Wednesday, August 04, 2004
Terror alerts and "stale" intelligence
Howard Dean seems to be the first credible person -- if that is what he is -- to have suggested this. His attack came on the carefully orchestrated Sunday morning talk circuit, so it is hard to believe it didn't come from Democratic strategists. Kerry disassociated himself, but normally level-headed bloggers continue to make the case. The attacks seem to be continuing at a sufficiently high level that Tom Ridge feels the need to defend his weekend warning.
Democrats are obviously hoping to have it both ways. Their candidate has validated the warnings by saying that we are "not doing enough," and their rabble-rousers will raise questions about the Administration's credibility. The question remains, do they believe we are at war with Islamist jihad, or not?
All of this posturing is the sad result of the politicization of the 9/11 Commission's work. Leading Democrats and the national press corps have spent a large part of the last year fly-specking the work of the 9/11 Commission and feeding off leaks coming from its members and staff, searching for the possibility that the attacks on that sad day were somehow the consequence of a particular error of government. Having identified various "missed opportunities" to disrupt Al-Qaeda's plans, many on the left have tried to argue that the attacks were the consequence of Bush Administration failures. Naturally, the right has counter-charged that the failures run back into the Clinton Administration. In light of this history, Tom Ridge would have been insane not to raise the threat level around those particular buildings. If the government is now too willing to share what it knows, it is because of the post hoc criticism of decisions not made and actions not taken prior to 9/11.
All of this confusion is the obvious and forseeable consequence of conducting the commission of inquiry before the conclusion of the war. The commission's report is apparently excellent work -- I haven't read it myself -- but it is inevitable that the expressed and implied criticism inherent in such an exercise would make our nation's bureaucrats very sensitive to second-guessing in the future. The way to avoid that, of course, is by alerting us to any and all reasonably credible threats.
I'm still out of the country and quite busy, so my reading and my blogging has been very catch as catch can. Nevertheless, I am either amused or distressed -- I'm not yet sure which -- by the charge from the left that Homeland Security identified particular potential Al-Qaeda targets for political rather than security considerations.
Democrats are obviously hoping to have it both ways. Their candidate has validated the warnings by saying that we are "not doing enough," and their rabble-rousers will raise questions about the Administration's credibility. The question remains, do they believe we are at war with Islamist jihad, or not?
All of this posturing is the sad result of the politicization of the 9/11 Commission's work. Leading Democrats and the national press corps have spent a large part of the last year fly-specking the work of the 9/11 Commission and feeding off leaks coming from its members and staff, searching for the possibility that the attacks on that sad day were somehow the consequence of a particular error of government. Having identified various "missed opportunities" to disrupt Al-Qaeda's plans, many on the left have tried to argue that the attacks were the consequence of Bush Administration failures. Naturally, the right has counter-charged that the failures run back into the Clinton Administration. In light of this history, Tom Ridge would have been insane not to raise the threat level around those particular buildings. If the government is now too willing to share what it knows, it is because of the post hoc criticism of decisions not made and actions not taken prior to 9/11.
All of this confusion is the obvious and forseeable consequence of conducting the commission of inquiry before the conclusion of the war. The commission's report is apparently excellent work -- I haven't read it myself -- but it is inevitable that the expressed and implied criticism inherent in such an exercise would make our nation's bureaucrats very sensitive to second-guessing in the future. The way to avoid that, of course, is by alerting us to any and all reasonably credible threats.