating, al Qaeda may be losing. I don't expect the left to acknowledge this, either, because it runs against the thesis that the war in Iraq is a strategic failure in the broader war against Islamist jihad, but I believe it nonetheless.
The second question, of course, is where is al Qaeda is sending its fighters?
Some small number, probably a miniscule few, came from Europe and will return there. All but this tiny number, however, come from the Muslim world, particularly Arab countries. The Center for Strategic and International Studies argued that Algeria was the single biggest "contributor" of foreign fighters, but CSIS relied (apparently) on Saudi intelligence for its estimate. It is safe to say that Saudi intelligence might not have wanted Saudi Arabia to show up at the top of the list, so perhaps Saudi representation is higher than the 12% CSIS reported (CSIS also reported on Saudi Arabia's allegedly extensive efforts to police its border with Iraq, the accuracy of which I certainly am in no position to assess).
Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are the three obvious destinations for retreating al Qaeda fighters because they share a border with Iraq. Of the three, Saudi Arabia is al Qaeda's principal strategic target, and has been since Osama bin Laden founded the organization. The destabilization of the House of Saud would represent a huge coup in al Qaeda's long struggle to "vex and exhaust" the region's apostate regimes. Since the American invasion of Iraq the Saudi regime has put tremendous pressure on al Qaeda's organization there, and it is probably in need of reinforcement.
According to Stratfor (subscribers only), Jordan, al Zarqawi's homeland, has "become somewhat problematic for him" in recent years...
Syria, which most analysts believe is Zarqawi's main pipeline into Iraq, would not necessarily be hospitable for him either:
Algeria might be another destination, but it is of no meaningful strategic value to al Qaeda and having recently concluded a long civil war is probably a pretty hard target. Stratfor does not suggest it, but Egypt -- which is in so many ways the most influential Arab country -- also strikes me as a probable target (as it already has been).
It is also interesting to speculate what Bayan Jabor's motives might have been in releasing this information. One purpose, obviously, is to run something of a victory lap -- he is obviously implying that Iraq is quickly becoming too hard a target for al Qaeda. Beyond that, though, it is important to remember that Jabor is a leading Shiite politician. It is possible to characterize the international Arab support for the insurgency in Iraq as part of the ancient Sunni war on the Shiites. Jabor may be cautioning local Sunni governments that they need to do more to shut down collaboration with the insurgency, lest they suffer blowback. Put differently, Jabor is implicity accusing the Saudis of continuing their tactic of "buying off" al Qaeda, this time by supporting (or acquiescing in) al Qaeda's terrorism in Iraq.
The tension between Jabor (and presumably his constituents) and the Saudis is manifest. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal recently worried aloud about growing Iranian influence in Iraq, and Jabor hit back hard:
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Bayan Jabar just called one of the leading princes of Saudi Arabia a camel jockey. And he didn't stop there:
Faster. Please.
Interior Minister Bayan Jabor said documents found with Abu Azzam, said to be a lieutenant of Abu Mussab Zarqawi, the most wanted man in Iraq, signalled a plan to send foreign Arab Sunni militants back home to widen the battlefield beyond Iraq.
"We got hold of a very important letter from Abu Azzam to Zarqawi asking him to begin to move a number of Arab fighters to the countries they came from to transfer their experience in car bombings in Iraq," Jabor told Reuters in an interview in Amman.
"So you will see insurgencies in other countries," said Jabor, a member of the Shiite Islamist SCIRI Party, a key component of the Shiite- and Kurdish-led coalition government.
Assuming for a moment that the counterinsurgency did find such documents and that they are authentic, there are at least two interesting questions that flow from this. First, is al Qaeda's objective in sending soldiers home to attack other "apostate" Arab regimes (as it has already done, particularly in Saudi Arabia), or is it to preserve the military assets that it has gathered in Iraq? Put differently, is al Qaeda escalating against other apostate regimes now that it smells victory in Iraq, or is it retreating from the squeeze play that is depriving it of its operational flexibility in the Sunni Triangle? Or perhaps the return of Sunni Arabs to the political system has persuaded al Qaeda that it will not soon destroy democracy in Mesopotamia? Since these alternative explanations are not mutually exclusive, it is possible that al Qaeda is both attacking and retreating. Is necessity the mother of al Qaeda's invention?
The extent to which the al Qaeda "diaspora" is an attack or retreat is virtually impossible to assess -- at least from a hotel in Gaithersburg, Maryland, where I find myself this morning -- to anybody's political satisfaction. As has been true for thirty months, there are as many reasons to be pessimistic about Iraq's future as there are to be optimistic. As I have written before, however, it is possible that even while the insurgency as a whole shows little sign of abating, al Qaeda may be losing. I don't expect the left to acknowledge this, either, because it runs against the thesis that the war in Iraq is a strategic failure in the broader war against Islamist jihad, but I believe it nonetheless.
The second question, of course, is where is al Qaeda is sending its fighters?
Some small number, probably a miniscule few, came from Europe and will return there. All but this tiny number, however, come from the Muslim world, particularly Arab countries. The Center for Strategic and International Studies argued that Algeria was the single biggest "contributor" of foreign fighters, but CSIS relied (apparently) on Saudi intelligence for its estimate. It is safe to say that Saudi intelligence might not have wanted Saudi Arabia to show up at the top of the list, so perhaps Saudi representation is higher than the 12% CSIS reported (CSIS also reported on Saudi Arabia's allegedly extensive efforts to police its border with Iraq, the accuracy of which I certainly am in no position to assess).
Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are the three obvious destinations for retreating al Qaeda fighters because they share a border with Iraq. Of the three, Saudi Arabia is al Qaeda's principal strategic target, and has been since Osama bin Laden founded the organization. The destabilization of the House of Saud would represent a huge coup in al Qaeda's long struggle to "vex and exhaust" the region's apostate regimes. Since the American invasion of Iraq the Saudi regime has put tremendous pressure on al Qaeda's organization there, and it is probably in need of reinforcement.
According to Stratfor (subscribers only), Jordan, al Zarqawi's homeland, has "become somewhat problematic for him" in recent years...
...especially since he had a parting of ways with his ideological mentor, Sheikh Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi. Amman allowed al-Maqdisi to be interviewed recently, during which he condemned the actions of al-Zarqawi in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi shot back, accusing his former mentor of selling out. The Hashemite rulers of Jordan have likely penetrated al-Zarqawi's hometown of al-Zarqa and his old network there, given that the country's intelligence apparatus has historically kept a tight lid on Islamist dissidents and militants. This perhaps is why the government has been able to nab at least two different cells in Jordan trying to stage attacks.
Syria, which most analysts believe is Zarqawi's main pipeline into Iraq, would not necessarily be hospitable for him either:
Given the current U.S. pressure on Syria, and given Damascus's involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese President Rafik al-Hariri, this could be a bad move. Allowing one's country to be used by a militant group for geopolitical objectives is one thing, but it is quite a different thing if that group begins to attack the host country -- which could well happen in Syria. Moreover, the Syrian regime is already coming under strong U.S. pressure to crack down on the jihadists. Syria is thus also not a viable option.
Algeria might be another destination, but it is of no meaningful strategic value to al Qaeda and having recently concluded a long civil war is probably a pretty hard target. Stratfor does not suggest it, but Egypt -- which is in so many ways the most influential Arab country -- also strikes me as a probable target (as it already has been).
It is also interesting to speculate what Bayan Jabor's motives might have been in releasing this information. One purpose, obviously, is to run something of a victory lap -- he is obviously implying that Iraq is quickly becoming too hard a target for al Qaeda. Beyond that, though, it is important to remember that Jabor is a leading Shiite politician. It is possible to characterize the international Arab support for the insurgency in Iraq as part of the ancient Sunni war on the Shiites. Jabor may be cautioning local Sunni governments that they need to do more to shut down collaboration with the insurgency, lest they suffer blowback. Put differently, Jabor is implicity accusing the Saudis of continuing their tactic of "buying off" al Qaeda, this time by supporting (or acquiescing in) al Qaeda's terrorism in Iraq.
The tension between Jabor (and presumably his constituents) and the Saudis is manifest. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal recently worried aloud about growing Iranian influence in Iraq, and Jabor hit back hard:
"We will not allow anyone to interfere in our internal issues, regardless of their political status," Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabor, a member of the Shi'ite Islamist SCIRI party, retorted during a news conference in Amman.
"We are Iraqis and we are responsible for solving our problems, we will not allow anyone to interfere," he said.
"This Iraq is the cradle of civilisation that taught humanity reading and writing, and some Bedouin riding a camel wants to teach us. This talk is totally rejected."
He proceeded to take a swipe at the Saudi monarchy, saying:
"There are regimes that are dictatorships; they have one god, he is the king, he is God of heaven and earth, and he rules as he likes. A whole country is named after a family. If we open these topics without inhibitions, it is neither to our benefit nor to theirs."
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Bayan Jabar just called one of the leading princes of Saudi Arabia a camel jockey. And he didn't stop there:
Jabor hit back at Saudi Arabia's treatment of its own Shi'ites. These are believed to make up 10 percent of its native population, and complain of being marginalised by a government allied to Wahhabi Sunni scholars who consider Shi'ism a heresy.
"There are problems within the kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... there are more than four million Shi'ites in the kingdom who are considered as third-class citizens," Jabor said.
Iraq was emerging as a democratic country with equal status for women while Saudi Arabia was a "dictatorship that does not even allow women to drive", he said.
"Therefore, I wish they would give women their rights and let them drive, let alone vote. In Iraq, a woman can be head of state and can become a minister ... This is the new Iraq, this is the democratic Iraq," he said.
Faster. Please.
2 Comments:
By 
Cardinalpark, at
Tue Oct 04, 08:15:00 AM:
TH - -my 2 cents. This is an undeniable victory. By retreating to their home countries, they are acknowledging an inability to defeat the American military. They historically have willed themselves to kill Americans, not Arabs. Now they are retreating to kill Arabs, avoiding Americans. There cannot be 2 ways of reading this. Zarqawi has argues previously that Iraq is the main battlefield against the West and the US. Now he's pulling his assets off that battlefield?
That is the sign of a guy with a losing hand being pragmatic and folding. It is also a sign that there is no sanctuary left in Iraq.
Finally, it is a sign that Iraqis are developing national pride. By explicitly focusing criticism and insult on Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi politician is reviving an old rivalry -- that between Levantine Arabs (who think of themselves as educated and urbane) and Bedouins (who Levantine Arabs think of as, well, camel jockeys).
This is all excellent...
By 
, at
Tue Oct 04, 02:55:00 PM:
According to the Debkafile Al Qaeda has a major base now in the Egyptian Sinai in striking distance of Jordan, Israel, and the Suez Canal. (See Debkafile.com)
