Tuesday, April 12, 2005
More on the rearmament of China and the Taiwan security guarantee
Yesterday I put up a lengthy post discussing the possibility that China would build a blue water navy to protect the flow of the vast amounts of raw materials needed to power its economy. I linked to a couple of analysts -- both obvious Sinophiles -- who recognized this issue but discounted the risk for one reason or another.
Today the Washington Post has an article about just such an expansion, focusing on both deterring the United States from intervening in a conflict with Taiwan and the protection of China's oil lifelines.
Interestingly, The Post links Taiwan and the defense of China's sea lanes (discussed here yesterday):
This changes the equation enormously, and makes it much more likely that China will confront Taiwan. That confrontation, which is being unhelpfully fanned by Taiwan's President Chen, is of dire strategic significance to the United States only because of our guarantee of Taiwan's security.
As I have written repeatedly before, the American guarantee of Taiwan's security is destabilizing (it is encouraging Taiwan to play a reckless game) and it is losing its credibility. Given China's economic growth and proximity to Taiwan, it will be enormously difficult for the United States to defend Taiwan. Unfortunately, our guarantee of Taiwan's security -- a relic of the Cold War, in my opinion -- is a sacred cow to American conservatives. They will go absolutely bananas when -- and it is a matter of when, not if -- the United States backs away.
Equally unfortunately, the chances that we will be called upon to honor that guarantee are rising quickly with the quality of the Chinese military and our own declining credibility. Why do I say that our credibility is declining? Because I don't think that an American president would trade Honolulu or Las Vegas for Taipei.
Today the Washington Post has an article about just such an expansion, focusing on both deterring the United States from intervening in a conflict with Taiwan and the protection of China's oil lifelines.
The Chinese navy has taken delivery of two Russian-built Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers and has six more on order, equipped with Sunburn missiles able to skim 4 1/2 feet above the water at a speed of Mach 2.5 to evade radar. In addition, it has contracted with Russia to buy eight Kilo-class diesel submarines that carry Club anti-ship missiles with a range of 145 miles....
Strategically, China's military is also close to achieving an improved nuclear deterrent against the United States, according to foreign officials and specialists.
The Type 094 nuclear missile submarine, launched last July to replace a trouble-prone Xia-class vessel, can carry 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Married with the newly developed Julang-2 missile, which has a range of more than 5,000 miles and the ability to carry independently targeted warheads, the 094 will give China a survivable nuclear deterrent against the continental United States, according to "Modernizing China's Military," a study by David Shambaugh of George Washington University.
In addition, the Dongfeng-31 solid-fuel mobile ballistic missile, a three-stage, land-based equivalent of the Julang-2, has been deployed in recent years to augment the approximately 20 Dongfeng-5 liquid-fuel missiles already in service, according to academic specialists citing U.S. intelligence reports.
It will be joined in coming years by an 8,000-mile Dongfeng-41, these reports said, putting the entire United States within range of land-based Chinese ICBMs as well. "The main purpose of that is not to attack the United States," Lin said. "The main purpose is to throw a monkey wrench into the decision-making process in Washington, to make the Americans think, and think again, about intervening in Taiwan, and by then the Chinese have moved in."
Interestingly, The Post links Taiwan and the defense of China's sea lanes (discussed here yesterday):
[U]nifying Taiwan with the mainland has become more than just a nationalist goal. The 13,500-square-mile territory has also become a platform that China needs to protect southern sea lanes, through which pass 80 percent of its imported oil and tons of other imported raw materials. It could serve as a base for Chinese submarines to have unfettered access to the deep Pacific, according to Tsai, Taiwan's deputy defense minister. "Taiwan for them now is a strategic must and no longer just a sacred mission," Lin said.
This changes the equation enormously, and makes it much more likely that China will confront Taiwan. That confrontation, which is being unhelpfully fanned by Taiwan's President Chen, is of dire strategic significance to the United States only because of our guarantee of Taiwan's security.
As I have written repeatedly before, the American guarantee of Taiwan's security is destabilizing (it is encouraging Taiwan to play a reckless game) and it is losing its credibility. Given China's economic growth and proximity to Taiwan, it will be enormously difficult for the United States to defend Taiwan. Unfortunately, our guarantee of Taiwan's security -- a relic of the Cold War, in my opinion -- is a sacred cow to American conservatives. They will go absolutely bananas when -- and it is a matter of when, not if -- the United States backs away.
Equally unfortunately, the chances that we will be called upon to honor that guarantee are rising quickly with the quality of the Chinese military and our own declining credibility. Why do I say that our credibility is declining? Because I don't think that an American president would trade Honolulu or Las Vegas for Taipei.
2 Comments:
By 
Final Historian, at
Tue Apr 12, 01:15:00 PM:
I agree on the need to keep Taiwan in check. But I also feel that it is imperative for the US to prevent China from forcibly occupying Taiwan. It is in our national interest to avoid that happening. The impact on our allies in the region alone is reason enough to do so.
By Myrtus, at
Tue Apr 12, 08:44:00 PM:
It sounds like you're right on the money, TigerHawk! (:
