Thursday, February 02, 2006
In re Saudi nuclear weapons
The SSI document, which at more than 300 pages is chock-full of interesting stuff, is a series of related articles by different scholars that consider the dangers of a nuclear Iran from various dimensions, including from its neighbors. Richard L. Russell's article "Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran" includes the following fairly disturbing passage:
Iranian nuclear weapons would add already substantial political-military incentive for Saudi Arabia to pursue its own nuclear weapons capabilities...
A Saudi nuclear weapons capability would work strategically to shore-up Saudi insecurities vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities, but also against potential hostile actions in the longer run from Israel, Iraq, and the United States. The Saudis have already taken several steps in this direction. In the 1980s, unknown to the United States, they secretly negotiated for and purchased intermediate range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. According to Anthony Cordesman, the Saudis purchased 50-60 CSS-2 missiles, 10-15 mobile launchers, and technical support from China. The missiles would be ideal for delivering nuclear weapons, but poorly suited for the delivery of conventional munitions because they are very inaccurate and too limited in numbers in the Saudi arsenal to be used in the massive missile barrages with the conventional weapons necessary o compensate for inaccuracies. The missiles, moreover, were sold from Chinese operational nuclear force inventories. Although Beijing and Riyadh claim that the missiles in Saudi Arabia are armed with conventional weapons, no American or international observers have been allowed by the Saudis to inspect and independently verify Chinese and Saudi claims.
I would be very surprised if the Saudis in fact had nuclear weapons, but this story reminds us that we do not want nuclear weapons even to exist on the Arabian peninsula. It is highly unlikely that the House of Saud, enjoying its limitless wealth, would experiment with nuclear brinksmanship. The House of Saud, though, will not always be in charge Riyadh, and we cannot be sure that its successor won't be an ambitious and expansionist whack job.
Why am I skeptical that the Saudis bought nukes from China in the 1980s? For at least three reasons.
First, I don't see how they could have kept it a secret that long. Yeah, I know, the Israelis have never acknowledged their weapons. But that's exactly my point -- nobody thinks the Israelis don't have them.
Second, if the Saudis had nukes in the 1980s, surely they would have let that fact be known when revolutionary Iran threatened to break through Iraq's lines and boil over into the Gulf. Nuclear weapons only deter if they are known to exist.
Third, even if the Saudis managed to get through the denouement of the Iran-Iraq war without hinting that they had nukes, surely they would have released at least rumors of atomic weapons in 1990 when Saddam threatened Kuwait, or at least after he had occupied it. Indeed, the Saudis were very worried about letting 500,000 American soldiers on to their soil, and nuclear weapons would have strengthened the hand of those insiders who were troubled by all those infidels in the cradle of Islam.*
I'm sure there are other even better reasons. Point is, the behavior of the Saudis in the last 20 years is powerful evidence that the they have not had nuclear weapons during that period. Unfortunately, these same arguments can be turned around: wouldn't the House of Saud, which does, after all, live in a dangerous neighborhood, have been much more secure if it had had nukes during that period? If Iran's mullahs get their hands on a "Shia bomb," how quickly will Saudi Arabia try to cut the obvious deal with a China that is increasingly reliant on imported oil?
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*Counterfactual speculation: Back in 1990, the Saudis rather famously polarized a young Osama bin Laden when they rejected his plan to import recently victorious fighters from Afghanistan for the purpose of defending the Kingdom and ejecting Saddam from Kuwait, and instead turned to the crusader Americans for help. It is not clear whether bin Laden was more offended that he had been rejected or that the infidels had been invited in, but the decision was nonetheless a momentous one from today's vantage point. If Saudi Arabia had a nuclear deterrent back then, that decision, at least, might have gone differently (although it is hard to believe that the Saudis would have wanted to let thousands of mujahideen in to their country even for the salutory purpose of whacking Saddam), and bin Laden's life might have unfolded in a very different direction.
3 Comments:
By Final Historian, at Wed Feb 01, 10:30:00 PM:
I remember reading somewhere an article mentioning the possibility of Saudi Arabia purchasing Pakistani bombs, or possibly allowing the Pakistanis to station nuclear weapons on their soil.
By Georg Felis, at Thu Feb 02, 12:47:00 PM:
There is another possibility here. This gives the Saudis an option, in the future event that they are threatened by another Gulf State (*cough* Iran *cough*), they can in a matter of days turn this fairly weak CSS-2 force into a powerful deterrent. One phone call to their oil client China, one planeload of warheads that just by coincidence fit perfectly into these missiles, and instant deterrence, with none of these pesky storage and security issues up until that point. The best of both worlds, they have deterrence without upsetting the egos of sensitive neighbors, or worrying that their bombs might be stolen. The realistic problem with this plan is that in the event of a Gulf Crisis, somehow I would suspect China would suddenly get cold feet about shipping nukes to *anywhere* where they would be used, particularly to an Arab state.
By Harrywr2, at Thu Feb 02, 02:49:00 PM:
The US has had a Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia since WWII.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/usmtm.htm
It would be a far stretch to believe that the Saudi's could have a weapons program "hidden" from US Military advisors.