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Monday, October 01, 2007

Hating Iran 


A Bush administration official apparently shocked some British MPs by saying that she "hates" Iranians.


Britsh MPs visiting the Pentagon to discuss America's stance on Iran and Iraq were shocked to be told by one of President Bush's senior women officials: "I hate all Iranians."...

The all-party group of MPs say Debra Cagan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Coalition Affairs to Defence Secretary Robert Gates, made the comments this month.

Well, I don't know what Cagan may have meant -- the word "all" seems especially critical to the meaning of the sentence -- but surely it was unwise. Diplomacy, I am told, requires a healthy measure of bull puckey to sustain itself, and diplomats should only reveal their emotions with a purpose.

I myself am not long on hatred, and do not recall ever genuinely hating a person or nationality. I deplore, resent, and do not enjoy the company of individual people, and I believe that certain cultures make no meaningful contribution to the general condition of humanity, but I'm not a big hater. That said, many people obviously are. Assuming the report is true, Cagan is. The interesting question is whether she is justified in her hatred. Suppose she did not mean literally "all" Iranians, but just those who advance the interests of the Islamic Republic. Is it understandable why Cagan, as an American official charged with our national security, might hate Iranians?

Well, the Islamic Republic has planned, abetted, or killed a fair number of us in the last 28 years. It is possible that we might hate them for that. The appendix to Thomas Joscelyn's "Iran's Proxy War Against America" (big pdf) is an invaluable reminder of the war Iran has waged against us, over which there has been virtually no American response:
November 4, 1979

Fifty-two American citizens are taken hostage by “students” loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini. They are held for more than a year, until January 20, 1981. The kidnappings are part of the Iranian revolution, which serves as a model for Sunni terrorist groups like Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

April 18, 1983

Iran’s master terrorist, Imad Mugniyah, orchestrates the first significant Islamist suicide attack against America: the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Establishing a modus operandi for terrorists in the years to come, the attacker utilizes a van packed with explosives.

October 23, 1983

Using massive truck bombs, Hezbollah’s suicide bombers simultaneously attack the U.S. Marine Barracks and a housing complex for French Paratroopers in Beirut, Lebanon. Al-Qaeda would later adopt simultaneous suicide bombings as its preferred method for committing attacks.

December 12, 1983

Iranian-backed terrorists bomb the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. A close relative of Imad Mugniyah is convicted by a Kuwaiti court and sentenced to death for his role in the bombing. Other attackers, also supported by Iran, are imprisoned. The terrorists come to be known as the “Kuwait 17” or “Dawa 17.”

March 16, 1984

William Buckley, the CIA’s station chief in Beirut, is kidnapped and later tortured-to-death by Imad Mugniyah’s Hezbollah. Buckley’s kidnapping is one in a series of Hezbollah’s kidnappings from the early 1980s through the early 1990s. Dozens of Americans are kidnapped and Hezbollah frequently demands an exchange for the Kuwait 17. Hezbollah’s kidnappings lead to the biggest scandal of President Ronald Reagan’s tenure, the Iran-Contra affair, after the Reagan administration agrees to exchange arms for the hostages.

September 20, 1984

Hezbollah terrorists strike the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut with a truck bomb.

December 3, 1984

Mugniyah’s operatives hijack Kuwait Airways Flight 221. The hijackers attempt to barter for the release of the Kuwait 17.

June 14, 1985

Mugniyah’s terrorists hijack TWA Flight 847. Once again, the hijackers attempt to barter for the release of the Kuwait 17. When the hijackers’ demands are denied, they beat and kill a U.S. Navy serviceman, Robert Dean Stethem, who happened to be on the flight. Incredibly, Germany granted parole to one of the hijackers in December 2005.

1990

According to Ali Mohamed, a top al-Qaeda operative in U.S. custody, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad partners with Iran in a planned coup attempt in Egypt. Tehran trains EIJ terrorists for the coup attempt, which is ultimately aborted. Iran also pays al-Zawahiri $2 million for sensitive information concerning the Egyptian Government’s plans to raid several islands in the Persian Gulf.

1991

Iran and Sudan, then the world’s only Sunni Islamist states, forge a strategic alliance. They begin to jointly export terrorism throughout the world.

April 1991

Hassan al-Turabi hosts the first Popular Arab Islamic Conference in Sudan. The conference provides a forum for disparate forces in the Middle East who oppose American presence in the region to come together. Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Iraqi and Iranian representatives all attend the meeting.

February 26, 1993

Terrorists connected to al-Qaeda and the global terror network bomb the World Trade Center using a rental truck packed with explosives. The bombers’ colleagues plot a follow-on attack against landmarks in the NYC area. There is no known evidence
that Iran had a hand in these events. It is clear, however, that several of the plotters had ties to Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan. Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the spiritual leader of the two leading Egyptian terrorist groups (both of which will join al-Qaeda) and who was living in the New York metropolitan area, is later convicted for his involvement in the attacks. Reports surface that he and his organization received financial assistance from Iran.

1993

According to Ali Mohamed, Imad Mugniyah and Osama bin Laden meet in Sudan. Bin Laden expresses his desire to model al-Qaeda after Hezbollah. In particular, bin Laden expresses interest in Mugniyah’s bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983 and similar attacks. They agree to work together against America and the West.

1993

According to Jamal al-Fadl, an al-Qaeda operative in U.S. custody, bin Laden meets a leading Iranian sheikh in Sudan. The purpose of the meeting is to put aside any differences between their competing brands of Islam in order to come together against their common enemy: the West. The meeting is just the first of several between bin Laden and Iran’s spiritual leaders.

1993

Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps train al-Qaeda’s terrorists in camps in Sudan, Lebanon and Iran. Among the terrorists trained are some of bin Laden’s most trusted lieutenants and al-Qaeda’s future leaders.

1993

Egypt and Algeria cut off diplomatic ties with Iran. Both nations accuse Iran and Sudan of supporting Sunni terrorism, including terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. Egypt will blame Iran for supporting both the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group throughout the 1990’s.

November 13, 1995

Two bombs are detonated, nearly simultaneously, at the Saudi National Guard training facility in Riyadh, killing five Americans. The suspects are captured and confess to being inspired by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden denies responsibility, but praises the attack. It is likely al-Qaeda’s first terrorist attack inside the Saudi Kingdom.

November 19, 1995

An al-Qaeda suicide bomber destroys the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. The CIA’s Bob Baer later learns that Mugniyah’s deputy assisted al-Qaeda in the attack and that one of bin Laden’s top terrorists remained in contact with Mugniyah’s office months afterwards.

May 1996

Bin Laden is expelled from Sudan, but the 9/11 Commission reports that “intelligence indicates the persistance of contacts” between al-Qaeda and Iran even after al-Qaeda’s relocation to Afghanistan. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda maintain an ongoing presence in Sudan, despite not being “formally” welcome.

June 21 - 23, 1996

Tehran hosts a summit for the leading Sunni and Shiite terrorist groups. It is announced that the terrorists will continue to focus on U.S. interests thoughout the region. Mugniyah, bin Laden, and a leading member of the EIJ reportedly forge the “Committee of Three,” under the leadership of Iran’s intelligence chief, to focus their joint efforts against American targets.

June 25, 1996

Hezbollah terrorists, operating under the direction of senior Iranian officials, bomb the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Saudi Arabia. Contemporaneous reports by both the State Department and the CIA note that al-Qaeda is also suspected of playing a role. The 9/11 Commission would later find “indirect evidence” of al-Qaeda’s involvement. The evidence includes intelligence indicating that al-Qaeda was planning a similar operation in the months prior and that bin Laden was congratulated by other al-Qaeda operatives, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, shortly after the attack.

July 1996

According to Bob Baer, the Egyptian Islamic Group—an ally of bin Laden’s al-Qaeda—is in contact with Mugniyah.

1996

According to Bob Baer, there is “incontrovertible evidence” of a meeting between bin Laden and a representative of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

August 7, 1998

Al-Qaeda’s suicide bombers simultaneously destroy the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It is al-Qaeda’s most spectacular attack prior to 9/11. The attack is clearly modeled on Hezbollah’s attacks in the early 1980s. Indeed, the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible were trained by Hezbollah in the early 1990s. There is evidence that Iran also provided explosives used in the attack.

October - November 2000

Imad Mugniyah and his lieutenants personally escort several of the 9/11 muscle hijackers out of Saudi Arabia on flights to Beirut and Iran. In all, eight to ten of the hijackers travel through Iran on the way to 9/11.

December 2000

Ramzi Binalshibh, al-Qaeda’s key point man for the 9/11 plot, applies for visa at the Iranian Embassy in Berlin. His visa application is approved.

January 31, 2001

Ramzi Binalshibh arrives at Tehran International airport. He does not return to Germany until February 28, 2001. The purpose of his trip to Iran remains a mystery. The 9/11 Commission does not mention Binalshibh’s trip to Iran.

Early September 2001

Binalshibh flees to Iran shortly before the 9/11 attacks.

September 11, 2001

Nineteen al-Qaeda hijackers execute al-Qaeda’s largest operation to date, killing nearly 3000 Americans. Many of the details surrounding the plot, including who financed the attack, remain a mystery.

October 2001

According to a high-level Taliban detainee at Gitmo, Iran offers the Taliban Government assistance in retreating from Afghanistan.

October 2001

Numerous press reports indicate that Iran aids the retreat of hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban members from Afghanistan. Some al-Qaeda operatives enjoy safehaven in Iran to this day. Among them is Said al-Adel, who is reportedly the third highest ranking member of al-Qaeda and was trained by Hezbollah during the early 1990s, and Saad bin Laden, Osama’s heir apparent.

April 11, 2002

Al-Qaeda carries out the first attack ordered by bin Laden since 9/11: a suicide bomber destroys a synagogue in Tunisia, killing nineteen people. According to NBC News, Saad bin Laden contacted the cell responsible for the attack from his safehaven in Iran. Suleiman Abu Ghaith, bin Laden’s spokesman, also claims al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the attack from his abode in Iran.

End of 2002 - Spring 2003

According to former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, senior al-Qaeda leaders discuss the acquisition of nuclear weapons from their safe haven in Iran. In fact, al-Qaeda’s “nuclearchief,” Abdel al-Aziz al-Masri, is one of many senior terrorists living in Iran.

May 12, 2003

Under orders from Saif al-Adel and Saad bin Laden, who are operating from Iran, al-Qaeda’s terrorists simultaneously strike three separate housing complexes in Riyadh Saudi Arabia. Another al-Qaeda agent thought to be responsible for the attack flees to Iran before he can be captured.

May 16, 2003

One dozen al-Qaeda bombers attack several targets in Casablanca, Morocco. Saad bin Laden, living in Iran, is reportedly in contact with the cell shortly before the attack.

2004 – present

Iran supplies advanced IED technology to the insurgents in Iraq. There is growing evidence of Iranian support for both Sunni and Shiite insurgency groups in Iraq. Iran continues to harbor senior al-Qaeda leaders as the terrorist network reorganizes.

January 20, 2007

IRGC and Hezbollah terrorists kill five American soldiers in Karbala, Iraq.

January 2007 – present

Numerous IRGC and Hezbollah terrorists, who are responsible for arming and training terrorist groups in Iraq, are captured by American and Iraqi forces.

Of course, Joscelyn's timeline includes only those bits of information available in the public record. It is enough, though, to imagine that there is a great deal more known to Western intelligence agencies but still classified, and that there must be much more beyond that that we do not know about at all. A reason to hate Iran? No more, or less, than there was a reason to hate Russians in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.

7 Comments:

By Blogger Ardeshir Dolat, at Mon Oct 01, 06:02:00 AM:

The entire Islamic regime hates all Iranians. The Brits must also hate all Iranians because they surreptitiously support the Ayatollahs.

Seems everyone hates us! It must be all the oil and gas we have!!

You have to be very careful with the Brits as they are masters of skillfully quoting you out of context if they don't like you! Never eat your words with the Brits. If it takes you three paragraphs to make a simple point absolutely clear, you are recommended to do it in four to make sure.

However, what this is telling you is that you have a lot of difficulties getting the Brits behind you in your encounter with the Islamic regime. Good luck!  

By Blogger Nomenklatura, at Mon Oct 01, 06:45:00 AM:

This woman's mistake was to think that just because Britain is officially an ally, all members of a group of visiting British MP's can be considered allies.

This is very far from the truth. Many MP's in Britain's ruling Labour Party consider the US an enemy and will go to any lengths to undermine its foreign policy.

She made a mistake if she let her guard down and said anything informal in front of people like this. It would be totally unsurprising to find that many of them were eager to portray whatever she said in the worst possible way.

Note for instance that they do not seem to have sought any confirmation or denial that whatever remarks were made reflect official policy, before rushing into print. These are not the actions of allied supporters.  

By Anonymous Anonymous, at Mon Oct 01, 09:37:00 AM:

Tigerhawk,

Thomas Joscelyn makes a mistake in calling Iran, along with Sudan, a "Sunni Islamist state" in the entry for 1991.

Despite his error, this proves the larger point that apologists for Iran such as Juan Cole go out of their way to deny -- that Iran is perfectly willing to make common cause with Sunni Islamists when it suits them, whether it's the murderous Islamists in charge of Sudan, the Sunni Palestinian Hamas, the Sunni Islamic Jihad of Egypt, and last but not least the entirely Sunni leadership of Al Qaeda.

For those folks like Cole who claim that, for Iran, it's all about Shi'ite solidarity with Hezbollah or Moqtada Al Sadr, well, they clearly haven't been paying attention.

Iran might prefer Shi'ite Islamists to Sunni Islamists but, in the end, it will help ANY Islamist in their common goal of humiliating the U.S. and driving it from the region.

-- Eric  

By Blogger Georg Felis, at Mon Oct 01, 12:48:00 PM:

Somehow I find it difficult to believe a British reporter writing a story in a British newspaper about what a British MP said that an American administration official may or might not have said. There is a slim but positive probability that the official was quoted correctly, and a much greater chance they said some off-the-cuff remark that was promptly twisted into a pretzel. Strange how these claims almost never have any video or audio to back them up.  

By Anonymous Anonymous, at Mon Oct 01, 12:58:00 PM:

I think the hate comes from the funny names and the sneaky, two-faced way that they do everything.

The British, that is. :)

Now, about those Iranians....

-David  

By Blogger TigerHawk, at Mon Oct 01, 07:56:00 PM:

Eric -

Joscelyn definitely knows that Iran is a not Sunni -- I guess that the typo is the "s" at the end of "states". Sudan was the "world's only Sunni Islamist state" in 1990, so my guess is that it is a proofreading error, rather than a substantive mistake of fact. Good catch, though.  

By Blogger Thomas Joscelyn, at Tue Oct 02, 01:35:00 PM:

Hi,

I only noticed the typo in the Appendix Eric mentions only after the booklet was published. I regret the typo, but it was the only place in the booklet where that typo was made. I had originally written something like "Iran and Sudan, the only Shiite and Sunni Islamist states..." When I changed it, I missed the typo.

Indeed, a whole section of the booklet deals with the alliance between Sudan (Sunni Islamist) and Iran (Shiite Islamist) in the early 1990's. As you can see, I think that this relationship is particularly important for understanding how al Qaeda evolved into an international terrorist empire.

Thanks much for reading my work and the eagle eyes!

Tom Joscelyn  

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