Monday, March 06, 2006
India and Pakistan - The War That Did Not Happen
Forgotten by now, of course, is that this victorious mission to India was by no means assured, and our relationships with both India and Pakistan -- leave alone Afghanistan -- were utterly unstable when Bush assumed the Presidency in January 2001.
In fact, the India-Pakistan War of 2002 is the war that did not happen - and is integrally related to the subsequent Iraq War. How so?
In the aftermath of the events 9/11, the US had finally decided to respond to Al Qaeda's previous declarations of war against the US (both in 1996 and again in 1998). Whereas attacks on American military installations and personnel abroad by Al Qaeda were deemed not to merit an overwhelming military response (Somalia, Khobar, Cole, Kenya, Tanzania etc.), the attack on the homeland in NY and DC which killed 2500 or so civilians served to mobilize an impressive American military response.
The first and obvious response was to attack Al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. But of course, Al Qaeda was designed from inception as a transnational, sectarian institution, prepared to atomize and disperse its network of militants - and so they had and did. They withstood the initial assault in Afghanistan, losing significant personnel, their sanctuary and training facilities. However, they had dispersed and could move additional personnel to other hotspots. They had significant capability and leadership in Indonesia (Hambali), Iraq (Zarqawi) and Pakistan (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed). The subsequent strategic question was where might the US or its proxies or allies subsequently engage Al Qaeda.
In the spring of 2002, tensions escalated dramatically between India and Pakistan. Today, this is hardly recalled in the press, but at the time there was a distinct possibility of a hot war between the two nuclear powers. This hot war would have been over Kashmir, a source of great sectarian friction and a magnet for Islamofascists. This magnet in more significant than Bosnia or Palestine to al Qaeda. It is a unifying totem.
At that moment, the US had a vital strategic choice. It could have encouraged India to lead the war against Islamofascists, with Kashmir as the magnet. This would have put the US in the backseat and created grave risks in terms of the future of Pakistan. It was certainly a war which Pakistan could not win, though Musharraf could not have resisted using every weapon in his arsenal to try. It was a war the US could effectively sit out (like we did in earlier conflict in the region). Or wait to enter at a convenient or opportune moment.
This may seem silly, but it is not historically without precedent. Chamberlain's decision to placate Hitler with the Munich Agreement was an explicit effort to promote a war to Hitler's east with Stalin, and away from Britain and the west. When Stalin countered with his own agreement with Hitler and the partition of Poland, Chamberlain (the emperor) was left with no clothes.
Bush could have chosen to stand aside, let India and Pakistan go to war, and turned Kashmir and Pakistan generally into a killing ground for Islamofascists. It would not have been an insane strategic choice. More Islamofascists would almost undoubtedly be dead today, including Zawahiri and Bin Laden. Of course, so might hundreds of thousands of innocents. Maybe millions. And we would likely have seen the first usage of nuclear weaponry since 1945.
Instead, history has played out differently. We have used carrot and stick to enhance our effectiveness with Pakistan. We have rolled up a portion of Pakistani Al Qaeda (KSM being the most senior commander captured), relying on Musharraf to continue the process (with an occasional incursion or two from our, ahem, equipment). We have made progress in the stabilization of Indonesia, working with the locals to seize their senior commander, Hambali). Of course, the most controversial decision (at least to the MSM), was our decision to go to Baghdad, knock out Saddam and rollup Zarqawi and his Al Qaeda branch.
Viewed in this light, of course, the cost of going to war in Iraq seems a humane and intelligent way to address Al Qaeda forcefully without imposing maximum risk and cost. It also has the residual impact of putting us squrely in the heart of the Middle East where we can address a host of other political, economic and military problems.
And, finally, it positions us as the friend of India, who we increasingly will want and need as an ally to Britain, Australia and the US in the war against Islamofascism and other forms of tyranny. Personally, I am quite happy India and Pakistan did not go to war. Had this blog existed at the time, I wonder what we might have written....
6 Comments:
By 
TigerHawk, at
Mon Mar 06, 01:12:00 PM:
I also wonder. Excellent post, CP.
By 
, at
Mon Mar 06, 03:05:00 PM:
I’m not sure I understand how the invasion of Iraq mitigated the risk of war between India and Pakistan. If it’s the flypaper theory, why wouldn’t a more concentrated effort in Afghanistan (along with the aforementioned carrot and stick approach with Pakistan) have been even more effective? It would have had the added advantage of going after the people who actually attacked us on 9/11. True, we wouldn’t have the “influence” in Iraq that we currently have, but that seems a dubious liability at best given how that particular enterprise is going.
By Chris, at
Mon Mar 06, 04:45:00 PM:
This is definitely a forgotten episode, one in which the United States walked a fine line indeed, as our relations with both countries subsequently have improved. Not too shabby, backing both horses, and averting a possible nuclear exchange to boot.
By Dawnfire82, at
Tue Mar 07, 04:57:00 PM:
"Viewed in this light, of course, the cost of going to war in Iraq seems a humane and intelligent way to address Al Qaeda forcefully without imposing maximum risk and cost."
The decision to invade Iraq had very little to do with Al Qaeda.
By , at
Wed Mar 08, 12:45:00 AM:
The averted 2002 war was not over Kashmir. It was as a result of the attack on Indian Parliament by Pakistan sponsored terrorists, and the subsequent refusal of Musharraf to handover the terrorists.
Read more here:
http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jan/02parl.htm
and here...
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/13parl1.htm
and here, Powell expects more action from Musharraf...
http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jan/05parl.htm
The attack itself came just a couple of years after terrorists hijacked an Indian airliner and took it first to Lahore, Pakistan and then to Kandhahar, Afghanistan. They demanded (and got) the release of 3 terrorists lodged in Indian jails. The said terrorists now head jihadi organizations in Pakistan and openly advocate anti-India ad anti-US hatred.
By Chris, at
Wed Mar 08, 09:59:00 AM:
No, the war in Iraq did not involve al Qaeda. Not all military operations are direct attacks. Jihadist organizations would feel compelled to meet the U.S. military, deployed for combat in the heart of the Umma. In order to maintain their credibility, they could not appear unwilling to fight for Arab land.
The Iraq war, however, is mostly being fought to deliver the message that state sponsors of terrorist groups, no matter who the groups or states are, run the risk of being toppled by the U.S. Iraq was the logistical choice between Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia for many reasons, which I am sure you can find in detail here at Tigerhawk. It was not enough to take down the Taliban. They were small fry in the world of state-sponsored terrorism.
The big target is, of course, Iran, which is now surrounded by nations sympathetic to the U.S. We have tens of thousands of combat-tested troops in the immediate vicinity. We have demonstrated our resolve. We can put much more indirect pressure on Iran than ever before, perhaps averting a full-scale war with them.
