Friday, January 12, 2007
A question for your discussion: What's the downside of the surge?
The comments to this post (my quick reaction to the President's "surge" speech) were interesting enough that I decided to elevate the discussion to the front page.
I really have no idea whether "the surge" and other elements of the administration's new plan for Iraq will work. However, they strike me as holding out some chance for strategic success, particularly so because David Petraeus is in command. But what do I know? I'm just a hobbyist who reads a bunch of stuff and thinks about it. I am, however, willing to support the administration in this because it strikes me as an extremely low risk roll of the bones. Even if the probability of success is low, it seems to me that the cost of failure is also low and the benefit of success is potentially huge.
There is, nevertheless, extremely dogmatic opposition to the President's plan from both the usual suspects and a fair number of Republicans. Why? If the new plan demonstrably fails over the next six months or so, we can always then retreat. We will have lost very little. Unless I'm missing something, the worst the surge can do is cost a few incremental casualties and some additional money, in both cases a small addition to the sunk costs. Neither is the surge likely to make things much worse from Iraq's perspective. According to the anti-surge side of the argument, Iraq is already a humanitarian disaster, and nobody credible is really arguing that it will become less so after the United States withdraws. So again, why not try?
In order that the conversation remain orderly, let's suppose that this intense opposition to the surge is sincere, and not driven by tactical political considerations (as I speculated last week). Let's also agree to exclude the argument that we should not spend one single additional American life in Iraq or similar moral claims that overweigh American casualties. I'm sure that some people genuinely feel that way, but I do not believe that this view drives the policy debate in Washington, or that it ought to under the circumstances.
So, with those ground rules, what is the downside to trying the plan that the President set forth in his speech on Wednesday night? We have many smart readers and commenters, so have at it.
44 Comments:
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I don't believe it will be given an honest shot at success. Al Sadr and the Iranians know that all they have to do is engage in a bit of a surge of their own and the political pressure to pull out will take over.
If the resistance to our "surge" in Baghdad is stiff at the start and doesn't let up, we aren't even going to last until spring.
On the other hand, there is some evidence of a split in the Shiite bloc. The head of SCIRI today came out strongly in favor of disarming the militias while a senior al Sadr aide said our new troops will be going home in bags.
I give it a 50/50 chance. If a moderate political alliance is formed across sectarian lines, I give it a 70% chance of it working.
Another alternative is that they just wait for us to leave the city again, turn things over to the Iraqis and start the killing all over again.
The idea of the surge is to mix American army personnel with Iraqi soldiers and police outside of the wire; living with the people in Baghdad. At last report the Iraqi soldiers will be from a mixed Kurd, Shia and Sunni battalion. There are many downsides to this. First the soldiers will remain outside of our relatively secure forward operating bases and thus have to, by positioning and tactics, be in close contact with the people. I suspect that the Iraqi force will be predominantly Shia and Kurd; those who as a group have historically a strong hatred concerning the Sunni. This could easily evolve into the same situation that now exists with the Lebanese Army; divided loyalties resulting in inaction or otherwise internal conflict in the army as happened with the Lebanese Army during their country’s civil war. Worse yet, the Iraqi government has not responded, as required, twice before when this was tried in Baghdad. Who can believe that they will now, when even our own experts believe that the Iraqi Army will not be fully operational and trained until the summer of this year. The Iraqi Army did not hold after the areas were pacified each time before. Haifa Street is a perfect example of an area that has slipped back into the terrorists’ and insurgents’ control after much effort and may casualties by the US military to pacify it. Why should we not expect the same result again with this unreliable ally.
We, the hated occupiers, have difficulty in protecting those that have little respect for us. The people will gravitate to the side with the perceived strength to succeed and our suicidal enemy will see many targets of opportunity. Our “nice guy” philosophy of warfare will not impress the people of Baghdad. If the Iraqi army does not react as required, our troops will be caught outside of the wire with little support. A possible replay of Mogadishu unless the Bush Administration is willing to do in downtown Baghdad what the Clinton Administration was unwilling to do in Mogadishu.
With the confusion exhibited by the Iraqis even determining whether or not one of their police officers is an AP source, how can we trust their defense ministry’s judgement to supply Iraqi troops which are loyal to the government? Many reports exist that the Shia militia and insurgents have infiltrated the Army and the national police; in particular the police. And the national police will be an integral part of the Iraqi force supplied to work with the US Army forces. The Iraqi forces actually will represent the majority of the forces to be sent to Baghdad and, as stated, are potentially infiltrated by the Shia militias and Sunni insurgents. Our military will have the added concern to watch their back.
Any killing by our troops of apparent innocent, appearing innocent to the media or fabricated innocent killings will be believed by the people of Baghdad and the American press, thus the American people. The International Zone (Green Zone) reporters will have an open window to the struggle in the streets. With the US government’s methods of projection of effort having failed miserably in Iraq, little success will be reported in the US. The propaganda of the enemy will take front stage in the theater of Baghdad.
We apparently don’t know how to win the hearts and minds of the Middle East people. Since 9/11 proved that we have failed in this effort for over a generation. The American congressional leadership, who make many decisions on our foreign policy, doesn’t know who is Shia and who is Sunni, so why would we expect 18 year olds to know the difference and how to respond to each. With the vast bureaucracy in Washington against our efforts in the Middle East, as evidence by the numerous leaks about national security measures and the with media participating in this effort, how can we expect our military to prevail when our country is unwilling to proclaim that we intend to win at all costs?
PS: An intellectual exercise; I support the surge but recognize the problems presented. Also I have a stake in this since I have a son serving in Iraq.
I think the weak link in the plan is the assumption that Maliki will follow through on his tough talk about confronting Sadr's militia.
I don't believe it, and I don't understand why others are skeptical as well.
I am in favor of the surge, I am hoping for victory, but if this key point fails then it's all futile.
By Purple Avenger, at Sat Jan 13, 02:03:00 AM:
Maliki will follow through on his tough talk about confronting Sadr's militia.
I think we'll whack him anyway if Makiki goes soft. It might even be one of the first things to happen to draw the the loons out into the open.
By Chris, at Sat Jan 13, 07:08:00 AM:
First of all, I don't believe we're going to "whack" the elected head of a sovereign nation. I'm pretty sure that kind of thing won't work any more.
Second, I think that the key to this whole thing is changing the rules of engagement. The President made reference to this. If our troops are less restricted in their operations, they will be more lethal. It seems that more lethal in that part of the world means more feared and respected.
Third, putting Petraeus in charge is a clear signal that a new sheriff is in town. His background and reputation indicate that he knows how to fight this type of war. Let's hope that is true.
Last, there is some advantage to be seen engaging in what most people believe is a last-ditch effort to salvage the security situation. Certainly the enemy will be focused on disrupting our "last effort", but our Iraqi allies, and especially Maliki's government, will be taking a closer look at the projected endgame if it fails. If the Iraqis feel that we have reached the end of our patience, then they may find themselves willing to lend fuller support in order to stave off our withdrawal.
By Jeremiah, at Sat Jan 13, 08:08:00 AM:
The downside of the surge concept is not different from the downside of any military operation. If we have a clear benchmark for objectives and victory and a clear plan for exit when that is benchmark is achieved, there is no significant downside. This is the Powell doctrine and it is valid for all management exercises, including those in which the objective can be defined as breaking things and killing people in one form or another.
So how can we fail? In two ways: We can fail by having defined objectives that are inappropriate or unrealistic. We can fail by lacking the will to achieve those objectives that have been defined. (That is the defect that has dogged American military operations for the last thirty plus years.)
And what are those objectives? Theoretically, they are as the President stated on Wednesday. Are they appropriate and realistic? All of this depends on Maliki. Do we have sufficient leverage to hold his feet to the fire on his "commitment"? Bearing in mind that he is an Arab, it had better be heavy leverage. What might it be? I suspect al Sadr in a body bag might do the trick.
And, by the way, I don't believe that purple avenger was suggesting that we might "whack" Maliki. I believe he was also discussing Moqtada's imminent departure from the building.
The downside of leaving now is so awful that the downside of the surge is insignificant. I have to believe that our imbeded forces in Bagdad will inspire their Iraqi bretheren and be in constant communication with their support elements. The key to success in this effort is now and has been all along the ROE. That element in our war efforts has been effed up since Korea and our enemy always takes full advantage. First order of business is Sadr and his closest. If that is done swiftly enough the rest of the Shia will crumble fast. Then concentrate on Anbar/Iranian/Syrian support to stop the Sunni troublemakers. Force, shock and awe, is the only thing that is respected. Our military can deliver that and also teach/bond/lead the Iraqis the are camped with.
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The greatest downside I see is US casualties are likely to increase substantially. We will have many units embedded and living in cleared sectors. The bad guys will try to come back and are likely to attack the troops holding the sectors. This compounded with the fact that we will be called in by the Iraqis to bail them out when they get in trouble, and there is likelihood that some of these calls will be ambushes, could increase our casualty rate two or three fold.
To me that is the greatest downside.
Robert Kagan, the architect of the "surge" plan, who along with William Kristol have been peddaling their idea of sending more troops to Iraq since early 2005, laid out in a recent editorial the concise --and easily understood--reasons why the plan that Bush veiled this week will not work. Yet, regrettably, the President, who is seldom right but never in doubt, has once again, failed to make the right choice.
It is difficult to imagine a responsible plan for getting the violence in and around Baghdad under control that could succeed with fewer than 30,000 combat troops beyond the forces already in Iraq.
The United States faces a dire situation in Iraq because of a history of half-measures. We have always sent "just enough" force to succeed if everything went according to plan. So far nothing has, and there's no reason to believe that it will. Sound military planning doesn't work this way. The only "surge" option that makes sense is both long and large.
Condoleeza's comment at the Senate Foreign Relations hearings the other day sums up best why our mission in Iraq, in the hands of this Administration, was doomed from the outset:
"It's bad policy to speculate on what you'll do if a plan fails when you're trying to make a plan work."
Helluva way to run a war.
By Dan Trabue, at Sat Jan 13, 09:57:00 AM:
Suppose that a businessman had invested $1,000,000 in a company and it kept losing money. Suppose that he came to the board and said, "I know that I've been losing money, but I think if I just keep doing the same thing, the business will turn around. Can I have an additional $200,000?"
How likely is the board to give him the money?
Now imagine that, instead of just money being lost, it's lives being lost.
Do you understand how the notion of asking "What's the worst that can happen?" is highly offensive to some of our board who have been saying this is a bad idea all along and how we're not especially trusting of more of the same? And when it's a large majority of the board that is in opposition to the plan, why we'd EXPECT a change?
Anonymous,
His name is Frederick W. Kagan, not Robert Kagan and he has endorsed the president's plan.
By buck smith, at Sat Jan 13, 10:06:00 AM:
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
By buck smith, at Sat Jan 13, 10:08:00 AM:
The surge is not as important as the rules of engagement. With the right rules of engagement, we can suppress the insurgency with the forces we have. All that is required is to use our air force over Syria and Iran to attack the rat lines and their enablers and to speak openly and frankly to the world about the US force's commitment to extreme violence in response to attacks, even when the attackers deliberately fight in an urban area with women and children as human shields. I am happy to have Petraeus in there, but my first picks are Kaiser Sozhe, Curt Lemay and W T Sherman. Of course none of those guys are available...
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Buck,
I think the additional carrier group was to assist in the border enforcement.
The intent in the plan of the additional troops were to use them to hold the areas after we cleared them.
By Boghie, at Sat Jan 13, 10:16:00 AM:
Here is the worst thing that could happen…
We may not provide the support required to secure Baghdad to the point that it is a functioning society on its way to Core status. Thus, it will become the Afghanistan of the 2010’s – but in a strategic (and ‘connected’) spot on the map and with the potential for immense wealth transfers to either Sunni or Shiite terrorist non-state entities. Then a mysterious disease hits New York, London, Paris, and Berlin at the same time. We will think it is man-generated, but we don’t have a state actor to directly blame. And, we are out of the region looking mean and scary just over the horizon on some island in the Pacific.
That result is guaranteed without victory on the Iraq Theater of war…
Quitting in Iraq is like quitting in France (why attack France and destroy their cities when it was the Germans who declared war on us) because the Krauts were wiping us off the field as a result of having better equipment and more experienced soldiers and better generals. Some of that changed with Patton, eh…
By Cassandra, at Sat Jan 13, 10:22:00 AM:
Every time we've gone in with the Iraqis on joint patrols, we've been successful.
The problems have come when we've had to retreat later due to insufficient manpower or political pressure. This plan specifically addresses BOTH those problems.
Therefore, logically, the half-vast punditocracy in their infinite military wisdom have decided it is doomed to fail. You can't have it both ways folks: you can't say you support the military because they've done a bang up job and the only reason we're losing over there is the leadership and not enough boots on the ground, and then bitch when we change the leadership and decide to put more boots on the ground.
Oh... my bad. Yes you can -- if you're the NY Times.
The downside is the traitorous press, the fickle domestic population and a president that either can't or won't communicate to the people in a way that inspires rather than divides.
I support President Bush, and I believe he has the decisiveness to make the tough decisions (although I began to doubt that right after the election, with what appeared to be a cascade of capitulations), but our representative democracy makes fighting a war without the full support of the majority of the people substantially difficult, if not impossible. And there are so many elements in the US and the West who are against this effort, that I can't see it succeeding unless the administration dispenses with political correctness and just wins.
Richard1 writes: His name is Frederick W. Kagan, not Robert Kagan and he has endorsed the president's plan.
My bad. The WaPo editorial I linked to is written by Frederick Kagan. Sometimes it's difficult to differentiate among neo-cons...especially when they are brothers:)
That clarified, what do you suppose would prompt Mr. Kagan now to embrace Bush's plan to add only 20,000 troops for "a matter of months, not 18 months or two years" (as per Secretary of Defense Gates's testimony Thursday at the House Armed Services Committee) when Kagan warned us in December that anything less than a surge of 30,000 troops for 18 months "would virtually ensure defeat?"
Given the stakes at hand, and the Administration's "history of half measures," I can't help but find the change in numbers and duration deeply troubling.
Anonymous,
As you may know, Kagan wrote his proposed plan in conjunction with General Jack Keane (U.S. Army, ret.). Gen Keane was interviewed this week and asked about the numbers. His answer was that they always talked about five additional US brigades to Baghdad. Depending on how the brigades were made up and how many support staff you are talking about, the numbers went up and down.
As to the 18 months. That includes the "holding" of the sectors. Gates was vague when asked about how many troops were needed to hold the city long term. I don't think we will know until we see what happens.
By SR, at Sat Jan 13, 11:22:00 AM:
For Dan T.
I believe it is too simplistic in a Time/Newsweek/Nightly News sort of way to believe that there and have not been contingency plans upon contingency plans.
What you can;t do in war or in business is let the contingency plans dominate the thinking to the point where no action is taken. Opponents of the war in Iraq appear to be fixated on the difficulty moving through contingencies ( though few would stand up and say that a stable democratic Iraq that is not a base for terrorism is not a worthy goal) because moving through contingencies is just TOO HARD.
By D.E. Cloutier, at Sat Jan 13, 11:23:00 AM:
Dan: "How likely is the board to give him the money?"
Quite likely if the businessman has a good plan. The magazine Sports Illustrated lost a million dollars a year during its first 10 years. In the 11th year, the magazine made $11 million profit. Over the next decades the magazine continued to generate substantial profits.
Many other highly successful businesses lost money for extended periods of time after start-up.
The question is: Does Bush have a good plan?
By TigerHawk, at Sat Jan 13, 11:43:00 AM:
Dan T:
A board would look at the incremental return on the incremental investment, and heavily value the "optionality" of closing down the company in the future. My point with this post is to observe that the incremental investment here is actually quite low, so the incremental expected return doesn't need to be spectacular to make it worth doing. Since we are doing a bunch of things differently (changing the rules of engagement, putting a counterinsurgency expert in charge ('bout freaking time), and brushing back Iran), why not give it a shot? Again, sweeping away the political positioning, I have a hard time understanding the good faith objection.
Dan,
Paraphrasing: 'Another $200,000 of "more of the same" on top of $1,000,000 already invested and not showing the promised results to a skeptical board is a tough sell, especially when the dollars represent lives'. Sure. But this skews the situation in several ways.
(1) There is new upper management with Petraeus who was in the lead on the new development of anti-insurgency doctrine. The outlined approach to Baghdad is new as are the rules of engagement. There is all the reason to deny that it will be "more of the same" and your analogy is silent about this. The inadequacy of U.S. efforts in Baghdad and the Sunni triangle do not prove inevitable failure: even in wars that we won such as the American Civil War and WW2 or in which we ended in stalemate such as Korea, our initial tactics did not work or were even disastrous.
(2) It is not only the lives of our troops in the balance but also those of the Iraqi people who arguably would engage in a massive civil war absent U.S. military presence. Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur... Should we add Iraq to the list because the U.S. is unwilling to tolerate casualties over 3+ years that compare favorably to say the 1-month Battle of Iwo Jima (USA: 6140 killed, 17913 wounded)?
By knighterrant, at Sat Jan 13, 12:18:00 PM:
I list the downside on my (liberal) blog. In brief:
1) The American embeds among Iraqi forces is an ill-defined mission. Are they babysitters, observers, or commanders?
2) Sadr City has over two million people in it. Entering this "neighborhood" will be a bloody mess.
3) The promise to "seek out and destroy" insurgent support from Iran and Syria, with the addition of a second carrier group, hints at expanding the war far beyond a tiny "surge" into a massive regional war.
4) The principle problem with the plan is that it is really just minor tweaking of "Stay the Course." Adding 21,500 troops will only raise the troop levels back to where they were in 2005.
I know I wasn't suppose to mention American casualties, but your uses of the phrase "low risk roll of the bones" gave me a sick feeling. This "low risk" gamble is using the lives of America's best as the chips; the "bones" we are rolling are the limbs of US servicemembers. I'm sorry, but I really do care about that.
By Mark in Texas, at Sat Jan 13, 12:31:00 PM:
Boghie
Then a mysterious disease hits New York, London, Paris, and Berlin at the same time. We will think it is man-generated, but we don’t have a state actor to directly blame.
In a situation like that, we don't need legal proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We need a shit list. And we need a President who can be trusted to speak to the leaders of the countries on that list and be believed like Vito Coreleone "I'm a superstitious man, and if some unlucky accident should befall Michael - if he is to be shot in the head by a police officer, or be found hung dead in a jail cell... or if he should be struck by a bolt of lightning - then I'm going to blame some of the people in this room; and then I do not forgive."
KnightErrant,
We see the embed recommendation in the Hadley memo to Pres Bush after he visited Iraq. There was a successful Marine action in Anbar province where they put advisers alongside Iraqi units down to the NCO level. They stayed with and fought with their Iraqi counterparts 24/7. And the Marines reported that the Iraqis fought with more confidence and effect. Also in 2004 a similar but broader effort at integration between U.S. and Iraqi forces was planned in Anbar province by Marine Maj. Gen. James Mattis. The Mattis plan is summarized in the middle of the Army's new Counterinsurgency Manual, dated Dec, 2006. The new operational commander for Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, oversaw the creation of the manual. That he was chosen for the job is no coincidence. The manual describes in detail the purpose, theory, tactics and problems (including spikes in violence and casualties) likely to emerge during the new counterinsurgency strategy, I would recommend reading it (at least Chapter 1).
3) The promise to "seek out and destroy" insurgent support from Iran and Syria, with the addition of a second carrier group, hints at expanding the war far beyond a tiny "surge" into a massive regional war.
SECDEF Gates explained to congress this week that actions would only take place within Iraq.
By TmjUtah, at Sat Jan 13, 01:50:00 PM:
Our time of active involvement in Iraq, toward the goal of democratization, is coming to an end.
The media, and certainly not the Democrats, will never acknowledge any acceptable standard of "stability". It's that simple. Hussein is gone, there have been multiple fair national elections, the Iraqi constitution and government exist and are functioning as best they can in an unprecedented environment...
But democratization was a toe in the water re permanent solutions to the challenge of Islamic terrorism. It was a liberal (of the highest order) attempt to counter the true wellspring of the threat which is constituted by the barbaric, backward, and ultimately failed nation states sprinkled across the muslim arc.
Even if the Iraqis ran a "draft Hillary" campaign for their presidency and the violent death rate in Iraq dropped to zero, half our polity and 90% of our media/entertainment/intelligentsia would make time to damn Bush for leaving Iraq with unacceptable levels of arsenic in their (new since 2003) water supplies.
My wife asked "what now?" about the war after the Republicans gave away their majorities in the House and Senate. After a little thought I told her that Bush would buy a case of veto pens, sign a bunch of hunting licenses, and concentrate on safeguarding and strengthening the military for the administration to follow his.
I do not have the text of the resolutions authorizing presidential force re terrorists in general, but I remember that a key sentiment is that if we find them the president is authorized to kill them. The Somalia saga of the last two weeks is a fine case in point; over the holidays it was "Islamic Courts Kick Ass Without Restraint" and "Al Qaeda OWNS Somalia".
That meme ran right up until the Ethiopians, with what had to have been months or weeks of previous coordination with U.S. shooters on the ground, rolled the muj up.
I believe the "surge" will help Iraq out a lot, dependent on how serious Maliki is about presiding over a democracy. "Gloves off" as it relates to the terrorists cannot be conceived by anyone not exposed to the cutting end of the U.S. military - and if the gloves are truly off, then refer back to my above "hunting licenses" remark.
We are in the Long War. The Democrats didn't win any sort of a mandate this last election. Their actions in these first few weeks of their majorities put their ignorance of the reality (political, economic, and military..) they inhabit on stark display; the difference between "winning the big one" against all odds and winning by default since the other team didn't show up.
Our enemy watches and waits. They know that they win when we quit and not before. They think they can pay what this war will cost to win and are prepared to slaughter as many innocents as necessary to see us fold. What they don't understand is that just because we elected losers this time we won't unscrew our mistake two, or four, years down the road.
The cost of eventual victory for civilization has gone up with our November mistake. The outcome is not in doubt.
By Dan Trabue, at Sat Jan 13, 02:35:00 PM:
"The question is: Does Bush have a good plan?"
The problem for a majority here at this blog is that a majority of the US does not think Bush has a good plan. You'll have to trust in our Republic's self-correction, because we're NOT going the direction Bush wants.
By Jamie, at Sat Jan 13, 02:35:00 PM:
When someone begins a statement with "I'm sorry, but..." it's usually clear that they're not, Knight Errant. What you appear to be saying is, "You all may place a low value on the lives of American soldiers, but I don't - and that puts me on a higher moral plane than you." If I mischaracterize your feelings, I'm sorry (so obviously I'm really not; rather, I'm confident that I've accurately deciphered your meaning).
But the important question is whether those lost and damaged lives are worth what they're spent for. You apparently believe they're not. I believe they are, if we succeed - given the low number of casualties the United States has suffered; no doubt there'd be a point where a victory would become Pyrrhic (per the argument for withdrawing from Vietnam, though that particular point is arguable). TigerHawk's ground rules implied a shared goal of success and an acknowledgement that success will benefit us and Iraq; do you disagree?
Knight,
An answer to your objections from a soldier in Baghdad:
1) Of all of the missions we do here, perhaps the best defined one for the guys executing it on the ground is the Military and Police Training Teams. And that's exactly what they are, training teams. Over the last few days I've sat down with Iraqi leaders and their US counterparts and have been impressed and heartened by what I saw. This is working, and will continue to work the more time and effort and resources we give it. Arabs in general and Iraqis in particular have a different sense of time than we do, a different sense of urgency about some things, and choose to do things differently. But the underpinning of our strategy has been T.E. Lawrence's maxim that (paraphrasing)its better the Arab do something for himself tolerably than the outsider do it for him perfectly.
2. The solution to Sadr City always has and will continue to be a political one. And if that fails, I don't believe it will be nearly as bloody as you think. However, having said that, how bloody is too bloody? 1 KIA? 50? 100? If it accomplishes the mission and helps to ensure we aren't getting picked off one or two at a time ad infinitum, I'd have a hard time defining what "too bloody" is.
3. A principle of counterinsurgency operations (and I would ask Tigerhawk if that term actually defines the type of fight we're in, as it has historically defined a binary conflict with one insurgent group or umbrella of groups fighting one counterinsurgent force, not the current sectarian battle we find ourselves in today) is to cut off the outside support of the insurgent. Both Iran and Syria are providing that support. What's incredible is not that we're doing this now, but that we haven't focused more on it to this point. Your "hints" can be spun whatever way your political weathervane points, but from a strictly military perspective, this is a no-brainer.
4. We're only marginally staying the course. If your alternative to what we're doing is redeployment of all troops and Bush resigning in shame while simultaneously apologizing to all he has offended, then I don't think you're going to get it. Until I got here I was a supporter, perhaps too blindly, of what the Administration was doing. And since I've been here I see a number of areas the military can improve upon. However the biggest problem is not with the military, it's that the rest of the government hasn't shown up. The parts of Bush's plan that probably weren't in the speech (I didn't see it, but read other documents outlining the plan) involved getting other Cabinet agencies into the fight here. That, in my mind, is the most important part of the plan, not necessarily the soldiers. An insurgency (again, if that's what we're really fighting) can only effectively be countered by the effective use of all elements of national power. Only the M of the DIME has shown up in force thus far in Iraq. If that changes, look for much more improvement down the road. And the final point is counterinsurgency TAKES TIME. 3 years is nothing. For us to win here, and perhaps especially here, it will take time and patience. Don't give up on us, or our brothers will truly have died in vain.
One other note. There is a boy, about 8-9 years old, whose family lives near the gate to our base. Every time we drive by he smiles and waves at us and -- in a way only a child can -- fills me with hope. Hope that I didn't get reading the newspaper back home. Iraqis are good people. And we're helping them get through this tumultuous period. Don't give up on us, or them.
By D.E. Cloutier, at Sat Jan 13, 05:00:00 PM:
"Arabs in general and Iraqis in particular have a different sense of time than we do, a different sense of urgency about some things, and choose to do things differently."
That different sense of time extends throughout much of the developing and undeveloped parts of the world.
The Indonesians use the term rubber time. "Time is elastic," one Indonesian told me during my first trip to Jakarta. "You can stretch it. You can allow it to resume its original shape."
In predominantly Muslim Indonesia, you can expect an executive to show up at 11 a.m. for a 9 a.m. meeting. It is simply a fact of life that deeply annoys punctual Swiss, German, and American businessmen.
In Egypt the government frequently takes up to two years to negotiate one contract.
Americans seem to have a need for instant gratification. In business the most common complaint I hear from overseas customers involves the impatience of American executives.
By allen, at Sat Jan 13, 05:07:00 PM:
DEC,
As you observe, American emphasis is contractual, while the Asian emphasis is familial.
Dear TigerHawk:
You ask, "What's the downside of the 'surge'?"
The downside is that the U.S. could destroy important options during the surge that it will dearly miss afterwards.
What are these options the U.S. could destroy?
1. If the U.S. is intent on going after al-Sadr and the Shi'ite militias, it risks alienating Iraq's majority Shi'ite population. It may be impossible, at this point in time, to attack al-Sadr's men and not anger the general Shi'ite population (al-Sadr and the Mahdi army need to be destroyed, but not yet and not by the U.S. Army). If the Americans alienate the Shi'ite population, only the Kurds, themselves in an untenable status, will remain pro-U.S.
Why does this matter? Political reconciliation in Iraq, still President Bush's goal, is dead. After the surge strategy fails, the U.S. will have to pick a side in Iraq's civil conflict if it wishes to retain influence and have any hope of keeping the Iranians away. The only side the U.S. can pick is the 80%+ Shi'ite/Kurd majority. But if military operations during the surge alienate the Shi'ites, the U.S. will destroy this option for itself.
2. Another possibility is that the U.S. casualty rate might accelerate from about three killed per day (the rate in Q406) to 10 or more per day. The U.S. domestic backlash could be intense when this hits the daily video media. Instead of having the tactical flexibility to maneuver, make arrangements with internal tribes and allies (see point #1), establish a moderate cross-sectarian government to succeed al-Maliki, or do any number of other options, a large jump in daily U.S. casualties could provoke an Article I congressional response: OUT! Drive to Kuwait - now!
The surge is not, as you assert, a low risk strategy. It is highly risky and could eliminate options the U.S. may dearly wish it still retained.
Westhawk
By Assistant Village Idiot, at Sat Jan 13, 07:03:00 PM:
blog after blog, a common liberal argument is "the polls are with us, so we must be right," and Dan Trabue obliges us again.
To paraphrase Inigo Montoya, "I don't think that government works the way you think it does."
By Dan Trabue, at Sat Jan 13, 07:12:00 PM:
Well, in a Representative Democracy such as ours, the majority matters.
A majority does not determine right-ness or morality, of course. I happen to think that the majority is morally and legally right on this one. You'll just have to live with it and continue making your case for supporting Bush. The majority of us, in the meantime, are demanding another direction.
The "olls are with us" is not an argument I'm making. I've made my arguments here before. I'm just telling you that we disagree and the majority is with me on this one and therefore you've got to deal with it.
By Dawnfire82, at Sat Jan 13, 08:11:00 PM:
One of the reasons that our republic is designed the way that it is is to try to divest the government from 'mob rule.' Senators have 6 year terms so that they can make unpopular (but presumably wise) decisions and not immediately be stripped from office by an irritated contituency, unlike Representatives and their 2 year terms.
Public opinion should not determine policy. It's not well thought out, it's not researched, it doesn't benefit from experience, it's easily manipulated; it's an opinon and it changes constantly.
A majority also believes that gays shouldn't be allowed to marry, that capital punishment is acceptable, humanity was created by divine force, and that torture by agents of the US government is at least sometimes justified. Does that mean that these ideas should necessarily be part of national policy? Think carefully.
You can't cry 'democracy democracy! the majority is with me!' on one occasion and 'poor misguided sheep, leave this to your betters' on others.
By allen, at Sat Jan 13, 09:31:00 PM:
Dan Trabue,
You seem to make the case for withdrawal from Iraq because that is the public will, presumably based on polling data. Do correct me if I misunderstand.
If that is your position, it is not supported by the polls. Surely in your research you have found that upwards of 70% of those polled believe the President has and is mismanaging the war. What is not found in Pew, Zogby, or CNN polling is the simple question: Should America bring the troops home from Iraq, now? Doesn’t that strike you as peculiar? It does me.
How the public’s dissatisfaction with Mr. Bush’s leadership translates into the immediate, unconditional American withdrawal from Iraq remains to be explained. Your help would be appreciated.
By allen, at Sat Jan 13, 10:21:00 PM:
Ace of Spades makes some points apropos the Democrat leadership and the war.
Goldberg & Kristol On Democratic Cravenness
If, as those who want an end to the war claim, there is a public clamor for immediate withdrawal, then, why needlessly, immorally waste more American lives?
See, also: See, also:
>”Kaus has slammed Andrew Sullivan for suggesting that a bloody cleansing of mass ethnic slaughter might be just what is needed to stabilize Iraq.”
Dan T --
Fox lost something like a BILLION dollars it's first ten years. It is now among the most profitable of the broadcast networks. Apple Computer was widely assumed to be dead in 1996, needing an emergency infusion of funds from Microsoft. The British were routed at Dunkirk, why didn't they just surrender to Hitler? Why didn't Chuikov just surrender to Von Paulus? Von Paulus had almost ALL of Stalingrad by December (Chuikov had half of six buildings at the riverbank and the sewers, and had lost around 3 million men).
Think on THAT. The Soviets lost 3 MILLION MEN in Stalingrad alone (around 20 million combined military and civilian losses). Whole armies of 5 million men would be wiped out or surrender in August-September of 1941 and April-August 1942.
Lincoln lost every election up to the Presidential one.
Sometimes it's far more costly to just "give up" (I know, Liberals love nothing more than giving up).
That being said, the surge will fail without addressing the core problem: Iran is funding the killing and controlling it; and giving new anti-armor weapons to the militias and Al Qaeda terrorists (Iran has been found by captured Iranians and docs to be funding both the Shia and Al Qaeda death squads).
Sink Iran's Navy, destroy it's air force, hit all it's oil facilities, and hit it's nuke facilities without caring how many civilians are killed. Cause for war: Iran's invading our Embassy in 1979 and holding our people hostage for 444 days.
Navy and Air Force haven't been stressed that much. And Iran will fall back if hit hard. The only way to raise the stakes is to ... raise the stakes.
Plus it's good politics to have Nancy Pelosi and Hillary weep for Ahmadnutjob. Iran and the Iranians are our enemy. Simple as that.
Dan you are correct when you assert Bush's plan is not supported by the majority of Americans. They are not however of Democrat's mind (surrender in Iraq and Afghanistan ... if you can't hold Iraq you end up surrendering to bin Laden in Afghanistan).
Dems bet the farm on surrender to bin Laden and THAT will cost them just as Bush bet the farm on removing Saddam without also removing Iran and THAT will cost him.
Look for a populist Ross Perot type to propose nuking em all. And win or direct politics in that direction. If the Dems force surrender to bin Laden in Iraq (and Afghanistan to follow as their peacenik lunatic base wants) the only resort is nuking enemies to make us feared. Americans will not tolerate any more 9/11's or surrender to bin Laden and Ahmadnutjob.
DEC: Yes and who is richer? Egypt once the world's breadbasket now a basket case, or Switzerland and America. Third world behavior makes them poor. Singaporeans would tell you that as well.
By D.E. Cloutier, at Sat Jan 13, 11:22:00 PM:
Anonymous: "Singaporeans would tell you that as well."
I spend a lot of time in Singapore. In fact, I have a home there. Singaporeans tell me Americans are too impatient.
I'm not about to pick a fight with Westhawk (I read the blog), but the part about the 80%+ shiite/kurd majority bothers me. I've had no luck finding reliable numbers of southern shiites, mainline sunnis and sunni kurds. Even the total population of Iraq varies, from 22 million to 26 million. The only number of kurds I've found is "about" 5 million. I've read assertions that the shiites are 60%, 70% and 80% of the population, with no stats to back them up. That's an important point. Shiites seem to assume they represent the overwhelming majority of the population, but if the numbers aren't true, the political situation could be transformed. That may be why Bush got Maliki to promise provincial elections. Who gets elected could give us a decent idea of relative numbers.
By D.E. Cloutier, at Sun Jan 14, 12:36:00 AM:
Anonymous, the online CIA World Factbook might help you:
Iraq
Population: 26,783,383 (July 2006 est.)
Ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5%
Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi'a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3%
By Assistant Village Idiot, at Sun Jan 14, 03:00:00 PM:
Dan T - to say "We're NOT going in the direction that Bush wants," which was your original phrasing, does sound to me very much that you are insisting on your (plural) own way despite bare majorities in Congress. I prefer our government as it's designed, thank you. You retreated to a more moderate phrasing when challenged, but seem determined that "we" shall have our way.
I'm trying to to remember the exact quotes from the Democrats about sharing power when Bush was elected. My take then was that it was the resentful narcissism of the loss of power, not something they actually believed in. This year, they have immediately proved me right.