Friday, December 08, 2006
Win the Region
So what constitutes victory in this regional war? And how do we achieve it?
I have long argued that, media arguments to the contrary, toppling the Hussein mafia regime in Baghdad constituted an American military victory in Iraq, just as toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan similarly was an American military victory. The longer term challenges which continue in these countries are extremely complex and will require the passage of time, patience, will and investment to see each nation through to freedom and prosperity. I stubbornly continue to believe this.
However, the Middle East remains unstable. In fact, regional instability has increased because the old, reactionary, tyrannical order of things is fighting back. It is not an accident that Syria and Iran are actively undermining freedom, stability and progress toward prosperity in Iraq and Lebanon. So which philosophy will emerge victorious? Freedom? Syrian Baathism? Shiite Theocracy? Sunni Theocracy?
I obviously believe freedom will eventually emerge victorious. But at what cost? And in what timeframe?
During WWII, the USA and Soviet Union gnawed away at the German Reich's periphery, gradually turning the tide of the hot war against Hitler. German satellites like France and Italy were in turn conquered and flipped or neutralized. They were fundamentally unstable allies to the German Reich.
In this regional conflict -- a far smaller, less difficult challenge by far -- Syria is Iran's key peripheral ally. Iran extends its regional influence through Syria to Lebanon via Hezbollah. To weaken Iran, we should break it from Syria. Syria and Lebanon are both unstable Iranian satellites. Why? Because of the substantial non-Shiite, non-Persian populations in both.
In this sense, I believe it is in America's interest to strike a lucrative bargain with Syria to divide it from Iran and complicate Iran's relationship with Hezbollah. That bargain should involve Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. It involves significant financial incentives that might make us blush. But dealing with Syria is done from strength, and relatively easy to achieve, I think. Dealing with Iran today is not done from strength, unless we deal with it militarily, which we seem loathe to do.
So, what is in the second, classified ISG plan? Beats me.
I have not been a proponent of increasing our troop presence in Iraq, especially in Baghdad. But, if we form some sort of consensus viz. Iran, it may be that we give Syria a carrot, and wave a stick at Iran. That stick would include a very substantial American naval and air presence in the Gulf, more US troops garrisoned in Iraq, and a very tangible opening to Syria.
Patience is required. And maybe the next administration.
[Time stamp corrected.]
4 Comments:
By 
K. Pablo, at
Fri Dec 08, 07:46:00 PM:
It's not hard to make a few assertions that are fairly supportable, and then draw some conclusions:
1. For the foreseeable future, U.S. needs to stay in Iraq, protecting oil fields and the Kurds, securing Baghdad and the central government.
2. Iran will soon undergo upheaval as Khamenei dies, probably within the next three months given what sounds like colon cancer metastatic to the spine. The degree of the upheaval is difficult to predict.
3. Sunni Arab refugees will continue to pour out of Iraq, mostly into Syria and Jordan. Assad won't be able to handle this, and the Iranians won't be able to help him. Syria likely to be destabilized.
4. Hezbollah is likely to cause the downfall of the Siniora government, and has built up an excellent Sturmabteilung with which to replace it.
5. Saudi Arabia and Israel are "re-aligning" at the moment, which will place Hamas in an untenable position. Other re-alignments include Qatar cozying up to Iran, and Turkey and Iran cooperating against their Kurdish populations.
6. al-Maliki and al-Hakim are likely to be drawn into conflict. al-Hakim's SCIRI brethren are more useful to Iran than are al-Maliki and his Sadrist street gangs.
7. Saudis have dropped hints about boosting oil production to depress Iran's economy. Iran can blockade the straits of Hormuz but this is likely to be temporary and at the cost of Iran's navy (until they get a nuke).
My forecast is for a very warm spring, featuring explosions and regime change.
By TigerHawk, at
Fri Dec 08, 08:24:00 PM:
That's an interesting set of predictions. I may build them into their own post.
By Dawnfire82, at
Fri Dec 08, 10:00:00 PM:
Only a few comments.
"2. Iran will soon undergo upheaval as Khamenei dies, probably within the next three months given what sounds like colon cancer metastatic to the spine. The degree of the upheaval is difficult to predict."
The vibes I've always gotten from Iran was that Khamenei was a mitigating force on their crazy, messianic President. If the next Supreme Leader is not of Khamenei's caliber, Iran might get even more bellicose and aggressive. In the end, that could be good for us.
"4. Hezbollah is likely to cause the downfall of the Siniora government, and has built up an excellent Sturmabteilung with which to replace it."
I don't think that the other factions will allow this. If the Christians and Sunni are standing together (as they are now) then they must feel strongly about opposing Hezb Allah. Another civil war seems likely to me, rather than a simple coup.
"7. Saudis have dropped hints about boosting oil production to depress Iran's economy. Iran can blockade the straits of Hormuz but this is likely to be temporary and at the cost of Iran's navy (until they get a nuke)."
A blockade is an act of war, and would again be good news for us. In my opinion, what we need most is a clear cassus beli to do some house cleaning.
By Assistant Village Idiot, at
Fri Dec 08, 10:35:00 PM:
I thank both poster and commenters. My remarks come from less knowledge of the ME and of strategy than I see here, but I hope to be helpful anyway.
The difficulty of this war is its complexity. Every action has several reactions, and predictability lessens at every remove. None of the single items we are attempting has proven to be that difficult militarily. What we can define, we accomplish with stunning success.
All players are eyeing each other nervously, trying to predict (and influence) where the others will go. In Game Theory, that sort of uncertainity tends to resolve when one player commits to a course of action. If the player chooses wisely at all, then advantage goes to initiative. In fact, if the initiator does not make a wildly bad move, he usually captures advantage. America has had good success in OIF when we have made choices and forced others to choose. We have not been uninterruptedly successful in this - such as our failure to get Turkey to allow us to open a second front at invasion - but the record has been generally good.
You will notice the many qualifiers I include. It is likely to our great advantage to choose any of a half-dozen strategies, so long as it is not catastrophically bad. But "likely" is not "assuredly," and heavy is the head that wears the crown.
