Friday, April 06, 2007
Is the al Sadr movement on the ropes?
Stratfor's morning "geopolitical diary" wonders whether Moqtada al-Sadr's political organization is imploding. It is worth reading in its entirety, so I substantially reproduce it below (along with my strong recommendation that you subscribe for your ownself, which I hope constitutes sufficient consideration for my "fair use"):
A senior aide to radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr revealed on Thursday that al-Sadr had sacked two senior lawmakers representing his al-Sadrite Bloc in parliament after they met with Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq. The two deputies, Salam al-Maliki and Qusai Abdul-Wahab, reportedly attended a dinner gathering at the home of former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari also attended by Petraeus -- though in an interview with U.S.-funded Alhurra television, al-Maliki denied meeting Petraeus or any U.S. official.
The firings only add to the growing crisis within the ruling Shiite Islamist coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, which recently has seen the departure of its fourth-largest component party, Fadhila. But beyond the matter of Shiite unity, the move highlights what appears to be the gradual implosion of the al-Sadrite movement.
Until now, the problems appeared to be confined to the armed wing of the al-Sadrite Bloc -- the Mehdi Army -- where there has been talk of rogue elements and commanders who are conducting independent operations. Then there is the matter of the joint U.S.-Iraqi security plan, which is designed to crack down on al-Sadr's militia, and has increased pressure on al-Sadr to the point that he has been forced to go into hiding. We are told by sources close to the al-Sadr family that he is in Iran.
Al-Sadr's absence from the scene is only exacerbating his growing apprehension about the loyalties (or lack thereof) of his own people. Losing control over fighters and militia commanders is bad, but losing control over parliamentary deputies could prove to be even worse. This issue is even more critical for al-Sadr, given his own position as the head of the radical Shiite Islamist movement in Iraq.
Al-Sadr is neither a cleric nor a politician. He not only lacks clerical credentials, never having completed his seminary studies, but also does not hold public office. What this means is that he cannot truly be a spiritual leader of his movement along the lines of other Shiite clerics who lead political groups. At the same time, he also is not a political leader, in the hands-on sense, because he has to rely on other officials to further his political goals.
These two factors are likely threatening al-Sadr's position as the leader of his movement. What has thus far prevented a complete loss of control is the fact that his followers have great respect for the al-Sadrite family -- especially his father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr -- and he is the sole heir to his father's legacy and that of the wider al-Sadr clan. But he cannot rely on his family brand name to continue to hold on to his position.
Over time, religious elements within al-Sadr's group could begin to challenge him on his religious qualifications -- that is, if they have not already begun to do so. Meanwhile, it is only natural for the political elements -- people who are more educated than al-Sadr himself -- to ask themselves why they need to take orders from a seminary dropout, especially when his militia is out of control and a liability for the movement as a whole. This would explain reports that he is in the Iranian religious seminary town of Qom seeking to enhance his religious credentials.
Unfortunately for al-Sadr, the revolt already appears to be beginning. Several militiamen are violating his orders and engaging in sectarian violence, or have been co-opted by Iranian intelligence, while his political allies are trying to salvage their own positions by cutting deals with the U.S. military....
However gratifying it is to see Al-Sadr in trouble -- we should have arrested him in 2004 -- it seems to me that the fracturing of the Shiite coalition is at best a mixed blessing. However, perhaps it creates room for a trans-confessional alliance against Iran and al Qaeda (see, inter alia, yesterday's much-linked article by Bing and Owen West on the Sunni alliance against al Qaeda in Al-Anbar province). I would love to know what David Petraeus thinks of this.
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