Friday, May 30, 2008
Live-blogging Princeton Reunions: Panel discussion on "Post-Surge Iraq"
I have made it to my 25th reunion, at least for the time being, and am watching a panel discussion about Iraq "after the Surge." Here's the description from the reunions calendar:
Alumni-Faculty Forum: Prospects for Post-Surge Iraq Moderator: Barbara Bodine, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Ambassador-in-Residence, Woodrow Wilson School. Panelists: Joseph Nye ’58, University Distinguished Service Professor and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Alison Ryscavage ’83, Lt. Col, U.S. Army; Eric Young ’98, Former Lieutenant, Multi-National Force—Iraq; Peter Hegseth ’03, Executive Director, Vets for Freedom. To 3:30 PM. Sponsored by the Alumni Association of Princeton University.
The panel itself -- all alumni -- is extremely distinguished and knowledgeable, and seemingly balanced in its view of the war, ranging from two articulate veterans of the war to Joseph Nye, most famous for his advocacy of "soft power." Ambassador Bodine's commitment in her introduction was promising, insofar as she promised to focus entirely on the future, rather than dwelling on the arguments over the justification for the war or its conduct to date.
Hegseth is a huge believer in the importance of confronting and defeating both Sunni jihadis and Iranian-backed militias, but left Iraq in 2006 "hugely frustrated." He had read deeply on the subject of counterinsurgency, and felt that the military did not understand it. The Petraeus strategy represents a sea-change, a "180 degree reversal" of American tactics, and it has been accompanied by "an Iraqi surge six times our own." Sectarian violence has fallen 90% around the country, 95% in Baghdad, and Iraqis are assuming control. Success is an Iraq is stable, is allied with us, and which is able to take the fight to its enemies -- al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed militias.
Hegseth was exceedingly articulate, and should be on television every day explaining why persistence in Iraq, rather than retreat from it, is strategically essential.
My classmate Alison Ryscavage largely echoed Hegseth's report, but allowed that there was the difficult possibility that we might win the battle and lose the war, in that it might be that Iraq was continuing to radicalize Muslims around the world. Or maybe not; it is impossible to know right now whether the trade is worthwhile.
Eric Young served in Iraq from December 2006 to December 2007. He discusses the sharp changes in strategy from General Casey to the Petraeus/Crocker strategy; under the former, the minimization of casualties was the watchword ("we were not in the counterinsurgency game, we were in the casualty mitigation game"). Under Petraeus, the rules completely changed.
Most interesting point was that Petraeus, unlike Casey, would not telegraph what he wanted to see from the intelligence officers. Under Casey, intelligence findings that did not meet preconceived notions were ignored (my interpretation of Young's more diplomatic characterization), and Casey and his team signaled in advance what they wanted to hear. Petraeus refrained from such signalling, so the intelligence officers became much more creative and out-of-the-box in the assessments that they provided.
Petraeus was also willing to absorb casualties initially in return for the benefit of greater insertion into the population. "Everything is tied together," and better security led to much better performance on the part of the Iraqi government.
Young was if anything more positive of the Petraeus/Crocker strategy than Hegseth.
Nye: "I'd like to make seven points in five minutes." I ended up missing some of his points, or collapsing them.
First, if you look at the soldiers who have served in Iraq, they are extremely competent and impressive and treated as heroes on their return.
Second, the surge has had a very positive influence on security. The question is whether it will lead to political compromises.
So, the question is what ought the vision be for the future of Iraq? "The idea that we are going to stay in Iraq long enough to make it look like Japan and Germany is grandiose, not accurate." The vision the President propounds is ahistorical.
Alas, we have no vision for the future. We have made a sufficient mess that our vision should be damage limitation. Internally, we should try to build up Iraqi forces sufficiently that they avoid mass killings. Externally, we need to involve other countries. Either way, it is hard to see upside, only the possibility for preventing disaster.
Bodine: So where do we go from here? How do we build on the tactical successes, and do they have the seeds of further problems (by increasing divisiveness, for example).
Hegseth: You cannot understate the importance of security. We must not draw down troops until they are really ready to take over security. Violence has stayed down as the surge has drawn down because we have been very careful, under Petraeus, not to hand over areas to the Iraqis until they are truly ready to hold them. "Iraq is not going to look like Germany or Japan, it will look like Iraq. It will be messy, but that does not mean that it cannot be pretty peaceful, an ally of the United States, an Arab-style democracy, and opposed to al Qaeda and Iranian influence."
Nye: One of the ways we confuse ourselves is to believe that an election equals democracy. We have replaced a tyranny of the minority with a tyranny of the majority. "One of the things we need to do is to get these groups to bargain with each other."
Me: But isn't that what we are doing? Was not the Awakening project implicit bargaining with the Shiites? Nye seems to be operating with 2006 assumptions, but perhaps he is the realist and I am the blind optimist.
Question: Are we not handicapped by a shortage of Arabic speakers?
Bodine says yes, Ryscavage says that the situation is improving significantly. Recent graduates entered the field knowing that they might serve, and are much better prepared to enter intelligence as a result.
[The audience, mostly older Princeton alumni from the class of '58, is obviously exceedingly anti-war. Or perhaps the anti-war folks were just more disrespectful, snorting derisively at decisive moments. It is also deaf, insofar as people keep asking for speakers to repeat themselves even when they are perfectly clear. That will be me in 25 years, leaving out the disrespectful part.]
Bodine: Believes that Iraqis want a unified state, and believes that ultimately they will be able to establish a national government that works again.
Question: As the violence has gone down, has the standard of living gone up? Eric Young says that it has -- "as the surge progressed, Iraqis in general had better access to hospitals, heatlh care, and you slowly began to see these things changing."
There was more, but nothing newsworthy.
5 Comments:
By 
Dawnfire82, at
Fri May 30, 06:55:00 PM:
I really disagreed with only one line here.
"So, the question is what ought the vision be for the future of Iraq? "The idea that we are going to stay in Iraq long enough to make it look like Japan and Germany is grandiose, not accurate." The vision the President propounds is ahistorical."
Was this explained further? We maintained presences in Germany and Japan because it was in our interests to do so, and they never asked us to go away. And in so doing, planted stable and working democratic regimes in nations whose very basic cultures were authoritarian and militaristic. There is no particular reason (aside from irrational "bring them home now!" types) that this situation should be any different.
By 
, at
Fri May 30, 09:10:00 PM:
"I really disagreed with only one line here."
Yes, that stood out for me too. The way it's presented looks more like a refusal to accept the facts on the ground. Nye is trying to use a superficial view of history to set policy rather than use an older set of basics that demand "stabalise".
History, especially military history, isn't determined by history books, but by a sensible reaction to the facts on the ground and the need to change the behaviours that caused the problems in the first place. Otherwise "history" becomes a self fulfilling prophesy.
If Iraq is to be done properly, then it requires the US to stay and make more mistakes, not less, so that there's a better history made.. and a better future.
And of course, it's better attention to some older basics of control of other hostile regimes.
JC
By TigerHawk, at
Sat May 31, 08:22:00 AM:
Nye did explain the difference, in his mind, between Germany and Japan and Iraq. Basically, it was the same stuff that is familiar to most war blog readers -- we had completely and utterly defeated both Germany and Japan, there was no insurgency against us, we occupied those countries with millions of troops, and (he lost me on this one) they had some tradition of democracy. I was struggling to remember what democratic tradition Japan had, and Germany's experience with democracy had turned the country against it. But in any case he did distinguish the cases.
By , at
Sat May 31, 10:33:00 AM:
This is one of the most interesting posts I've read in a while!
That really is a distinguished panel. Professor Nye's comments sound particularly interesting, and the general tone of the participants is that we're winning the war.
Thanks for sharing!!
By Eric, at
Sun Jun 01, 01:26:00 AM:
The gulf you describe between the pure academic's perspective and the war veteran's perspective on Iraq is familiar - I experienced the same differences at Columbia as a Poli Sci/IR major while also involved with the sizeable campus veterans' community, which includes many recent war veterans.
At Columbia, as at Princeton, we have excellent professors with high reputations, but when it comes to OIF, they don't seem to be any better informed than everyone else.
