Monday, August 15, 2005
"What al Qaeda really wants"
Der Spiegel has published this summary of a book by Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein: al Zarqawi: Al Qaida's Second Generation. Hussein, who apparently writes in Arabic, claims senior sources within al Qaeda. These sources have corresponded with Hussein, and he has directly interviewed at least one operative on the "most wanted" list. In addition, Hussein knew Zarqawi when the two were in prison together in years past.
Well, he's certainly "particularly trustworthy" if you're a jihadi. We're all very grateful that Hussein negotiated to get Abu Musab al-Zarqawi released from solitary confinement.
Der Spiegel goes on to describe al Qaeda's seven-step plan (why aren't there twelve) for re-establishing the Caliphate during the next fifteen years, according to Hussein:
Many of you read my summary of Michael Scott Doran's lecture on "al Qaeda's grand strategy." If not, suffice it to say that he believes that al Qaeda's core objective is to "vex and exhaust" the apostate regimes in the Muslim world and their Western sponsors, particularly the United States. Their objective, having provoked the United States with mass casualty attacks, is to launch many small attacks in multiple places and force the "apostate regimes" and the West to spread themselves thinly. That will create unpoliced open spaces from which the jihadis can build their forces for the next round of attacks. Hussein's description seems to track Doran's analysis quite closely, for better or for worse.
It is interesting that Syria is listed as al Qaeda's next target. This also strikes me as credible, since Assad's regime may in fact be more vulnerable than the other critical Arab countries (Saudi Arabia and Egypt). As much as we would like to see the end of Assad's government in that country, we cannot afford to create another "open space" that is safe for the jihad. Therein lies a policy dilemma.
Syria, for its part, is undoubtedly hoping to buy off the jihadi threat by turning the other way when they cross the border into Iraq. This "non-aggression pact" between Assad's regime and al Qaeda, if it is exists, is ultimately a bad deal for Damascus. Assad is Stalin in this story and Zarqawi is Hitler. Syria will soon learn, as the Saudis already have, that al Qaeda's ambitions are too galactic to be bought off over the long term.
What should the United States make of this? For starters, it is not at all clear that the removal of the government in Damascus is better for the United States than some combination of coercing and cajoling it into reforming itself and joining the war against al Qaeda. We need to find the right levers and start pulling.
There must be something particularly trustworthy about the Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein. After all, he has managed to get some of the the most sought after terrorists to open up to him. Maybe it helped that they spent time together in prison many years ago -- when Hussein was a political prisoner he successfully negotiated for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to be released from solitary confinement.
Well, he's certainly "particularly trustworthy" if you're a jihadi. We're all very grateful that Hussein negotiated to get Abu Musab al-Zarqawi released from solitary confinement.
Der Spiegel goes on to describe al Qaeda's seven-step plan (why aren't there twelve) for re-establishing the Caliphate during the next fifteen years, according to Hussein:
In the introduction, the Jordanian journalist writes, "I interviewed a whole range of al-Qaida members with different ideologies to get an idea of how the war between the terrorists and Washington would develop in the future." What he then describes between pages 202 and 213 is a scenario, proof both of the terrorists' blindness as well as their brutal single-mindedness. In seven phases the terror network hopes to establish an Islamic caliphate which the West will then be too weak to fight.
The First Phase. Known as "the awakening" -- this has already been carried out and was supposed to have lasted from 2000 to 2003, or more precisely from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. The aim of the attacks of 9/11 was to provoke the US into declaring war on the Islamic world and thereby "awakening" Muslims. "The first phase was judged by the strategists and masterminds behind al-Qaida as very successful," writes Hussein. "The battle field was opened up and the Americans and their allies became a closer and easier target." The terrorist network is also reported as being satisfied that its message can now be heard "everywhere."
The Second Phase. "Opening Eyes" is, according to Hussein's definition, the period we are now in and should last until 2006. Hussein says the terrorists hope to make the western conspiracy aware of the "Islamic community." Hussein believes this is a phase in which al-Qaida wants an organization to develop into a movement. The network is banking on recruiting young men during this period. Iraq should become the center for all global operations, with an "army" set up there and bases established in other Arabic states.
The Third Phase. This is described as "Arising and Standing Up" and should last from 2007 to 2010. "There will be a focus on Syria," prophesies Hussein, based on what his sources told him. The fighting cadres are supposedly already prepared and some are in Iraq. Attacks on Turkey and -- even more explosive -- in Israel are predicted. Al-Qaida's masterminds hope that attacks on Israel will help the terrorist group become a recognized organization. The author also believes that countries neighboring Iraq, such as Jordan, are also in danger.
The Fourth Phase. Between 2010 and 2013, Hussein writes that al-Qaida will aim to bring about the collapse of the hated Arabic governments. The estimate is that "the creeping loss of the regimes' power will lead to a steady growth in strength within al-Qaida." At the same time attacks will be carried out against oil suppliers and the US economy will be targeted using cyber terrorism.
The Fifth Phase. This will be the point at which an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared. The plan is that by this time, between 2013 and 2016, Western influence in the Islamic world will be so reduced and Israel weakened so much, that resistance will not be feared. Al-Qaida hopes that by then the Islamic state will be able to bring about a new world order.
The Sixth Phase. Hussein believes that from 2016 onwards there will a period of "total confrontation." As soon as the caliphate has been declared the "Islamic army" it will instigate the "fight between the believers and the non-believers" which has so often been predicted by Osama bin Laden.
The Seventh Phase. This final stage is described as "definitive victory." Hussein writes that in the terrorists' eyes, because the rest of the world will be so beaten down by the "one-and-a-half million Muslims," the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed. This phase should be completed by 2020, although the war shouldn't last longer than two years.
Many of you read my summary of Michael Scott Doran's lecture on "al Qaeda's grand strategy." If not, suffice it to say that he believes that al Qaeda's core objective is to "vex and exhaust" the apostate regimes in the Muslim world and their Western sponsors, particularly the United States. Their objective, having provoked the United States with mass casualty attacks, is to launch many small attacks in multiple places and force the "apostate regimes" and the West to spread themselves thinly. That will create unpoliced open spaces from which the jihadis can build their forces for the next round of attacks. Hussein's description seems to track Doran's analysis quite closely, for better or for worse.
It is interesting that Syria is listed as al Qaeda's next target. This also strikes me as credible, since Assad's regime may in fact be more vulnerable than the other critical Arab countries (Saudi Arabia and Egypt). As much as we would like to see the end of Assad's government in that country, we cannot afford to create another "open space" that is safe for the jihad. Therein lies a policy dilemma.
Syria, for its part, is undoubtedly hoping to buy off the jihadi threat by turning the other way when they cross the border into Iraq. This "non-aggression pact" between Assad's regime and al Qaeda, if it is exists, is ultimately a bad deal for Damascus. Assad is Stalin in this story and Zarqawi is Hitler. Syria will soon learn, as the Saudis already have, that al Qaeda's ambitions are too galactic to be bought off over the long term.
What should the United States make of this? For starters, it is not at all clear that the removal of the government in Damascus is better for the United States than some combination of coercing and cajoling it into reforming itself and joining the war against al Qaeda. We need to find the right levers and start pulling.
1 Comments:
By 
Mike H., at
Wed Aug 17, 03:18:00 PM:
The question is, what would Hezbolla be doing while Al-Qeada was taking out Assad? It might turn into Red-on-Red. Both Hezbolla and Al-Qeada have differing goals to accomplish. The difference being, who is running Sharia.
