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Tuesday, July 11, 2006

What did China know, and when did it know it? 


Smart people are disagreeing about China's role and interest in North Korea's recent missile launches. Niall Ferguson has a must-read essay that outlines the geopolitical significance of North Korea for those of us in need of a history lesson:

History helps explain how this tinpot dictatorship has achieved so much diplomatic leverage. For the Korean peninsula remains one of the world's strategic pivots, as it has been for more than a century.

The first half of the 20th century saw a succession of wars at the two ends of the Eurasian landmass. In the West, the fulcrum of conflict was central and eastern Europe, particularly Poland and its neighbours. The equivalent conflict-zone in Asia was Korea and the contested territory north of it, Manchuria.

These regions were pivotal because it was around them that imperial rivalries revolved. As the Austrian and Turkish empires crumbled, Germany and Russia vied for mastery in central and eastern Europe. As the Chinese empire crumbled, Russia and Japan struggled for dominance in Korea and Manchuria.

The result was a global Fifty Years' War that began with the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and ended with the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. In the intervening period, these pivotal territories repeatedly changed hands. Peace, when it finally came, meant their partition: the division of central Europe (and of Germany itself) and the division of Korea. In each case, there were American clients on one side and Soviet clients on the other.

These outcomes were not inevitable. There were a number of moments during the Cold War when reunification under some form of informal Soviet tutelage might have been Germany's fate. There were several occasions during the Korean War when first Truman and then Eisenhower contemplated using atomic bombs to decide the issue, which might have shattered China's support for the North Korean regime and reunited the peninsula under American protection.

Of the two great fences of the Cold War - the one running through Germany and the one running across Korea - only one now remains. In 1989 Germany was reunified: overnight, the possibility of a lethal war fought over the heart of Europe simply vanished. Yet the division of Korea, between a prosperous South and a pauperised North, remains. So does the danger of war, epitomised by crazy Kim's missiles. Why?

The answer lies in the different paths taken in 1989 by the two great Communist empires, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Ferguson goes on to speculate that since this confrontation is so obviously against China's interests, the Norks must have sandbagged Beijing:
For perhaps the most significant thing that happened last week was that Kim fired his missiles in defiance not just of the United States, Japan and South Korea but also of China. Before July 4, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Prime Minister, explicitly warned North Korea not to heighten diplomatic tension. By ignoring that warning, the Dear Leader can scarcely have endeared himself to his patrons in Beijing.

But were Beijing's warnings just for show? Stratfor argues($) that Kim would not have launched without China's approval. Their thesis is that it was in China's interests to claim to object to the missile tests but for the tests to proceed in any case, because it reinforces, rather than diminishes, the centrality of China's role in the security of northeastern Asia.
By contrast, China has seemed the least concerned by the tests, though it did criticize the launch. Despite media and foreign government comments that this showed China was unable to control North Korea, and would be perceived as a slap in the face by Beijing, China's post-launch reaction seems to belie this. In fact, it appears Beijing not only had prior notice of the launches, but may well have encouraged them. No matter what plan of action other countries intend to take with North Korea, China remains the key. Punitive action against Pyongyang is ineffective without Chinese acquiescence, and the road to discussions with Pyongyang runs through Beijing.

For China, the North Korean missile crisis provides a renewed opportunity to reinforce its central role in Northeast Asian peace and security. Beijing has tacitly backed Pyongyang's claims that the real threat to regional security is the United States, particularly Washington's unilateralism and failure to engage in dialogue. China's calls for informal six-party talks a week before the North Korean missile launch -- and their apparent rejection by the United States -- plays into building the perception that if Washington had only listened to Beijing and rejoined talks, North Korea would not have been so reckless.

From this perspective, China welcomes the looming confrontation in the United Nations Security Council. The West cannot take any effective action -- diplomatic or otherwise -- against North Korea without at least tacit support from China. What price will we pay for that support?

Let's just say that we shouldn't expect the Yuan to strengthen much below 8 to the dollar any time soon.

2 Comments:

By Anonymous Anonymous, at Tue Jul 11, 11:02:00 AM:

China's North Korea policy is stupid and self-destructive. Stratfor may be looking for a clever trick buried somewhere in the wreckage Beijing's diplomacy has created, but in the meantime, Japan rips up Article 9 to its constitution, and creates an offensive strike capability.

For more discussion of the consequences that have occurred since last week's missile tests, please see

China kills Japan's Article 9, and thus shoots itself.

We agree that China is the key to a diplomatic solution to the North Korean problem. However, China's foot-dragging has broken its credibility. China's neighbors are now making other arrangements and China's strategic situation has drastically deteriorated as a result. China has no one to blame for this outcome except itself.

Westhawk  

By Blogger Unknown, at Tue Jul 11, 04:01:00 PM:

I agree with Westhawk's observation. The inducement we should offer the Chinese is negative inducment: the assurance that either we or the Japanese will respond forcefully if the North Koreans go to far. No one, including the Chinese, wants to see that so it's time for the Chinese to stop enabling North Korean brinksmanship.  

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